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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores how transitional reforms and the concomitant recession have 
transformed the labour market in Kazakhstan and how changes in the labour 
market have transformed workers3 attitudes to labour supply. It is found that the 
initially expected reallocation o f labour from the state to the private sector has 
been a very weak phenomenon and that, instead, a sharp growth o f self- 
employment has occurred. During a period o f transition and recession, such as 
the one that Kazakhstan is experiencing, income seems to converge towards a 
subsistence minimum across working sectors altering the relationship between 
growth, wages and productivity. In such an environment, the supply o f labour is 
mainly determined by non-income factors and so is the cross-sector mobility. 
Unemployment exists not as a temporary phenomenon instrumental in labour 
reallocation but as a permanent condition for the very poor. Current labour 
market policies, originally designed for structurally different labour markets, 
seem inconsistent with the nature o f unemployment and unsustainable in the long 
run. The prolonged stagnation is dragging the economy towards a third world 
scenario rather than a first. Hence, future prospects and policies are to be re­
thought not in terms o f transition but in terms o f economic development.
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FORWARD
The idea to write a thesis on the labour market in Kazakhstan came to me during a 
joint UNESCO and ADB mission in Kazakhstan in which I accidentally 
participated in November and December 1995. The mission had the principal task 
of reviewing the educational sector in Kazakhstan and included a labour market 
study. From this study, it appeared that the registered unemployed were around 
2.5% of the labour force. This seemed incompatible with the output shock that the 
country had experienced and was still experiencing at the time. Labour force 
surveys were not yet available and the general understanding of the labour market 
was that state enterprises had retained most of the workers for various reasons and 
that most of those who exited these enterprises turned to informal activities.
During the mission and the following year, I lived on a street called ‘Seifulina’ in 
the now ex-capital city Almaty. The street was known for being the recruiting 
place of occasional labour, the place where the real unemployed stand on street 
comers waiting for the occasional employer. I remember leaving my flat in winter 
mornings (with temperatures varying from -15 degrees Celsius to -35) and seeing 
these men with their tool-kits waiting for a potential employer. I would find them 
again in the evenings, standing on the same comer chatting to their neighbours. 
These were real job seekers that for some reason did not register at employment 
offices.
With positive growth forecasts for 1996, the general understanding was that the 
worst was over and that the country was about to move slowly out of the 
recession. However, while the facade of the capital city continued to change, 
enterprises continued to experience major difficulties and, to this day, output 
remains as it was at the bottom of the recession in 1995. In the course of the 
writing of the thesis it became obvious that the country faced structural limits to 
change and that the transition to recovery was not going to happen simply pushing 
through the existing reforms. What I have tried to do in this work is to look at 
changes from the perspective of the workers. I have tried to understand the
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mechanics of the recession, the impact on the labour market and how labour 
responded to such shocks. I found this perspective useful to shed some light on 
apparent inconsistencies of changes in macro variables such as output, 
employment and unemployment.
During the research, I had multiple objectives in mind. The period considered is 
historically important, the country considered is one of the least studied, the topic 
covered is one that attracted little attention in mineral rich Kazakhstan and facts 
and figures generally available to the large public are very scarce. Therefore, I felt 
that a record of events, facts and figures was a first necessary contribution of this 
work. Second, I felt that the study of labour markets in transition had overlooked 
the major single phenomenon occurred in the CIS, i.e. the growth of self- 
employment. By bringing to the fore self-employment I took a fresh look at the 
reallocation of labour and labour supply. Third, I felt that the role of the private 
sector in driving the recovery had been overestimated. I tried to assess the real 
size and potential of the private sector by looking at the workers in the sector. 
Fourth, I felt that the approach to labour market policies has been inconsistent 
with the nature of unemployment in Kazakhstan. Therefore I tried to highlight 
such inconsistencies and discuss how to move beyond them. Last, I felt that the 
process of transition I had been witnessing was a convergence towards an 
economy of a developing type with a large section of the population engaged in 
informal and subsistence activities. In this sense, the ‘transition debate’ will, in 
my view, leave the ground to a ‘development debate’ and we need therefore to re­
equip ourselves with a different set of tools.
The thesis is structured in six chapters. The first chapter is a general introduction 
of the process of transition in the CEE and CIS countries, Chapter 2 sets up the 
framework of the analysis. Chapter 3 looks at reforms and the causes of the 
recession. Chapter 4 discusses direction and mechanics of the reallocation of 
labour and Chapter 5 tests some of the hypotheses developed in chapter 4. Chapter 
6 discusses labour market policies in the light of the findings and speculates on 
the future of labour.
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PART I-C E E  AND CIS
CHAPTER I 
TRANSITION, OUTPUT AND LABOUR IN CEE AND CIS ECONOMIES
This preliminary chapter is a brief introduction to some general aspects of the 
process of transition from a planned to a market economy occurring in Central 
and Eastern European countries (CEE), and the republics of the Former Soviet 
Union (FSU). I recall how the process started, what it entails, how it is measured, 
its general performance to date and the main debates emerging from the specific 
literature. The parallel experiences of CEE and CIS1 countries and labour market 
developments are the central arguments treated in this chapter. The purpose is to 
situate the work that follows in the wider context of transition.
1. Introduction
When Gorbachev initiated economic reforms towards a market economy in the 
Soviet Union, the leader was supported by the West as a courageous reformer and 
someone who the Western hemisphere could finally look at as an interlocutor for 
a large range of international issues. This new atmosphere of relaxation of 
traditional cold war tensions coupled with dynamic political changes in countries 
such as Poland prepared the ground for more audacious changes throughout the 
Socialist East culminating in the fall of the Berlin wall and the assimilation of 
East Germany into West Germany.
While until the fall of the Berlin wall changes were driven largely by long periods 
of negotiations and consideration of the political and economic implications of 
such changes, the images diffused around the globe of German reunification 
raised in the minds of millions unprecedented expectations for a better future of 
prosperity. Political leaders across the East did not fail to catch this new
1 Commonwealth of Independent States. This includes all FSU republics except the Baltic States 
(BS -  Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia)
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atmosphere and used it to support personal and regional interests buried for so 
long under the Soviet Union's political influence. Countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE), which had embarked on the reform process somewhat earlier than 
the Soviet Union, found it relatively easy to disconnect themselves from the 
political influence of the Soviet Empire already afflicted by internal instability. 
And by 1991, the same Soviet Union disintegrated into fifteen different and 
sovereign republics, the Newly Independent States (NIS). Twelve of these 
republics, all excluding the Baltic States (BS), founded the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS).
The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 was principally the fruit of an 
internal struggle. As Gorbachev was the head of the Soviet Union, the decision to 
break-up the union taken by Eltsin and sealed in Minsk in December 1991 
rendered Gorbachev powerless. The same decision paved the way for other 
republics to declare independence from the Union. For peripheral leaders, it 
became a matter of exploiting the weaknesses of the centre, the boiling 
expectations of the people and the drive to regain those national identities 
suppressed under Stalinism. This move was also welcomed by those young 
reformists within Russia who believed that market reforms in Russia could have 
been speeded up if the country could count on all its resources. As Russia was a 
net provider for the other Republics, the break-up would have liberated resources 
for Russian reforms. The economic and also long-term political implications of 
these changes were hardly considered during 1991 as these considerations were 
overruled by the logic of mass psychology, short-term political interests and 
internal power struggles.
Once political independence had been achieved and once the internal power 
struggles reached a consensus for a political leadership, economic issues exploded 
in the hands of the new political elites. The NIS had to build a new system of 
production, the new states had to be instituted, firms privatised, inter-industrial 
relations re-organised, the financial system re-invented, market forces introduced 
and laws and regulations able to control all the above changes designed. This was
14
an unprecedented change in history with no model to look at and no blueprint. 
The initial situation was known and the final target visualised in the form of a 
OECD-type of economy, but the know-how was missing.
These events occurred in a period when OECD countries were struggling with a 
minor but persistent economic crisis coupled with severe budget constraints and 
when the monetarist counter-revolution and neo-liberalism were dominating the 
economic and political agendas in many Western economies, partly as a result of 
the ‘Thatcherism’ and ‘Reaganomics’ ideological foundations. The state and its 
influence on economic activities were increasingly perceived in academic and 
political circles as a potential obstacle to growth. The early nineties saw an 
unprecedented swing towards monetarist beliefs. The focus was on stabilisation 
policies, principally addressed at controlling inflation and containing budget 
deficits, and on privatisation and liberalisation strategies, regarded as the ideal 
tools for increasing efficiency and reducing budget deficits. Even in Europe, 
where radical monetarist tendencies were still confronted by historical traditions 
of welfare policies, the Maastricht criteria and privatisation trends developed very 
much in line with the neo-liberal logic.
In a period of great changes for the post-communist economies, when the loss of 
ideology left a vacuum to be filled, the predominant OECD ideological trend 
became quickly the dominant ideology. Both for those who were in search of a 
new ideological identity and for those who were keen at testing a radical approach 
in a historically unique laboratory, liberalisation, privatisation and monetary 
austerity seemed the recipe for stability and prosperity. By then, the search of a 
'third way' as a possible alternative to both Capitalism and Socialism had been 
abandoned.
There is a general consensus around the fact that socialist economies had to be 
reformed. A close analysis of the last thirty years of the Soviet Union shows 
negative trends that would have eventually driven the system to a halt. Easterly 
and Fischer (1994) carried out an extensive comparative study of Soviet growth
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between 1928 and 1987. They find that growth rates, independently from the data 
source considered, have been declining persistently at least starting from 1950. 
The last period considered, 1980-1987 shows growth rates estimates between 0.2 
and 3.4% per year. World growth decelerated during the 1970s and 1980s and 
crude data show that the Soviet Union performed slightly better than world 
average. However, when controlling for factors' input, the same authors conclude 
tha t '(...) the Soviet economic performance conditional on investment and human 
capital accumulation was the worst in the world over 1960-1989' (p. 6).
The dispute around the alternative views of embracing western capitalism or 
searching for a 'third way' lost much of its vigour when in the early nineties, by 
popular demand, socialist economies rushed to the market. Ten years into the 
transition process a substantial dispute around the 'how' the transition should be or 
should have been conducted remains as the social cost determined by the process 
soared to dramatic proportions.
2. Some definitions
The main concern of the Socialist political apparatus was how to implement 
reforms avoiding the painful step of rejecting Socialism and the leadership of the 
central party. This dilemma remained unresolved in the Soviet Union, and when 
drastic reforms were first introduced by Gorbachev they in fact led to political 
instability and eventually to the collapse of the mono-party system. Between the 
two extremes of a full-fledged democracy and a mono-party state, transition is 
taking place across a wide range of political frameworks. Despite the fact that 
most of the political structures across the post-socialist East perform under the 
name of democracies, political consensus is often not achieved by means of 
democratic norms. Several countries of the Former Soviet Union moved from a 
mono-party system to a one-man state regardless of the democratic institutions 
established. Political consensus is often achieved through non-democratic norms. 
Other countries such as China and Vietnam have been successful in managing 
market reforms with a mono-party state. The political and economic faces of
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transition may not, in fact, be as correlated as the association between these two 
variables in OECD countries would suggest. A full-fledged democracy seems to 
be neither a precondition nor a consequence of economic transition, at least in the 
short-run.
With economic transition taking place under a wide range of political frameworks, 
it remains problematic to define the term transition in political terms. On the 
contrary, the economic profile of transition seems to reproduce itself with a 
similar pattern in all those former socialist countries that initiated structural 
changes after 1989. A number of standard reforms, such as price and trade 
liberalisation, privatisation of assets, establishment of independent financial 
institutions and stabilisation measures, are the most evident transformational 
characteristics that these economies share. Thus, the term 'transition' itself may be 
defined as a standard package of economic reforms necessary to move from a 
socialist to a capitalist and market based system of production. And transitional 
economies may be defined as those economies which, in one form or another, are 
adopting this package.2 The standard package of economic reforms which defines 
the term 'transition' can be condensed into the areas of intervention outlined 
below.
Price liberalisation: The government decides to let prices on goods and services 
float. Economic agents suddenly find themselves in a position to establish prices. 
It can be implemented in a gradual manner, by liberalising prices in successive 
stages and by imposing 'ceilings' to price increases progressively lifted, or by 
liberalising prices of different commodities in a sequential manner. Or, 
alternatively, it can be done all at once across the board. Price liberalisation is not 
a cause in itself of inflation but it can release over-hanging inflation especially in 
situations of severe shortages.
2 Here we are not suggesting that political changes are not important factors for transition. On the 
contrary we will see that political reforms are at the origin of systemic changes in Kazakhstan. 
What we argue is that it is difficult to define transition as a common pattern of political reforms 
followed by all socialist reformers. Also, the definition offered suits CEE and NIS economies 
better than those economies that initiated reforms earlier such as China or Vietnam.
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Trade and exchange rates liberalisation: It is the removal of quantitative and/or 
qualitative restrictions on imports and exports and the free floating of the currency 
on the international market. Again it can be applied in a gradual or instant manner. 
Its pros and cons are widely debated in the trade literature.
Establishment o f property rights: This is a legal process that establishes the right 
to engage freely in economic activity by defining entitlements. It is a precondition 
for privatisation and creates a fundamental set of rules necessary to regulate 
market exchanges.
Privatisation'. It is the process of transferring property rights from the State to the 
private sector. There was no blueprint on how to do it starting from a nearly 
exclusive state economy. A number of similar procedures have been implemented 
which usually include the allocation of shares to the entire population, the re­
collection of these shares by investment funds and the sale of state properties to 
individuals and investment funds in the course of auctions.
Establishment o f market financial institutions'. In command economies financial 
institutions had the prevalent role of transferring funds between operators for 
accounting purposes. In market economies they have to guarantee a correct 
allocation of resources according to financial criteria. These types of institutions 
had to be created in order to channel the savings generated by the new private and 
public sectors into proper investments.
Macroeconomic stabilisation : This is a necessary consequence of the shocks 
generated by the measures above. Price and trade liberalisation often spark 
uncontrolled inflation, privatisation generates winners and losers, the financial 
institutions established in the early stage of transition turned out to be very weak 
and unreliable reducing savers' confidence and investors' abilities. Monetary 
restrictions and inflation control, budget cuts and reallocations, the establishment 
of a sound fiscal system and restrictive monetary and fiscal policies define 
'stabilisation' and characterised the immediate post-liberalisation environment.
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Other legal reforms : This refers to the introduction of all those laws, rules and 
regulation which regulate the relations between operators in a market economy. 
These should guarantee a sufficiently risk-free environment to establish 
confidence in the system, encourage transactions and investments.
Having defined the term transition in economic terms, we should be able to 
measure the state of the process. How far transitional economies moved away 
from a command system and how close are they coming to an OECD-like market 
system. Indeed, there is no one market system, and even considering the share of 
the private sector in the economy among different OECD countries it is difficult 
to say what is the standard model of a market economy. How do we measure 
transition ?
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) dealt 
extensively with this issue elaborating a measure of transition based on several 
criteria such as the private sector share, degree of privatisation and enterprise 
restructuring, prices and trade liberalisation, competition policies and financial 
sector reforms.3 De Melo et al. (1996) constructed a liberalisation index that takes 
into account reforms in three major areas, internal and external markets and 
property rights. They calculated the index for 26 countries and classified them in 
four categories according to the index achieved. As the EBRD classification is 
reproduced on a regular basis, I will adopt its criteria as a measure of transition 
whenever it will be necessary to compare economies in relation to their specific 
advancement with reforms.
The 26 economies considered by the EBRD (CEE, BS and CIS) are those we will 
refer to in this study. The focus is on the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) and Kazakhstan will be the case study analysed in Part II.
3 See EBRD (1995)
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3. The state of transition
Transitional economies have experienced in the 1990s a sharp decline in output. 
Table 1.1 reports GDP figures between 1989 and 1997 (1989 = 100) for 24 CEE 
and NIS economies. All economies experienced a rapid decline until 1992. After 
1992, the CEE economies managed to stop and reverse the negative trend while 
output decline in the CIS continued well into 1996.
Table 1.1 -  GDP in CEE, BS and CIS (1989-1997)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997*
CEE, BS, CIS 100 95.1 87.8 78.7 74.5 69.6 69.0 68.3 69.4
CEE and BS 100 93.2 83.3 79.8 80.1 83.1 87.5 91.1 93.9
Albania 100 90.0 65.1 60.4 66.2 72.4 78.8 85.3 72.5
Bulgaria 100 90.9 80.3 74.4 72.6 73.9 75.5 67.3 62.5
Croatia 100 93.1 74.7 66.4 65.8 66.2 67.3 70.1 73.6
Czech Republic 100 98.8 87.4 84.6 85.1 87.4 92.5 96.3 97.3
Estonia 100 91.9 84.6 72.6 66.4 65.3 68.1 70.8 75.7
Hungary 100 96.5 85.0 82.4 81.9 84.3 85.5 86.4 89.0
Latvia 100 102.9 92.2 60.0 51.1 51.4 51.0 52.4 54.2
Lithuania 100 95.0 82.3 51.3 38.9 39.2 40.4 41.9 43.8
Poland 100 88.4 82.2 84.3 87.6 92.1 98.6 104.5 110.2
Romania 100 94.4 82.2 75.1 76.2 79.2 84.8 88.3 86.9
Slovak Republik 100 97.5 83.3 77.9 75.0 78.6 84.0 89.8 93.8
Slovenia 100 95.3 86.8 82.0 84.3 88.8 92.5 95.3 99.1
CIS 100 96.3 90.7 77.7 70.5 61.0 58.0 55.3 55.8
Armenia 100 92.6 76.8 36.4 31.0 32.7 34.9 37.0 39.1
Azerbaijan 100 88.3 87.7 67.9 52.2 42.7 38.0 38.5 40.5
Belarus 100 97.0 95.8 86.6 80.1 70.0 62.7 64.3 66.2
Georgia 100 87.6 75.5 41.7 31.1 27.6 28.2 31.2 34.4
Kazakhstan 100 99.6 86.7 84.1 75.4 62.0 56.5 57.1 58.2
Kyrgiz Republic 100 103.0 97.9 79.3 66.6 53.3 54.0 57.0 60.4
Moldova 100 97.6 80.5 57.2 56.6 38.9 37.8 34.7 34.1
Russia 100 96.0 91.2 78.0 71.2 62.2 59.7 56.7 57.3
Tajikistan 100 98.4 91.4 64.9 57.7 45.3 39.6 36.9 35.8
Turkmenistan 100 102.0 97.2 92.1 82.8 67.1 61.6 59.8 50.8
Ukraine 100 96.6 85.4 73.7 63.2 48.7 42.9 38.6 37.4
Uzbekistan 100 101.6 101.1 89.9 87.8 84.1 83.4 84.7 85.5
Source: EBRD (1997), IBRD (1997b), IMF (1997), CIS-Stat (1998), calculated from 
GDP annual percentage changes. (*) 1997 data are still subject to revisions.
The size of the output decline has been object of dispute in the transitional 
literature. It is argued by some that the output fall has been largely overestimated 
for a number of factors which go from statistical errors (Berg and Sachs, 1991, 
1992) to measurement discrepancies between old and new systems of
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classification (Jackman 1995). Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) have argued that 
GDP declined less than what estimated in national accounts. This would be shown 
by data on energy consumption, which declined significantly less than GDP 
estimates. Thus, there has been a general disbelief about such unprecedented 
recession.
Partly as a consequence of this lack of trust in administrative data and partly as a 
need to investigate an unprecedented convergence of factors, a long series of 
articles around the causes of the output decline in transitional economies have 
been published (Aghevli etAl. 1992, Commander and Coricelli 1992, Borensztein 
and Ostry 1992, Rosati 1994, Gomulka 1996b). Causes of the output decline 
discussed in the literature traced structural and institutional factors, supply and 
demand shocks, stabilisation measures, reforms and disorganisation. In substance, 
the debate is around the 'weight' to be attributed to each individual factor in 
explaining the output decline and the mechanism that links each factor to output. 
The reliability of data and the causes of the output decline in Kazakhstan will be 
discussed in Chapter 3.
Macroeconomic indicators on the whole showed unprecedented negative swings. 
Inflation skyrocketed in the first few years of transition. According to the EBRD 
(1996), the average rate for the 25 countries considered (annual percentage 
change) was 160% in 1991, 1047% in 1992, 2291% in 1993, 675% in 1994 and 
152% in 1995. Unemployment, which in 1989 was still close to zero, reached by 
1996 values ranging from 3% to 15% of the labour force. In the aftermath of the 
Comecon disintegration, trade collapsed and internal and external debts have been 
growing since. The rates of savings and investments declined together with the 
contraction of internal demand.
The social consequences of this great depression are reflected in a major 
population crisis, increase in poverty and income inequality. The population crisis 
has been characterised by falling birth rates, soaring death rates and large 
migration flows. Life expectancy at birth decreased in most countries. The share
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of the population living below the poverty line increased and income inequality as 
measured by the Gini coefficient increased in most countries. Health and 
education provision and standards declined sharply. Considering the UNDP 
Human Development Index (HDI), between 1990 and 1995, all CEE and NIS 
countries lost positions in the overall ranking with the sole exception of Romania. 
Poland, which lost less than any other transitional economy, lost four positions 
while Georgia, which lost the most, fell by fifty-nine positions in the scale. The 
average HDI value fell from 0.854 to 0.804 (-6%) for CEE countries and from 
0.779 to 0.665 (-15%) for CIS countries (UNDP 1992 and 1998). Considering that 
in 1995 the average value for industrialised countries was 0.911 and that for 
developing countries was 0.586, transitional economies and CIS countries in 
particular have been converging towards developing nations standards. An 
apparent transition from second to third world standards rather than from second 
to first world.
Yet, to the traveller's eye the post-socialist scenario offered by Eastern capitals is 
made of dynamic changes, emerging opportunities and the liberation of an energy 
potential manifested in free press, the development of alternative forms of art, 
music and culture in its wider sense. In Moscow, Almaty, Tallin, Warsaw or 
Budapest today one can find a large diversity of shops and products which would 
have not been imaginable just few years ago. Wealth and its different expressions 
parade in eastern capitals as it is rare to see anywhere else on the planet. For those 
who visited the same capitals ten or fifteen years ago changes occurred are 
remarkable. On the other hand, moving out of the capitals and into the provinces 
and rural areas scenes of extreme poverty are recurrent and the contrast is striking. 
Because of such contrasts, observers tend to polarise around extremes, being 
either too optimistic or too pessimistic about the future of these countries. For one 
thing, the transition process is far from being an homogenous process and features 
change widely when we start to discriminate between countries and regions.
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4. Two patterns of transition
One visible aspect of the process of transition is how CEE and CIS countries 
differed in their performances. GDP fall has been less deep and less protracted in 
CEE countries than in the CIS and most of European transitional economies are 
now back on a growth path. The shape of the trend shown by CEE countries has 
been described as a U-shape form of transition (Blanchard 1997). On the other 
hand, CIS economies have experienced a deeper recession and found more 
difficult to re-establish growth. Only in 1997, the average growth rate for CIS 
economies became positive. Thus the form of transition manifested by CIS 
countries to date would be better described as an L-shaped form, where the deep 
and protracted recession is being followed by stagnation or very slow growth. 
This is shown in Chart 1.1 where the U and L shapes are quite evident.
Chart 1.1 - GDP in CEE, BS and CIS (1989=100)
.C E E  and B S  
■ CIS
Source : Table 1.1; (*) Provisional estimates
Generally speaking, CIS economies have been slow reformers if compared to 
CEE neighbours. The EBRD evaluates the progress of reforms by giving a score 
from one to four to each category of reform and each country. One for the slow 
reformers, four for the fast ones. From this ranking a score can be calculated 
averaging CEE and CIS countries (Table 1.2). This shows that, as a whole, CIS 
economies have lagged behind the CEEs on this front.
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\Table 1.2 - Reforms Index (1990-1996)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
CEE and BS 3.27 3.98 2.67 3.02 4.08 2.48 2.94 2.52 3.12
CIS 2.54 3.04 1.81 2.88 2.92 1.77 1.88 1.67 2.31
Source : Calculated from EBRD (1997)
Legenda: 1. Large-scale privat.; 2. Small-scale privat; 3. Governance and restructuring ; 4.Price 
liberalisat.; 5. Trade and Foreign exchange system ; 6 Competition policy ; 7. Banking reform and 
interest rate liberalisation ; 8. Securities markets and financial institutions ; 9 Average
These particular trends have induced some scholars to argue that a negative 
relationship between the pace of reforms and output exists. Where reforms have 
been implemented faster the output decline has been smaller. As a consequence of 
this line of thought, CIS countries would recover faster if only reforms would be 
speeded up.
The speed of reforms has been a very controversial issue particularly in the early 
stage of reforms. Many argued that a 'big-bang1 or 'shock-therapy' approach to 
reforms minimises the costs in social and economic terms (Blanchard 1991, 
Aghion and Blanchard 1993, Borensztein and Ostry 1994). With fast 
liberalisation, markets are soon normalised and can behave according to price 
signals. These induce operators to behave rationally, maximising resource 
allocation and stimulating accumulation and eventually growth. The case of 
Poland, usually taken as an example of successful shock therapy, is pointed at by 
the supporters of this idea. On the other front, supporters of the gradualist path 
argue that the speed of reforms is the cause of great sufferings which could have 
been mitigated if the reforms were taken at successive steps in a co-ordinated 
fashion (Nuti 1992b). This approach would leave space for experimenting reforms 
either by initially confining them to certain areas or by introducing them 
gradually. Supporters of this standpoint usually point at China indicating this 
country as a successful gradualist reformer.
Among others, the World Bank in its 1996 World Development Report suggested 
that the pace and advancement of transitional reforms is positively correlated with 
growth. This would be shown by a Chart presented on page 30 of the report where 
a liberalisation index is plotted against cumulative output decline. At a closer
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look, if we split the chart into two halves, on the left hand-side (the negative 
slope) we find exclusively CIS economies while on the right-hand side (the 
positive slope) we find the other transitional economies. The report fails to notice 
this aspect. Taking data from table 1.1 in this chapter and the EBRD reform index 
of table 1.2, we find a similar dichotomy. While the positive relationship between 
growth and liberalisation seems to hold when we look at the 24 transitional 
economies as a whole (Chart 1.2.A), at a closer look, the correlation is much 
weakened when we discriminate between CEE/BS and CIS countries. CEE 
countries with the highest reform indexes such as Poland and the Czech republic 
suffered a less acute recession as opposed to slower reformers such as Bulgaria 
(Chart 1.2.B). But for the CIS countries, the same relationship does not hold. If 
anything, the relationship between reforms and growth is negative (Chart 1.2.C).
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Chart 1.2 - GDP and Reforms
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Others have argued instead that CIS countries are simply late comers and if 
performances are adjusted to the time of the introduction of reforms, CEE and CIS 
countries would show a very similar pattern indeed. Fischer, Sahay and Vegh 
(1998) argued that when performances of different transitional countries have 
been adjusted for the initial year of stabilisation reforms, the CEE and CIS 
patterns do not differ a great deal. In their own charts and words the authors 
recognise that CIS countries show a deeper recession than the CEEs but conclude 
that CIS economies are simply in an earlier stage of reforms. The authors use data 
until 1995 and up until that time a similar conclusion would have been plausible. 
However, repeating the exercise including 1996 and 1997 figures it shows that 
output in CIS economies stagnated over the period while reforms advanced. 
Today most scholars would agree that CIS economies seem to have entered into a 
stagnant period.
There is an additional element that casts doubts on the allegedly positive 
relationship between output and liberalisation in the CIS countries. If the success 
of stabilisation reforms can be measured by the capacity to succeed in curbing 
inflation and bringing general government balances to sustainable levels (two 
indicators not included in the EBRD reform index), then CIS countries as a whole 
outperformed CEE countries, considering the deeper recession they have been 
subject to. This is shown by Charts 1.3 and 1.4. Despite the highest inflation 
experienced by CIS countries in the early years, these economies managed, on 
average, to curb inflation below CEE average (EBRD 1997). Even when looking 
at general government balances (as % of GDP), CIS countries have been able to 
close the gap with CEE economies by 1996 despite the worse situation they came 
from.
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Chart 1.3 - Inflation (annual changes)
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Chart 1.4 - General Government Balances (% of GDP)
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Source : EBRD (1997)
28
It is widely accepted that monetary restrictions, particularly those addressed at 
limiting the monetary base, have been the key factor for the successful drastic 
reduction of inflation occurred in all transitional economies. However, 
expectations for growth have been quite disappointed by the poor performance, 
and a number of schools are now pointing the finger against the excessive 
restrictive spiral that these policies entail. With low internal saving rates, limited 
foreign direct investments, growing external debt and budget restrictions there is 
little space for manoeuvre that could generate productive investments. It is argued 
that a somewhat looser monetary policy could be tolerated if it provides the space 
for higher productive public spending, higher wages and generation of internal 
savings.4
Equally under dispute is the choice of the mechanism to adopt for a successful 
stabilisation. The IMF approach usually described as Orthodox Monetary Based 
Stabilisation (OMBS), where the size of the money stock is the main target and 
monetary and fiscal policies drive stabilisation, is challenged by the Heterodox 
Exchange Rate Based Stabilisation (HERBS) where the exchange rate is used as 
nominal anchor and income policies are addressed at containing inflation together 
with monetary policies.5
Related to the speed of reforms, the debate on the timing and sequencing of 
reforms has occasionally emerged particularly among policy makers and in 
relation to certain countries. If reforms cannot be introduced all at once across the 
board what should be done first and what later? Should the initial macroeconomic 
environment be considered and reforms adapted or should reforms such as price 
liberalisation be introduced at once regardless of the initial conditions?
4 European schools are usually at the forefront of this stand. The Vienna Institute of Comparative 
Studies published several papers and books in support of a more Keynesian approach. The UN 
Economic Commission for Europe sustains less restrictive approaches to monetary policies and 
European Union projects working on economic trends throughout the Former Soviet Union also 
claim the necessity to loose inflation targets.
5 See Bofinger (1996) for a comprehensive discussion on OMBS and HERBS
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It is useful to distinguish between timing and sequencing of reforms. We could 
interpret timing as having three connotations. One is the timing which refers to the 
relation between the moment a reform is launched and the macroeconomic 
environment present at that particular moment. The second connotation is the 
length of time necessary for a reform to have its effect and the third is the time 
period affected by the reform. A reform can have positive or negative effects 
according to when it is introduced. The sequencing refers to the relation between 
different reforms. Therefore it is the order of reforms which is stressed when 
analysing sequencing. Discussions around these two aspects do not have a clear 
cut two visions approach as it was the case before. Opinions are much more 
spread and reach the state of dispute when reference is made to a specific country 
and time.6 This is a critical area that will be explored in chapter 3.
Thus, CIS economies seem to have been fairly successful in stabilisation policies 
(Charts 1.3 and 1.4) and price liberalisation (Table 1.2) on the whole, remaining 
slow on other aspects of reforms. The CIS recession has been deeper and more 
protracted than the one experienced in the CEE countries and the positive 
relationship between growth and reforms does not seem to hold. Today CIS 
countries seem to find more difficult to re-establish growth irrespective of the 
state of transitional reforms, leaving unresolved some of the important debates 
that have emerged around the transition experience.
5. Two patterns of labour dynamics
The transitional 'dualism' evident in macroeconomic trends persists when we shift 
the attention to labour market developments. The process output-employment- 
unemployment took very different shapes depending whether we are looking at 
CEE or CIS countries. Some important differences are outlined below.
CIS countries experienced a 'gap' between the reduction in output and the 
reduction in employment which is not visible in CEE economies. Table 1.3.
6 The literature on Poland and the Czech Republic after 1989 is particularly rich on the timing and
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shows that this gap is on average more than (-) 36 percentage points as opposed to 
an average for CEE countries which is slightly positive. The CIS trend can be 
explained in terms of labour hoarding and underemployment facilitated by soft- 
budget constraints, sharp reduction in real wages and the recurrence to measures 
such as unpaid leave, salaries paid in kind and wage arrears. Countries such as 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan managed to increase employment despite the output 
fall. Opposite is the situation for the CEE countries. All CEE countries except 
Croatia, Romania and the Slovak Republic reduced employment at a faster pace 
than output. The CEE countries which have performed better such as Poland, 
Slovenia, Hungary and the Czech Republic have shed labour at a rate superior to 
the output loss, thus maintaining or increasing output per worker. If we measure 
productivity as a simple output/employment ratio, than it is obvious that in CIS 
economies overall productivity declined as opposed to CEE economies with some 
exceptions7.
Table 1.3. - Output and Employment decline, CIS, CEE, BS
1991-1996 Output Empl. 'O-E Gap' 1989-1995 Output Empl. 'O-E Gap'
CIS -44.9 -8.6 -36.3 CEE -14.9 -16.0 1.1
Armenia -51.9 -14.1 -37.7 Bulgaria -24.5 -30.4 5.9
Azerbaijan -56.1 -5.0 -51.1 Croatia -32.7 -12.2 -20.5
Belarus -32.9 -13.1 -19.8 Czech Republic -7.5 -9.4 1.9
Georgia -58.7 -15.2 -43.5 Hungary -14.5 -27.3 12.8
Kazakhstan -34.1 -15.5 -18.6 Poland -1.4 -14.4 13.0
Kyrgiz Republic -41.8 -1.8 -39.9 Romania -15.2 1.9 -17.1
Moldova -56.8 -19.8 -37.0 Slovak Republic -16.0 -15 -1.0
Russia -37.8 -8.4 -29.4 Slovenia -7.5 -20.8 13.3
Tajikistan -59.7 -12.1 -47.5 BS -46.9 -12.4 -34.5
Turkmenistan -38.5 6.1 -44.7 Estonia -31.9 -11.1 -20.8
Ukraine -54.8 -7.1 -47.7 Latvia -49.0 -15.5 -33.5
Uzbekistan -16.2 2.9 -19.1 Lithuania(*) -59.6 -10.6 -49.0
Source: CIS-Stat (1998), EBRD (1997), Allison and Ringold (1996); (*) 1992-1996
Registered unemployment rates are much lower in CIS than in CEE countries 
(Table 1.4). The difference can be explained as a combination of three factors. 
The first is what has been explained above. CIS enterprises have tended to retain
sequencing. See also McKinnon (1991)
7 Contrary to the other statistics presented, the Baltic States seem to follow a CIS path. The Baltic 
States show in fact a pattern on their own in many respects. For simplicity, in other tables I 
aggregated the BS with the CEE given that this group contains only three countries.
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labour for the various reasons illustrated. The second is that a large portion of the 
unemployed simply do not register in CIS countries. Emerging survey data for the 
CIS show that real unemployment rates are two to four times registered figures 
(table 1.5). Factors explaining this attitude include distance from Employment 
Services (ES) and transport costs, disillusionment with ES capacity to find work, 
poor ES provision and low level of unemployment benefits. The third factor is the 
large flow of workers out of employment and into economic inactivity. Early 
retirement, women turning to housework and the 'discouraged unemployed' effect 
have been larger phenomena in CIS economies than in CEE. Also, in some CIS 
countries, emigration has been an important exit channel from the labour force.
Table 1.4. - Registered unemployment (% of the labour force, end of the 
year)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
CEE and BS 0.8 1.4 5.4 8.0 10.1 9.5 9.5 9.2
Bulgaria 0 1.5 6.7 13.9 16.7 12.4 11.1 12.5
Czech Republic 0 0.8 4.1 2.6 3.5 3.2 2.9 3.5
Estonia 0 0.1 1.7 5 2.2 5 5.2
Hungary 0.5 1 4.1 10.7 12.9 10.4 10.4 10.5
Latvia 0 2.1 5.8 6.3 6.5 7.1 7.1
Lithuania 0 0.3 3.9 3.4 4.4 7.3 6.2 5.4
Poland 0.3 3.4 8.7 12.7 14.8 16 14.9 13.6
Romania 3 8.4 10.2 11 8.9 6.1 6.8
Slovak Republic 0.6 11.8 10.4 14.4 14.6 13.1 12.8 12.8
Slovenia 3.2 5.3 9.5 13.8 14.4 14.5 14.5 14 14.1
CIS 0.05 0.7 1.3 1.6 2.5 3.1 3.2
Armenia 3.4 6.2 5.8 8.2 10 10.6
Azerbaijan 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.8 1 1.1 1.3
Belarus 0.04 0.5 1.4 2.1 2.9 4 3.1
Georgia 1.4 2.4
Kazakhstan 0.05 0.4 0.6 1.1 2.1 4.2 3.9
Kyrgiz Republic 0.01 0.1 0.2 0.8 3 4.5 3.2
Moldova 0.005 0.7 0.8 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.6
Russia 0.08 0.8 1.1 2.2 3.2 3.4 2.9
Tajikistan 0.4 1.1 1.7 2 2.6 3.1
Ukraine 0.03 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 1.5 2.4
Uzbekistan 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4
Sources: Porket, J (1995), ILO (1995), Jackman (1995a), Nesporova (1998), Godfrey (1995), CIS- 
Stat (1998), IMF (1998), Godfrey and Richards (1997b)
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Table 1.5 - Unemployment from Surveys (% of the labour force, selected 
countries)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
CEE and BS
Bulgaria 21.4 20 13.5
Czech Republic 3.9 3.7 3.5 3.9
Hungary 9.1 11.2 10.1 9.4 10
Lithuania 14.2
Poland 12.9 13.8 14 11.6
Romania 8.2 8.2 8 5.8
Slovak Republik 7.8 12.7 12.4 13.4 10.7
Slovenia 9.4 7.3
CIS
Kazakhstan 11.1
Kyrgistan 1,7 4,1 5,7 7,8
Russia 4.9 5.5 7.5 8.2 9.3
Ukraine 5.6 7.6
Sources: Porket, J (1995), ILO (1994); Allison and Ringold (1996), (1) 1996 KLSMS, Bank of 
Finland (1998), Republic of Ukraine (1998)
In spite of the much lower registered unemployment rate, CIS economies reached 
already in 1994 an unemployed/vacancy (U/V) ratio comparable to the average 
CEE level. Differences in this respect between countries are substantial but it is 
evident that CIS economies have been 'catching up' fairly quickly with the CEEs. 
In 1992 the average ratio for CEE countries was 34.6 unemployed per vacancy 
against a ratio of 11.7 in CIS countries. By 1994, the same average ratio was 36.5 
in CIS countries while in CEE remained around 35 .
Thus, the output shock in CIS economies has been transmitted only in part on 
employment and among those who exited employment only a small part refer to 
employment services. This suggests that employment has changed its nature and 
that a large number of job-seekers are not monitored by the authorities and may 
not be visible in government statistics. What is behind these macro trends and 
how did these changes affected the reallocation of labour?
8 Calculated from Boeri (1996) and CIS-Stat (1998)
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6. Explaining labour market changes
In the Socialist system, work was both a duty and a right for the Socialist citizen. 
The Soviet concept of nezaniatye (not employed) was used to define those who 
for some justified reason were not employed. In the Soviet Union and in CEE 
countries, the general understanding was that the economies faced labour 
shortages rather than excess of labour (Nuti 1996). At the same time, labour 
within enterprises has often been described as little productive and labour 
hoarding was a recurrent practice. Thus, as Komai (1992) pointed out, labour 
shortages in the market and labour surpluses in enterprises co-existed in a socialist 
system. Labour was at times scarce, poorly allocated or little productive. This 
phenomenon was structural in that it was determined by the nature of the planned 
system. Production targets were set at the central level and fluctuations in these 
targets encouraged managers to hoard labour to be able to face sudden changes. 
Labour size also provided the status and prestige of the enterprise and managers 
competed for workers.
During the first phase of transition it was understood that the process of change 
would have affected both employment and unemployment. Blanchard (1997) 
argued that the process of privatisation was going to drive the reallocation of 
labour in a three stages process. In the first phase, the state sector reduces 
employment with immediate increase in unemployment. This is followed by the 
growth of the private sector and absorption of workers from the unemployment 
pool. In the final stage the growth of the private sector takes over state employees 
straight out of state employment. A similar model was proposed by Chada, 
Coricelli and Krajnyak (1993) who saw a two stages process with an initial 
reallocation of resources from the state to the private sector accompanied by a 
sharp increase in unemployment. This should have been followed by a phase 
where the reached level of unemployment and human capital determined a reprisal 
of growth and a decline in unemployment.
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The basic mechanisms described by early models have been useful as initial tools 
of analysis of a radically new process of change but the underlying logic 
supporting the models has not found strong support in the experiences of 
transitional economies to date. Labour flows did not follow the expected path 
state employment-unemployment-private employment. In CEE countries, 
employment declined in line with output but the dynamics of the reallocation of 
labour from the state to the private sector seems rather different from the one 
predicted by the models. The unemployment pool tend to be stagnant with a low 
inflow and an even lower outflow rate (Boeri 1994). Unemployment grows 
rapidly but the turnover is low with a clear tendency to long term unemployment. 
The reduction in employment partly turned into 'exit' from the labour force rather 
than into unemployment (Koltay 1995). Labour Force Participation Rates (LFPR) 
have been declining almost everywhere and the reallocation of labour when it 
occurs is often a direct migration from the state to the private sector with no stops 
in the unemployment pool. The number of 'exhaustees' (those who are no longer 
entitled to benefits) has been increasing in most countries and the 'discouraged 
unemployment' effect contributed to the decline in labour force participation.
These peculiar trends of the labour market have been observed also in CIS 
economies where labour market studies have been carried out. For instance the 
Russian labour market has shown very similar characteristics to those described 
for CEE economies (Layard and Richter 1995) though the intensity of the 
phenomena seems to be larger and more worrying (Standing 1997). With time, it 
was expected that labour markets would have normalised towards OECD-like 
type but until recently these same trends have shown to be persistent (Boeri, 
Burda and Kollo 1998).
It is also uncertain the relation between the processes of privatisation and 
restructuring and unemployment depicted by early models. According to Boeri 
(1994) there is no direct relation between the process of privatisation and the rate 
of unemployment as shown by the contrasting experiences of the Czech republic 
and Romania, and according to Jackman (1995) and Jackman and Pauna (1997)
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there is no evidence of a relation between the process of restructuring and the rate 
of unemployment. For these authors unemployment is not a necessary element of 
an efficient process of restructuring and reallocation of resources.
Two further assumptions on transition derived from orthodox economic theory 
and popular during the early years of reforms were that - following privatisation, 
price liberalisation and macroeconomic stabilisation - labour would have moved 
from declining and non profitable sectors to growing and profitable sectors and 
that a spontaneous private sector growth would have occurred absorbing with time 
redundant state workers.
A certain reallocation of labour certainly occurred across economic sectors. For 
instance, services and in particular financial services, banking and insurance 
increased in terms of employment virtually everywhere while heavy industry and 
construction contracted in most countries. The share of employment in different 
economic sectors changed remarkably in virtually all economies considered. 
Nonetheless, it is somehow misleading to interpret such changes as a testimony of 
labour reallocation across sectors. In some CEE economies and in most CIS 
economies this apparent reallocation reflects an asymmetric shock in different 
sectors rather than a real movement of workers between sectors. The sectors' 
shares of employment changed significantly while it remain uncertain how many 
workers really changed job moving from one sector to another.
The private sector growth was initially idealised in two forms. On the one hand, 
privatised enterprises facing a hard budget constraint would have prospered or 
died. On the other hand, a New Private Sector (NPS), i.e. the birth of a new class 
of entrepreneurs, was going to progressively become the growth engine of these 
economies. Privatised enterprises have generally shown poor performances, but 
where NPS enterprises have emerged it has been shown that they outperform both 
privatised and state enterprises (Richter and Schaffer 1996). While this is good 
news, it is not clear how large this new sector really is. Most newly registered 
businesses seem to be the fruit either of privatisation or of internal subcontracting.
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For instance, large former state distribution networks have been split among 
individual retailers while large enterprises have found easier to sub-divide 
production in different stages and create legally independent entities. Naturally, 
the latter is a very useful 'coping' strategy but it is doubtful whether these new 
companies are really new or independent. Thus, the NPS idealised as a class of 
new entrepreneurs who borrow money from a bank, set up a new activity and 
develop in a healthy manner has not been proven to be a determinant source of 
growth at this stage, at least in CIS countries.
The reallocation of labour from the state sector to the private sector and the 
reallocation across economic sectors have absorbed much research effort in these 
years while other aspects of labour reallocation have received less attention. The 
rural-urban migration of labour or the movement of workers from the formal to 
the informal sector have been acknowledged but the underlying implications of 
such changes have been little studied. By contrast, the study of developmental 
processes and the study of developing nations relied extensively in the past on 
rural-urban and formal-informal frameworks to understand the fundamental 
processes of change (Lewis 1954, Harris and Todaro 1970). In transitional 
economies, it is now recognised that the informal sector has been growing steadily 
while rural-urban migration has been a significant phenomenon in both directions.
In fact, among all dynamic changes in the labour market, the most significant 
phenomenon has been the reallocation of workers from dependent to independent 
activities, from wage to non-wage work. This form of reallocation has been most 
evident as a movement from state employment to self-employment and has been a 
significant trend in all transitional economies. In CEE countries this phenomenon 
occurred particularly between 1989 and 1992 (the years of the recession) but 
continued during the period 1993-1995 (the years of the recovery). In 1995, the 
share of self-employment in total employment was 29.9% in Poland, 38.3% in 
Romania, 11.5% in Bulgaria, 11.6% in the Czech republic, 10.6% in Hungary and 
6.5% in Slovakia (Boeri, Burda, Kollo 1998). Self-employment growth is even 
more visible in CIS economies. The share of self-employment in total
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employment increased in all countries, particularly in the Trans-Caucasian and 
Central Asian regions (Table 1.6).
Table 1.6 - Self-employment (% of total employment)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Russia 6.1 8.3 9.5 10.1 11.2
CIS-Europe 3.0 5.4 5.7 8.2 8.0 8.1
Belarus 2.2 2.9 4.2 5.6 7.2 5.1
Moldova 13.4 15.4 13.9 16.2 14.2 12.4
Ukraine 2.4 5.1 5.5 8.1 7.7 8.4
Trans-Caucasus 15.4 37.6
Armenia 19.9 29.8 30.4 34.0 37.4 41.5
Azerbaijan 16.1 18.3 19.2 21.6 26.1 29.3
Georgia 11.6 46.4
Central Asia 12.1 13.3 14.8 18.7 23.6 29.2
Kazakhstan 4.3 5.3 5.9 9.3 17.9 24.0
Kyrgiz Republic 13.1 17.1 18.6 29.3 43.9 50.0
Tajikistan 19.1 21.0 23.1 23.5 30.9 33.7
Turkmenistan 15.6 16.2 16.3 16.8 17.7 19.0
Uzbekistan 16.7 17.5 19.2 23.3 23.5 30.1
Source : CIS-Stat (1998)
The share of self-employment in total employment in OECD countries is very 
variable and it is not per se an indicator of well being or malaise of a nation . In 
principle, the category self-employment is not homogeneous and it contains 
professional practitioners as well as shop-keepers, farmers or street vendors. In 
developing nations self-employment is often associated with farm and household 
labour in rural areas or with informal work in urban areas. In transitional 
economies self-employment has not been really studied and it simply indicates the 
number of people who exited wage employment and entered non-wage 
employment. Since wage employment has been traditionally associated with state 
employment and self-employment is private by definition, this form of 
reallocation has been interpreted as a form of state-private reallocation of labour. 
It is, in fact, the main form of state-private reallocation of labour given that the 
growth of private wage employment has been relatively small if compared to the 
growth of self-employment.
This wage employment/self-employment reallocation of labour deserves attention. 
If this trend has been determined by 'push' factors, i.e. by labour shedding on the
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part of enterprises, we should study what self-employment really means in terms 
of welfare and opportunities for those who were forced into it. If, instead, it is the 
product of 'puli' factors and a free choice, then we should ask what is wrong with 
wage employment and what is attractive in self-employment. The choice of self- 
employment in principle is a 'hard' choice in transition. First because it is a new 
condition to which people have to adapt. Second, because to wage employment 
have been traditionally attached social services such as health, education and 
transport provisions which came mainly free of charge. And third because private 
provisions of these same services is still in a very early stage, it is expensive and it 
does not currently offer a real alternative to public provision. Thus, those taking 
up self-employment take a substantial risk and if this is their choice self- 
employment must be an attractive sector indeed when compared with wage 
employment.
Given the current trend, the future of transitional economies will have to rely 
partly on the self-employment sector as one new engine of growth. The question 
is whether self-employment is simply the by-product of privatisation or it entails a 
real growth of new activities. And, if this is the case, whether this real growth of 
activities is occurring in potentially value-added sectors or, rather, in subsistence 
activities. Moreover, we should ask if this sector is a temporary creation 
structurally in-built in the process of transition and therefore destined to decline in 
the long run or if, instead, it is a condition to remain.
The understanding of this aspect of the labour market may be critical to assess the 
impact of reforms and the growth potential of transitional economies. For the CIS 
economies, the reforms index constructed on EBRD (1997) data seems to be 
positively related with the share of self-employment in total employment (Chart 
1.5). And, if we plot growth rates between 1989 and 1996 against the share of 
self-employment in 1996 it is suggested that the deeper the recession has been, the 
larger is the share of self-employment (Chart 1.6). The same cannot be said for 
CEE countries.
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Chart 1.5 - Self-employment and Liberalisation (CIS, 1996)
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7. Conclusion
What has emerged from the political turmoil of the late 1980s and from the break­
up of the Soviet Union is a scenario cause of controversy where the socio­
economic costs attributed to the process of transition have so far outweighed the 
benefits in the CIS. While it is early to judge the wisdom of the choice undertaken 
by the former Socialist countries, it is time to assess the current state, evaluate the 
choice of reforms and speculate on future prospects. The developments observed 
in transitional economies took by surprise observers and forecasters and a fresh 
look and reconsideration of events is due to those who are suffering under these 
historical changes.
There seems to be a persistent dichotomy of experiences when we compare CEE 
to CIS countries exemplified by the U and L-shaped output paths. The 
developments occurred in the CIS countries took a particular negative turn which 
is reflected in macroeconomic variables and in labour market developments. In 
particular, the picture presented for CIS countries suggests that labour markets are 
adjusting in a slow fashion, real restructuring is sluggish and the emergence of the 
new private sector still has to play the role which is helping some of the CEE 
economies out of the recession. The labour market difficulties observed in both 
groups of countries are exacerbated in the CIS. Opportunities are scarce and 
people are more disillusioned with the situation.
These changes have determined a rapid growth of self-employment rather than the 
expected growth of new private enterprises. This has changed the profile of the 
labour market and has introduced new elements in the understanding of the 
reallocation of labour during the transition. Understanding the nature of self- 
employment becomes in this way an important means to comprehend current 
labour dynamics and future prospects. The next chapter will propose a framework 
to think about the relation between macroeconomic changes and labour market 
developments where self-employment becomes central to the analysis.
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CHAPTER 2
TOWARDS A MODEL OF TRANSITION FOR THE CIS
This chapter presents a simple framework to think about transitional economies 
with L-shaped output progress and the reasons behind a slow recovery. As 
previous models, labour reallocation is central to the analysis of transition and the 
economy is studied in a multi-sector framework. Additional elements include 
recession dynamics, the role of self-employment and economic inactivity and the 
analysis of labour supply in a sector choice framework.
1. Stages of transition
The economic rationale for embarking into the process of transition was to 
ameliorate the pre-transition growth rate and accelerate the process of 
convergence of former Socialist nations towards OECD standards of output per 
capita. Capitalising on the experience of the process of transition to date, it was 
shown in Chapter 1 how, roughly speaking, U-shapes and L-shapes forms of 
output developments could be attributed to CEE and CIS countries respectively.
Formally, we could imagine the process of transition as broken down into distinct 
and identifiable stages in the same spirit as Rostow imagined the stages of 
economic development of a nation. We can imagine a pre-transition state 
characterised by slow growth and a post-transition stage characterised by faster 
growth. The process of transition, i.e. the process of change required to pass from 
a pre-transition to a post-transition scenario can be idealised as composed of three 
stages : 'Recession', 'adjustment' and 'recovery' as illustrated in Chart 2.1.
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Chart. 2.1 -  Stages of transition
Pre-transition Reces. Adjus. Recov. Post-transition Time
While most CEE countries seem to be on a recovery path (C-D in the diagram), 
most of the CIS countries still seem to struggle with the adjustment phase (B-C). 
In a CIS context, the different stages could be described as follows:
Pre-transition is the situation before the introduction of major transitional reforms 
early in 1990. Enterprises are still mostly state owned, prices are fairly stable, the 
industrial linkages are built around the Comecon network protected from global 
competition by trade boards. Russia is still subsidising the other republics.
Recession is when the Soviet Union has broken down, Russia cuts subsidies to 
other republics, prices are liberalised, privatisation begins, trade barriers are lifted, 
Comecon collapses, the industrial linkages break down, the payment system is 
disrupted, there is hyperinflation, real wages, pensions and social benefits slump 
in real terms, the new independent republics begin to build the state and its 
institutions, the new currencies are introduced, output declines by as much as 30- 
40%. Employment starts to decline and unemployment starts to grow. This is the 
period between 1990 and 1994.
During adjustment, the newly established state institutions start to operate 
effectively. Central banks acquire monetary control, inflation is curbed,
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privatisation is well advanced, a modem banking system is being established. 
Thanks to privatisation, the state sector has declined substantially and is being 
replaced by the private sector. The rate of investment is very low. Employment 
declines further and unemployment keeps growing. Output may show first signs 
of recovery. This is the bottom of the recession. Capital has de-cumulated 
severely and employment has declined, though less than output. This is the 
situation experienced by most CIS countries starting from 1995.
Recovery is when output is back on a growth path, savings and investment gain 
momentum, institutions are well established, privatisation is completed, efficient 
restructuring is taking place, private employment is growing and offsets state 
employment decline determining a first decline in unemployment. How to 
engineer the recovery is the central policy question that remains unresolved in the 
CIS to these days.
Finally, during the post-transition stage, output has reached a long-term steady 
growth pattern with growth rates higher than the pre-transition period, the private 
sector is the engine of the economy and markets regulate exchanges.
Associated with the transition stages, progress could be monitored with a number 
of different output targets such as re-establishment of output growth (from C on 
the diagram), re-establishment of pre-transition output levels (point D), the 
achievement of output above what the pre-transition growth rate would have 
allowed for (from E) and the convergence towards OECD levels of income per 
capita. Transitional economies facing an L-shape transition today should, sooner 
or later, reach their pre-transition output levels. In the long run, transition may 
simply look like a negative business cycle. However, all economies considered 
and in 1997, only Poland had reached its pre-transition output level. Fischer, 
Sahay and Vegh (1998) estimated t h a t it will take around twenty years for the 
faster reformers to reach current OECD per capita income levels' (p. 34).
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The time necessary to ‘bounce back’ to the pre-transition level of output also 
depends from the depth of the recession experienced. Recession and growth are 
not symmetric processes. A 10% output decline is not equivalent to a subsequent 
10% growth. A 20% recession needs a 25% growth rate to re-establish the pre­
recession level of output and a 40% recession needs a 67% growth. For a country 
that experienced a 40% output decline it will take between ten and eleven years 
just to reach the pre-transition output level at a 5% annual growth rate. Thus, the 
depth of a recession is important for growth prospects and post-recession growth 
paths cannot be compared unless the extent of the previous recession is taken into 
consideration. Thus, in output terms, the process of transition is a process of long­
term changes that may span over a period of twenty, thirty or even forty years 
depending on the country considered. In this sense, it is well justified to attempt to 
elaborate a theory of such process.
2. Models of transition
Several economists have been interested in modelling the transitional process. 
Popular models concerned with the process of reallocation of labour have been 
those of Chadha, Coricelli and Krajnyak (1993), Aghion and Blanchard (1993), 
Blanchard (1997) and Commander and Tolstopiatenko (1998). Rather than 
describing the models, the focus here is on identifying some of the common 
elements and some of the problems that these elements may have in explaining 
empirical evidence in a CIS context.
Models of transition tend to see economies as segmented into two sectors, a 
private and a state sector. The two sectors are defined in terms of the goods they 
produce. The state sector produces subsidised and less competitive goods, the 
private sector produces internationally competitive goods. Production in the 
private sector is generally Cobb-Douglas (not in Blanchard 1997), private firms 
are profit maximisers and pay workers the marginal product of labour. State firms 
produce at zero profits and pay the average product of labour. Incentives and
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behaviour of operators in each sector are therefore different and the bargaining 
process occurring in enterprises follows different rules.
It is this behavioural asymmetry which allows for unemployment to exist and for 
the reallocation of labour to occur. Better workers are attracted to better jobs and 
the reallocation of labour is unidirectional from the state to the private sector. 
Unemployment emerges as the difference between the decline in state sector 
employment and the growth of private sector employment. The level of 
unemployment is instrumental in determining the reallocation of labour. High 
unemployment keeps wages low and allows the private sector to survive and grow 
during the early stages. Eventually, private employment will grow fast enough to 
offset state employment decline and unemployment will start to decline.
Perhaps the most comprehensive of these models is Blanchard (1997). In this 
model, Reallocation of resources from the less to the more competitive sectors 
and restructuring of state enterprises are the two basic mechanisms which shape 
the transitional process. 'Disorganisation', defined as the disruption of inter­
industrial relations and the organisation of production is analysed as one of the 
principal causes of the initial output decline. 'Derailments' are those transitional 
paths which may be followed if distortions, such as excessive insiders' control 
able to constrain the restructuring and reallocation processes, take place. If 
'derailment' occurs, restructuring may never gain momentum, private sector 
employment may not grow and unemployment may grow indefinitely. The model 
draws to a great extent from the experience of CEE countries. The case of 
Bulgaria is taken as an anomaly in this context and the hypothesis of ‘derailment’ 
is constructed around this particular case.
In a wider transitional context, L-shaped economies are numerous and tend to be 
concentrated among CIS economies. As Chapter 1 showed, Bulgaria could well 
belong to the CIS group in terms of transitional performances. Have CIS 
economies embarked on a derailment path and should we expect unemployment 
to grow indefinitely?
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In Blanchard model, ‘derailment’ entails an indefinite growth of unemployment 
while, if derailment does not occur, transitional models seem to share the idea that 
an initial fast increase in unemployment during reforms is followed by a steady 
decline in the post-reforms period. None of these two paths can be easily 
reconciled with unemployment figures in the CIS. Initially unemployment growth 
has been very slow during a period of acute output decline. Later, when output 
decline slowed down, unemployment took off and it is still growing at 
considerable speed nine years into reforms. Moreover, despite the slump in wages 
and a presumably large labour supply, the private sector as imagined in the 
models has not been able to emerge as a substantial force of change.
In transitional models, unemployment is looked at as a direct consequence of 
employment reductions in enterprises. If employment declines in the state sector 
and does not increase in the private sector, then unemployment grows. 
Employment, in turn, is seen as a fundamentally labour demand induced 
phenomenon. If employment in the state sector is not declining as it should, or if 
employment in the private sector is not growing as it should, this is due to 
distortions which affect the demand for labour. The government is too tolerant 
with enterprises in difficulties, managers are too benevolent towards workers, 
insiders' power slows down the restructuring process and employers 'buy' workers' 
consensus, wages are not paid or paid in kind to keep workers on the books. An 
unlimited supply of labour is generally assumed in times of recession and 
transition.
In contrast with these assumptions, administrative data and households surveys 
throughout the CIS show three important aspects of the labour market. One is that 
the category of 'self-employment’ is very large and growing as it was shown in 
chapter 1. In fact, it is often the only category of employment visibly growing. 
The second is that labour turnover is high even in the state sector despite the poor 
record of output and employment. And the third is that workers often leave 
enterprises because of their own decision. Workers decide to quit employment and
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take up alternative opportunities such as early retirement, house duties, informal 
employment or home production. This suggests that there is an opportunity cost in 
working for the formal state and private sectors other than leisure and other than 
the reservation wage determined by unemployed benefits.
In the models described the focus of attention is the enterprise and the role of 
incentives and disincentives affecting individuals within enterprises. In this sense, 
these models take a demand side approach to the study of transition and the labour 
market. In so doing, however, the role of employment outside enterprises, 
including employment in collective organisations such as cooperatives and self- 
employment, is marginalised. So is the impact that non-enterprise employment 
has on the functioning of the labour market and on the determination of wages and 
unemployment. The wage is thought of as the price emerging from the supply- 
demand dynamic occurring in enterprises while income opportunities outside the 
enterprise are bundled into a ‘reservation’ wage. Thus, the income of the self- 
employed does not occupy a distinctive role in such models.
While justified by the rigour of simplicity, omitting self-employment from the 
structure of transitional models may hide some important aspects of the labour 
market. Self-employment naturally positions itself between wage employment, 
unemployment and economic inactivity, thus becoming an important ‘pool’ 
interacting with these latter conditions. Also, in the context of transition, the study 
of self-employment represents the ideal ground to explore whether market 
principles and concepts have filtered down to individuals and entrepreneurs and to 
see towards what kind of labour markets transitional economies are converging to: 
A developed, dynamic and flexible labour market of a OECD type or a stagnant 
and largely informal labour market typical of poor developing economies. Is self- 
employment the nursery for the enterprises of the future or is it an alternative 
definition of a subsistence sector?
For some authors, entrepreneurial abilities explain the birth and development of 
new firms and self-employment is seen as a first stage of a positive cycle of
48
entrepreneurial and economic development (Lucas 1978, Blau 1987). For others, 
self-employment emerges during recessional periods and in times of high 
unemployment. Oxenfeldt (1943) saw self-employment as an ‘escape from 
unemployment’ and Storey (1982), Johnson (1986) and Hudson (1987 and 1989) 
seem to find evidence of correlation between unemployment and self- 
employment. Whether we are more sympathetic to one vision or the other, self- 
employment is an important sector to monitor during a process of rapid change1.
3. Towards a model for the CIS
A model that attempts to explain employment and unemployment dimensions in a 
CIS context may consider more closely a number of aspects. The first is the nature 
of the recession and its relation with the transitional process. A second is the 
existence of an alternative sector to state employment that cannot be characterised 
as private sector in the Blanchard sense. This is constituted by individual workers 
generally grouped in the category ‘self-employment’. A third is the existence of a 
pool of formally economically inactive individuals who actually attribute an 
economic value to home duties because of the transitional changes occurring. And 
the fourth, aiming at putting together the above aspects, is the study of labour 
supply in transition.
3.1. The initial shock, recession dynamics and the state sector
The first major output shock experienced by the Soviet Union and the post-Soviet 
republics occurred between 1991 and 1992 as a consequence of two fundamental 
reforms. The first was the quasi-total liberalisation of prices implemented in three
1 Self-employment overlaps considerably with the informal sector in a transitional context. In fact, 
studies of developing economies often use the term self-employment and informal sector 
interchangeably. I prefer the category self-employment for different reasons. First, I find that what 
is important for a successful transition, at least in the short-term, is whether value added is being 
created rather than to see whether this is created in formal or informal activities. Second, 
distinguishing between employees (state or private) and self-employment is important for the 
study o f entrepreneurial abilities as the literature suggests and entrepreneurial abilities are perhaps 
the most important human development aspect to be monitored in transition. Third, the definition 
conforms to the old and new employment classification used by CIS statistical offices as well as to 
the ILO international classification of labour.
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stages (January and April 1991, January 1992) and the second was the decision to 
break-up the Soviet Union in December 1991. The combination of these two 
reforms initiated a period characterised by hyperinflation and the disorganisation 
of production. In particular, the disorganisation of production entailed a disruption 
of inter-industrial relations and customer-suppliers relations between firms located 
in different republics of the union. This phenomenon alone was responsible for a 
steep fall in production from early 1992 to 1994, far greater than any loss of 
aggregate demand during the same period would have justified. Therefore, the 
very initial shock can be characterised as an adverse shock to firms’ production 
exogenously induced as illustrated in chart 2.2.
Chart 2.2 -  The initial shock AS’
AS
AD
N*
y’ y*w/p’ w/p* w/p y
Where, N is labour, p is price, w/p is the real wage, y is output and AS and AD 
are aggregate supply and demand respectively. Figure (1) illustrates aggregate
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demand and supply, figure (2) is the production function and figure (3) represents 
the labour market.
Initially (A), the product market is in disequilibrium with excess demand for 
goods and services, controlled prices (p*) and planned production (y*). With the 
first price liberalisation reforms, enterprises transfer the increase in producers 
prices onto consumers and production and employment are maintained while real 
wages decline, (from A to B in figure 1 and from w/p* to w/p’ in figure 3). 
Eventually, consumers adjust to the price and real wages shocks reducing demand 
for goods and services (from A to C). With the break-up of the Soviet Union and 
subsequent disorganisation of production firms experience a collapse in 
production (from y* to y’). This shifts the aggregate supply curve to the left (from 
E to C) which would theoretically lead towards equilibrium in ‘C \ However, 
production difficulties continue over the first few years and production continues 
to decline while aggregate supply keeps moving to the left (to AS’) maintaining in 
effect excess of demand and keeping pressure on prices.
This basic dynamic continued in most of the countries of the FSU for well over 
three years into 1994, it characterised the essential features of the state sector and 
accompanied the introduction of transitional and state building reforms. 
Moreover, the decline in state sector output and the reduction in bilateral subsidies 
from Russia meant, for the peripheral countries of the FSU, a substantial fall in 
government revenues and an increase in budget deficits. The labour market 
remains with excess of supply throughout the period as state firms reduce 
irreversibly employment needs while other sectors are still in their infant state. A 
real money market as such hardly exists as the new banking sector is in the 
making, but inflation is eroding real money balances quickly while the nominal 
supply of money is not under control. Therefore the recession is characterised by 
different forces which push the curves to the ‘left’ of the diagrams with lower 
levels of output, employment and money.
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3.2. The economy during the adjustment phase
We can imagine the adjustment period as a period of convergence towards a new 
equilibrium characterised by lower output and employment. Following the initial 
recession and transitional reforms the economy now features a smaller state sector 
and three relatively new sectors; the private sector, the self-employment sector 
and unemployment. These three sectors have expanded and absorbed at least part 
of the workforce exiting the state sector. Other workers have moved into 
economic inactivity. Given a potential workforce2 (N )  assumed to be constant and 
normalised to one the following holds:
( I )  N  =  N s t + N p r + N s e + N u + N ei =  l
With: Nst = State employees; N Pr = Private employees; Nse = Self-employed; Nu  =  
Unemployed and Net  = Economically inactive. The state and private sectors 
represent enterprise or wage employment. They are the ‘formal’ sector in that they 
pay taxes and are possibly entitled to subsidies. The self-employed do not pay 
taxes or receive subsidies but they contribute to output and employment.
The government budget constraint
Following the long period of economic and monetary instability, the government 
is now committed to balancing the budget. This implies the following government 
budget constraint where the employment fund is managed independently:
(2 ) T = G  
(3) n{ws,Ns,+ W prN pr) = WuN u 
(4) {r + n \w » N » + K ' N r )  = °{W«N s, + WprN pr) + W„Nu + I g +Cg
2 By potential workforce I mean the adult population potentially able to work excluding full-time 
students, ‘full-time’ pensioners and individuals disabled to work due to physical conditions.
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With: T = Government revenues; G = Government expenditures W, = Wages; = 
Employment; W,- N, = Wage bill; i = (st, pr, se, u); Ig = Public investment; i = Tax 
rate (% of wage bill); p  = Employment fund contributions (% of wage bill); cr = 
rate of subsidies (% of wage bill), Cg is government consumption with % p  a  < 0.
Consumption, expenditure and the money market
Households do not save and do not borrow from banks. In fact households do not 
hold bank accounts. This is explained by the long exposure to hyperinflation 
during the recession period that eliminated previous savings held in banks and 
induced household to convert new savings into consumption. All disposable 
income is consumed. State enterprises operate at zero profits but keep liquidity in 
banks at zero real interest rates. Private enterprises generate profits and savings 
(SPr), which are deposited into local banks. Household consumption is represented 
by the wages net of taxes and employment fund’s contributions , self-employment 
income and unemployment benefits as follows:
C = (l -  f  -  m) { K N s, + WP,N P,)  + W«N„ + W,N„
Given (3):
(5) C = (1 -  t)[ws, N a + W„, N „r) + Wse 1V„
Therefore expenditure and income are:
Y = E = C + G
E = (1 -  t)(wsiN s, + WprN pr) + WmN m + o{wstN s, + WprN pr) + I g +Cg 
(6) E = (1 - 1 + o){wstN a + WprN pr) + WslN s, + I g +Cg
With: Y= Income; C = Consumption and E = Expenditure.
The money market is experiencing growing real interest rates. This is because of a 
combination of factors. The stock of money available to the credit system has
3 For simplicity we assume that unemployment benefits are the only transfers levied from 
enterprises and paid to households.
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shrunk, monetary policies are restrictive, investments in domestic production 
activities carry high risk and the available financial capital earns better and more 
secure returns on the international financial market. Therefore, the savings 
generated from the private sector (Spr), after being deposited in local banks, are in 
fact exported abroad.
Privatisation, the private sector and restructuring
The process of privatisation is slow during the recession because the FSU 
republics are busy building the new state institutions including the executive, 
legislative and judicial branches. Privatisation occurs first in small-scale activities 
such as in the housing, retailing and small production spheres. During the 
adjustment phase, privatisation plans gain momentum. Some large enterprises find 
foreign buyers while others remain state-owned, most medium enterprises are 
transformed into mixed forms of Ownership where the state usually maintains 
important shares and small businesses are sold to the public.
During this period, the private sector formally consists of privatised enterprises, 
individual owners (self-employed), who bought off small ex-state activities or 
started a new business, and newly established private firms (New Private Sector - 
NPS). Maintaining the self-employed as a separate sector in its own right, the 
private sector is then constituted by privatised and NPS activities. For this sector 
to become ‘private’ in the Blanchard sense it requires either a process of 
restructuring of privatised firms or the establishment of NPS activities. Moreover, 
for the private sector to become competitive on an international market a 
technological upgrade is needed to push up productivity. For these reasons, an 
injection of capital is necessary.
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Assuming that insiders in privatised firms are fully committed to restructuring4, 
the probability of restructuring boils down to the probability of obtaining the 
necessary capital to restructure or to establish a new business. Sources of capital 
are the local money market, foreign direct investments or grants or subsidised 
credits from the state. Debt issue is not an option because households do not save. 
Therefore, investments in enterprises (I) are met if at least one of the possible 
sources of capital is willing to provide the funds.
(7) I  = / - / ) ’ M ’ xj
The first term on the right hand side represents the probability of obtaining a 
credit on the domestic money market where i is the real domestic interest rate and 
ii is the return on financial capital invested abroad. When the domestic real 
interest rate increases the demand for capital decreases. When the foreign interest 
rate is larger than the domestic one (ii-i is positive) the supply of capital to the 
domestic financial system decreases, pushing up in a second stage the domestic 
interest rate. In both cases the demand for capital eventually decreases and so will 
domestic investments and the probability of restructuring.
The second term (1/M) represents the probability of attracting Foreign Direct 
Investments (FDI) modelled on the basis of macroeconomic stability. It is 
assumed that foreign investors look at macroeconomic stability to take investment 
decisions. M is the supply of money and stands for budget deficits and monetary 
instability, assuming that budget deficits are financed by printing money. When a 
budget deficit occurs, the government prints money, inflation increases 
destabilising the economy and discouraging foreign investors. The third term (o/x) 
is the probability for enterprises to obtain government grants, subsidised credits or 
just a reduction in corporate taxation modelled with the rates of subsidies and
4 The assumption is rather unrealistic but the role of insiders’ control in the process of 
restructuring has been amply explored in the literature. Here, access to capital is emphasised.
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taxation used before. An increase in subsidies or a cut in taxation increase access 
to capital and the probability of restructuring.
It is easy to see why in this framework restructuring and NPS creation will hardly 
occur. The government is caught into two different dilemmas. The first is a 
subsidy dilemma. Either the government encourages restructuring and the creation 
of new enterprises with subsidies or tax cuts (therefore increasing M) or it 
encourages foreign direct investments with a hard budget constraint. The second 
dilemma is determined by the interest rate. The government can lower interest 
rates to encourage the demand for capital but it will discourage domestic savings 
from staying in the local economy by increasing the domestic-foreign interest gap. 
Therefore, the probability for enterprise to restructure and grow is very low due to 
difficult access to capital irrespective of any other internal constraints faced by 
enterprises.
3.3. The labour market during the adjustment phase
The working sectors
We depicted a scenario where the state sector has shrunk and the private sector -  
meaning enterprises producing internationally competitive goods -  has remained 
small. We now formalise the internal labour market of each sector.
For the state sector, we can think of the demand for labour to be equal to the 
average product of labour as in transitional models. With employment declining 
more slowly than output, the average product of labour declines through the 
recession and so does the state wage (fVsi). During adjustment, the wage is 
declining to a level equal or smaller than the largest competitive sector, self- 
employment. A lower wage pushes good workers towards self-employment. At 
the same time, state enterprises have not been reformed, they still face production 
difficulties and, generally speaking, they dispose of more labour than they 
actually need. As a coping mechanism, enterprises in difficulty simply do not pay
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wages or put workers on unpaid leave. Therefore, the share of employment that 
contributes to budget revenues with taxes and social contributions is actually 
smaller than the level of employment.
The demand for labour in the private sector can be thought of as the marginal 
product of labour as in any competitive firm. By definition, the private sector is 
more competitive, disposes of better technology and needs better and more 
productive workers. Therefore the private sector offers on the labour market a 
formal wage higher than the state and self-employment sectors (WPr = Wst+p). 
This is the efficiency wage argument. Private enterprises pay a premium to secure 
the best workers. In reality, the existing large supply of labour allows private 
enterprises to pay, at the end of the month, an income which is smaller than the 
formal wage offered and closer to the other wages available in the market. That is 
because private employers are aware that alternatives are scarce and that there is a 
cost in leaving employment represented by the risk of unemployment and the cost 
of moving. In other words, employers ‘flag’ better formal wages to attract the best 
workers but then pay them less knowing that leaving implies a risk and an extra 
cost for the worker. This constrains the expansion of private employment, unless 
the demand curve can be shifted to the right of the diagram by increasing 
technology or capital. We saw that this is problematic given the existing difficult 
access to capital. The private sector is also formal in that it pays taxes and social 
contributions as the state sector. Therefore, it is a sector that supports higher 
labour costs than self-employment. It is also the sector that potentially faces an 
increasing fiscal pressure given the reduction in contributions on the part of state 
enterprises.
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Chart 2.3. -  The state and private sectors
(a) State (b) Private
Nst
Dst
Dst’
Nst
Dpr
Wpr
Wpr’
Npr
Concerning self-employment, the model we adopt is the basic model described by 
de Wit’s (1993) survey of self-employment models. There is an unlimited number 
of individuals who can chose between self-employment and an indefinite outside 
option valued at iw \ All individuals have access to the same production 
technology characterised by a twice differentiable cost function c(x) where x is the 
level of production. The self-employed are price takers and maximise their profits 
chosing the appropriate production level.
(8) max[;r = px -  c(x)] 
x
is the price and the optimum level of production and profit can be determined 
as functions of p, x(p) and n(p). It is assumed that margined costs increase with 
production. Equilibrium in the product market is as follows:
(9) nx (p )=Xd(p)
Where is the number of self-employed individuals and X  is the demand for 
products. When n increases prices and profits decline. In other words, the larger
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the number of self-employed the smaller the per capita profit. Chart 2.4 illustrates 
the model.
Chart 2.4 -  Self-employment
n, w
Wse
Wu
Nse
The only departure from the basic model outlined by de Wit is that the self- 
employment profit of equilibrium during the adjustment phase is w se, equivalent to 
what the state sector is offering. However, since the state sector continues to push 
workers out, self-employment can theoretically move further to the right, up to the 
point where profits reach the level of unemployment benefits. In other words, 
unemployment benefits represent the reservation wage for self-employment. As 
opposed to wage employment, the self-employment sector does not pay taxes or 
social contributions in this model.
The value of wse that I expect during the adjustment phase can be understood as a 
subsistence value. It is a quantity sufficient to provide for basic needs but 
insufficient to generate savings and accumulation. It could be equivalent, for 
instance, to a minimum consumption basket or a poverty line which takes into 
account minimum subsistence needs. It is assumed that such value is what the 
self-employment sector can offer on average during the adjustment phase. 
However, individuals with different characteristics will earn different profits so 
that the potential profit accruing to each potential participant at any point in time 
is different.
Despite the basic model, the literature on self-employment seems to agree that 
profit prospect alone explains only a limited portion of self-employment status.
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Non-profit factors such as psychological attitudes to risk and change, ethnic 
belonging, education, job tenure, access to credits, household characteristics, 
family status, local economic conditions or tax regimes have been identified as 
some of the important elements contributing to explaining self-employment (de 
Wit 1993). These same factors are important determinants in any labour supply 
choice but they tend to increase their relative weight moving from wage 
employment to non-wage employment and from non-wage employment to 
unemployment and economic inactivity. We know, for instance, that the number 
of children is an important determinant of female participation while 
psychological attitudes to status often explains the ‘discouraged’ unemployment 
effect in many societies. We should expect the elasticity to changes in these same 
factors to grow in times of deep and rapid socio-economic changes.
To conclude, Chart 2.5 pieces together the different sectors examined. From left 
to right the state, private and self-employment sectors are illustrated while 
unemployment and economic inactivity are residuals measures. In particular, state 
employees should be thought of as split into two groups, the ‘paid’ and the ‘non­
paid’, while the unemployed should be thought of as split into ‘registered’ and 
‘non-registered’ depending on whether job seekers seek employment services’ 
support or not. The non-registered unemployed should not be confused with the 
discouraged unemployed found in the economically inactive pool. In the model, a 
large number of individuals seek work actively but do not refer to state 
employment offices.
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Chart 2.5 -  The labour market in the adjustment phase
N st’
'D st
Labour supply
Following from equation (1), the potential workforce (N )  is divided into five 
groups according to labour status: State employees (N st),  private employees (N Pr), 
self-employed (N se), unemployed (N u)  and economically inactive (N et).  At the start 
of the transition process (time */’) only two groups exist, the state employees and 
the economically inactive while private employees, the self-employed and the 
unemployed emerge in the course of reforms. During reforms, the state sector 
declines continuously while the other sectors are growing. Thus, assuming that the 
potential workforce has not changed in size during the period, in the post­
recession adjustment phase (time ‘t+V) we find a number of ex-state workers 
(A N si)  in the other four sectors such as:
A N s, = A N p r + A N Se + A N u + A Nei
(-) (+) (+) (+) (+)
By the time the economy has reached time 6t+J\ households have been subject to 
major shocks including net losses in terms of savings, income, security, public 
provision and health. A number of coping strategies have been devised such as a 
reduction in consumption, exploitation of household economies of scale, home
61
production, barter or sale of assets. The decision to work is now affected by a 
number of new considerations linked to both the state of employment and to the 
emerging needs at home and in the community. Many public services once 
provided by state enterprises such as transport and kindergartens have closed 
down and households are now faced with the choice of providing these services 
themselves or paying for privately provided ones where available. The 
organisation of the household had to change and with it the decision to work.
We are assuming that there is an economic value in staying at home. This value is 
different for men and womea for reasons that are both economically and socially 
explained. For women, this value can be thought of as equal to the available wage 
in self-employment, = wse. If the cost per hour of hiring a baby-sitter is equal 
to or higher that the potential wage available to women on the labour market, the 
choice is obviously to stay home. Baby-sitting is precisely the kind of activity we 
would expect to find in self-employment and valuing female economic inactivity 
with the wage offered by self-employment seems appropriate.
On the other hand, men tend to have a better potential wage on the labour market 
which makes them more suitable to seek employment while, we assume, they do 
not contribute significantly to home duties. Therefore men perceive economic 
inactivity at a value wg/< wse. For simplicity, we can value economic inactivity for 
men at the level of unemployment benefits, wei = wu. The best option for men 
would be to find employment but if this is not possible the alternatives of actively 
seeking employment in exchange of a small wage or leisure at home can be 
thought of as equally attractive. The set of choices can be illustrated as follows5:
5 Labour supply theoretically involves different types of choices such as the employment 
participation/non-participation choice, the choice of the working sector and the choice of time to 
be allocated to the working sector. Working time is usually modelled as a utility maximising 
problem under a budget and a time constraint where the arguments in the utility function are 
consumption and leisure. Here, we are only concerned with the choice of the sector.
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Males Females
Sector choice Npr Nse Nu Nei
Income/h wpr wse wu wu
Npr Nse Nu Nei
W pr W se W u W se
The choice spectrum offered to those who are exiting the state sector is then 
composed of four alternatives. Two factors determine sector participation. One is 
rationing, meaning the existing constrained demand for labour. The second is 
individual preference, meaning what individual would chose in the absence of 
rationing. Both rationing and preference can be thought of as having two sets of 
determinants each. For rationing, there is a screening component (Z), meaning the 
employer taste for skills, education and experience, and the location component 
(X), meaning the local economic and labour market conditions. Preference is 
instead determined by the worker’s expected income (W) and household factors 
(H) such as household responsibilities or characteristics. Schematically, sector 
participation involves the following factors:
The combination of rationing and preferences determines the outcome of the 
sector selected observed in the data. Thus, we have an individual i who maximises 
the expected utility deriving from the choice of sector j.
rationing-
screening(Z)
location(X)
Participation(N j )
income{W) 
household (H)preference
max with i = N  
and j  = 1, 2, 3, 4
j  = k iff U ik> U ij for all other j* k
Where W y  is the potential wage accruing to worker i in sector j  and K y  is a vector 
of variables thought to affect utility.
Determining the factors that affect sector participation is important to understand 
the mechanism of labour reallocation. The workers found in the private, self- 
employment and unemployment sectors during the adjustment phase are the 
product of the reallocation of labour determined by the transition process. 
Comparing the individual, location and household characteristics of workers 
across sectors should reveal whether the reallocation of labour has followed some 
clear sector specific pattern. This can be done empirically with a sector choice 
model which will be developed in chapter 5.
4. Conclusion
This chapter offered a framework to think about the adjustment phase in which 
many transitional economies have found themselves starting from 1995. The rapid 
recession determined a substantial exit of workers from state enterprises but only 
a few of these workers have been accommodated in new private firms. Such 
development turned partly into an increase in unemployment but mostly in the 
establishment and growth of a large self-employment sector acting as a buffer 
sector between wage employment, unemployment and economic inactivity.
Why does self-employment emerge? Is the growth of this sector a necessary first 
step to enterprise development emerging in particular stages of economic 
development, or it is rather a symptom of underdevelopment and a sector 
emerging in times of recession? The international experience is very diverse and 
large self-employment sectors are found in both developing and developed 
economies. It is not the size per se that matters for self-employment in transition 
at this stage but the structure, profitability and possible prospects to translate into 
enterprise development in the medium and long term.
The growth of self-employment at this stage can be seen as both a positive and a 
negative development. It is positive in that it provides an important source of 
subsistence for many households with basically no alternatives in the labour
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market and because it may provide the base for a new private sector development 
in the long run. It is negative because it keeps valuable human resources in low 
value added and low productive activities with a ‘de-skilling’ effect and because it 
reduces the ‘cue’ to private employment contributing to undermine private sector 
development.
If the adjustment phase persists with the characteristics illustrated, contributions 
from state enterprises will continue to decline indefinitely. The private sector may 
expand up to the point where the private sector wage reaches the self-employment 
wage. When this occurs, private enterprises expansion remains exclusively linked 
to capital investments and technological upgrade constrained by poor access to 
credits. At one stage, the unemployment fund will run out of resources and 
unemployment benefits will be cancelled. As the reservation wage for self- 
employment disappears, self-employment will continue to expand becoming the 
largest employment sector in the economy. If this occurs, internal savings will 
disappear, the financial system dries up preventing any self-employed individual 
from investment and growth. This is the type of recessional dynamic that could 
explain the persistence of the adjustment phase and drive CIS economies towards 
a scenario of a developing type, with large sections of the population employed in 
informal, subsistence and illegal activities.
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PART II -  KAZAKHSTAN
CHAPTER 3
TRANSITIONAL REFORMS AND RECESSIONAL DYNAMICS
The aim of this chapter is to illustrate and explain the transitional reforms and the 
macroeconomic developments as they occurred in Kazakhstan between 1990 and 
1996. Section 1 is a chronology of the reforms. Section 2 depicts macroeconomic 
developments in key areas of the economy and from a structural perspective. 
Section 3 discusses the causes of the output decline in the light of the specific 
literature on transitional economies. Section 5 summarises and concludes.
1. A brief chronology of economic reforms1
In this section we look at economic reforms. However, it should be kept in mind 
that these reforms occurred during a period when Kazakhstan, after having 
acquired independence as a nation-state for the first time in its history, found itself 
with the immense task of building the institutions of a modem state. From the 
writing of a constitution to the establishment of a parliament and a government, to 
important reforms such as the reform of the judiciary system, the army and the 
public administration, Kazakhstan was confronted with unprecedented 
institutional reforms in the course of rapid socio-economic changes. Institutional 
reforms were not completed before economic reforms but occurred in parallel. An 
elected parliament did not effectively start working until 1996 while important 
laws instrumental for economic reforms such as the law on bankruptcy did not 
become effective until 1997. Most economic reforms implemented during the 
period considered here have been managed by an elected president and a sequence 
of provisional governments.
1 Reconstructing the chronology of reforms proved more complex that I initially thought. 
Republican records were either non-existent or difficult to access in Kazakhstan, especially for the 
early years. This section has been mainly constructed making use of a selection of IMF, WB, EU
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It is useful to distinguish here three periods. The first period of reforms occurred 
before independence, under the Soviet Union (until the end of 1991). This is a 
turbulent period where Kazakh authorities had limited say in economic policies. 
The second period is between independence and the introduction of the national 
currency, the Tenge in November 1993 (1992-1993). This period has been 
characterised by the use of the Soviet ruble while economic policies were mostly 
being conducted at the national level. It is a period of high monetary instability 
and controversial reforms. The third period starts with the introduction of the 
national currency and ends with the end of the recession (1994-1996). It is a 
period when monetary control is finally achieved, transitional reforms are pushed 
through and the economic decline slowly comes to a halt.
1.1 Until 1991
During the soviet period international trade was the domain of state foreign trade 
organisations which executed the trade plan made of export and import targets. A 
'price equalisation system' established trade taxes and subsidies insulating the 
domestic price structure from the world market. Prices served as accounting 
measure but did not reflect relative scarcity and did not act as proper incentives 
for a correct allocation of resources. Trade within the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA) was conducted in a similar manner and cash flows 
were cleared through a system of bilateral agreements every year. The Soviet 
Union implicitly subsidised other CMEA members with adverse terms of trade as 
it was mainly an exporter of raw materials and importer of consumer and 
manufactured goods. Since the late eighties, enterprises in the manufacturing 
sector were allowed, after meeting the targets of the plan, to sell the residual 
output on the open market, and since April 1989, they were also allowed to 
engage directly in foreign trade bypassing the state owned foreign trade 
organisations.
and EIU country reports (see bibliography). As each paragraph is the product of a comparative
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Despite the introduction of these and other reforms between 1987 and 1989, in 
1991, 70-80% of total output in Kazakhstan was still regulated by the state orders 
system, where production levels and flows of inputs and outputs were planned by 
the central authorities in Moscow. Nonetheless, the increasing autonomy granted 
to the republics meant that some republics applied reforms faster and deeper than 
others. This determined asymmetric price changes across republics which in turn 
created real price distortions in the union system of exchanges. Some of the 
republics, to protect themselves from such distortions, started to introduce 
controls and barriers to trade which began to disrupt the flow of inter-republican 
inputs and outputs. Barter exchanges emerged for strategic goods such as raw 
materials, energy supplies and basic consumer goods.
At independence, the Kazakh authorities replaced the union trade system with a 
national version which, however, functioned approximately in the same manner, 
with enterprises having to trade with state organisations at set prices and having to 
comply with delivery targets irrespective of whether payments were made or not. 
In 1991, only 8% of Kazakhstan's export and 14% of imports were to non-FSU 
countries. Kazakhstan trade relations took place for the quasi totality in the 
territory of the ex Soviet Union.
Some changes also occurred in the financial system before independence. Prior to 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the central bank of Kazakhstan was a branch 
of Gosbank, the Soviet state bank. Until the late eighties, the system allowed for 
monetary control thanks to sectoral projections derived from an input-output 
model. Cash was mainly used to pay salaries and subsidies while inter-enterprise 
payments were substantially nominal bank transfers. Credits were allocated for 
meeting production targets rather than distributed with financial criteria and firms' 
deposits into banks were earmarked for specific purposes.
In addition to the central bank, the system included two state-specialised 
commercial banks, one with the task of providing long-term investment credits
exercise across sources, references in the text are limited to the strict necessary.
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and the other in charge of foreign exchange operations. The state bank performed 
all commercial, clearing and settlements operations and private savings were held 
at the savings bank, a branch of the state bank. Towards the end of the eighties, a 
number of specialised banks were introduced to take over part of the commercial 
functions of the state bank. Also, enterprises and co-operatives were allowed to 
establish their own banks and, by the end of 1991, 72 banks existed in the Soviet 
Kazakh Republic alone. The great bulk of private savings remained into the state 
savings bank while monetary policies were still the prerogative of Soviet 
authorities.
Other pre-independence transitional reforms included initiatives in the fields of 
privatisation, price liberalisation and budget reforms. A first phase of privatisation 
was launched in January 1991 when the Kazakh State Property Committee was 
established to organise the sale of state property. The committee developed 
legislation on privatisation, the creation of new enterprises and joint stock 
companies. Privatisation started in August 1991 and by the end of the year 380 
enterprises had been sold, mainly in the service sector and mainly to workers’ 
collectives. The enterprise structure at the end of 1991 is shown in table 3.1.
Table 3.1 -  Enterprise structure in 1991
Size No.of
firms
%of
firms
No.of
workers (m)
%of workers Av.
w./firm
Small 1-199 27,500 74.3 1.0 16.7 36
Medium and large 200-4,999 8,000 21.6 2.9 48.3 363
Very large 5,000 200 0.5 1.6 26.7 8,000
Special (*) 1,300 3.5 0.5 8.3 385
Total 37,000 100 6 100 162
Source: EIU (1996); (*) Natural monopolies (water, power, heating, communications), non­
commercial enterprises (social national security), non-renewable resource extracting enterprises 
(oil, gas, minerals, mining) and specified agricultural and forestry enterprises.
Price liberalisation was first launched in January and April 1991 with increases in 
administered prices and the abolition of controls over a set number of prices in 
non-strategic sectors. According to the IMF (1993,), “In April 1991, free or 
negotiated prices were introduced for some 15 percent o f non agricultural 
consumer goods, 30 percent o f heavy industrial goods, 20 percent o f agricultural
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goods and about 70 percent o f household services; most prices that remained 
under control were increased. ” (p.9).
Some initiatives were also taken in the field of fiscal reforms. During the late 
eighties the Kazakh republican budget was allowed to run substantial deficits 
reaching 10% of GDP in 1990. This was financed for the great part by union’s 
transfers. Fiscal autonomy was granted to the Soviet republics already in 1990 and 
by 1991 Kazakhstan had its own separate budget from the Union. However, 
Russia still controlled the Ruble and in fear of a sudden rise in money demand a 
general budget deficit target of 3% of GDP was established for the ex-Republics 
in 1992. For many republics including Kazakhstan such target could not be met 
during the year because of cuts in bilateral transfers from Russia. Other main 
sources of revenues until then were individual and enterprise income taxes (about 
44% of revenues) and a turnover tax (about 30%, IMF 1992b).
1.2 1992-1993
Independence was proclaimed on December 16th 1991. Three weeks later, in 
January 1992, prices for almost all goods were liberalised. Only 20% of goods 
included in the retail price index remained controlled but were increased several 
fold. During 1992, most of the remaining controlled consumer goods' prices were 
liberalised and, at the beginning of 1993, only energy, transportation, bread and 
bakery products and medicine prices remained regulated though, again, were 
increased several fold.2
The process of privatisation stepped up in 1992 when almost 6,000 small 
businesses were sold (IMF 1993). Most of the activities were sold to workers 
collectives, others were sold through direct tenders and the remaining became 
joint stock operations. Among the joint stock companies, the state generally 
maintained large shares. An estimated 4,000 privatised activities were engaged in 
trade, catering and consumer services and, of these, many were just assets such as
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trucks and warehouses. In agriculture, several state farms were privatised and, by 
the end of 1992, a substantial output of potatoes, vegetables, fruit, berries, meat 
and milk (between 40 and 70% of total output depending on the product) was 
produced in the private sector. The first experimental phase of privatisation lasted 
until March 1993 with the beginning of the second phase (see next section). By 
the end of 1993, between 15% and 20% of all enterprises had been sold, mainly of 
very small size and counting for a small part of the workforce.
Bilateral trade agreements between Kazakhstan and the FSU were signed in 1992 
specifying mutual supplies of industrial and consumer goods. These agreements 
still covered up to two thirds of all trade, and they were enforced by Gosgakaz, 
the state order system. The rest of trade was being carried out spontaneously by 
individual firms but it was still subject to quotas and licensing arrangements. The 
major trade reforms came with the abolishing of Gosgakaz in 1993 and its 
replacement with a system of state purchases according to 'state needs', Gosnub. 
This new system limited its intervention to strategic areas such as defence, health 
and education representing approximately 20% of output in 1993. Transactions 
became voluntary at negotiated prices and enterprises could hold deliveries upon 
payment. Later, bilateral trade agreement were renewed but limited in their scope. 
Also, the Ministry of Material Resources was re-converted into a new 
organisation called Kazcontract, a joint stock company partly owned by the state 
which became responsible for the implementation of interstate trade agreements 
and for purchases and deliveries in many sectors.
With independence, the former republican banks became the central banks for 
each of the new independent states. The basic Soviet financial structure was 
maintained until the introduction of the national currency in November 1993. The 
Central Bank of Kazakhstan (CBK) still obtained its funds from the Central Bank 
of Russia (CBR) and acted as a regional branch. However, important changes 
occurred. By the end of 1992, the CBK had responsibility for foreign reserves and 
for the establishment of the refinance rate, thus controlling in part monetary
2 For a comprehensive treatment of price liberalisation see De Broeck., De Masi., and Koen (1995)
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policies. Under the 1993 constitution, the central bank was made independent 
from the government and under the supervision of parliament. During this period, 
the number of banks continued to increase reaching 158 by the end of 1992, of 
which 11 were co-operative and 48 were private banks. By far, the largest bank 
remained the state savings bank and most of the new banks continued to obtain 
the majority of their funds from the CBK. The three largest commercial banks and 
the savings bank accounted for more than three-quarters of all assets in the 
system.
With one currency and 15 central banks introducing new regulations in an 
uncoordinated fashion during a hyperinflationary period, monetary control 
exercised from Moscow collapsed. The CBR attempted in 1992 to co-ordinate 
credit policies among central banks by introducing a system of correspondent 
accounts for each central bank. These bilateral accounts replaced the ex Soviet 
payments mechanism introducing some visibility in the inter-state financial flows. 
However, this changed the accounting procedures but not the payments practices 
conducted at the local level. A reform of the payments practises was attempted in 
April 1992. With the idea of stepping up monitoring, the number of financial 
transactions necessary to process a payment were increased. Rather than 
improving monitoring, this measure had the unwanted result of delaying further 
the processing of payments, introducing additional disruptions to the system. 
Inter-state credit arrears continued to increase during the period and in July 1992 
the CBR was forced to re-centralise all operations in Moscow and to introduce 
inter-republican credit restrictions.
The new arrangement of the interstate payment system also collapsed during the 
second half of 1992. The Moscow office was soon overwhelmed by the amount of 
payments and queries to be dealt with. This factor, together with the 
multiplication of banks, the growing number of payments, errors in processing 
transactions, slow payments which relied on the inefficient postal system, small 
number of clearing and co-ordinating bodies, and fraud practices, brought the
and IMF (1993)
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payments system in dire straits. In early 1993, the CBR decided to make all 
further credits to the republics in the form of bilateral loans and in the space of a 
few months inter-republic payments through the correspondent accounts almost 
halted. Barter practises and inter-enterprises arrears started to grow dramatically 
during this period (IMF 1994c).
Despite the inability of Moscow to co-ordinate monetary policies across the NIS 
and maintain monetary discipline, many countries were hesitant about leaving the 
ruble area because of fears of Russia retaliating by cutting subsidies further. 
However, in July 1993 (with a two days notice) Russia de-monetised the pre-1993 
ruble bank notes. Citizens were allowed to convert a limited amount of old rubles 
into new rubles within a two week period, and strict conditions were imposed to 
the ex republics for remaining in the ruble area. This forced most republics to 
abandon the ruble area and introduce their own currency. By December 1993, 
only Tajikistan continued to use pre-1993 rubles. Kazakhstan introduced its own 
currency, the tenge, in November 1993. Between July and November 1993, while 
the authorities were discussing the introduction of the new currency, pre-1993 
rubles remained the legal tender in circulation. As this currency was no longer 
convertible in Russia, the country faced an inflow of old rubles from Russia and 
from other former Soviet Republics which introduced their own currencies before 
Kazakhstan. This anomaly put additional monetary pressure on the system and 
contributed in building up inflation during the period.
The fiscal system adopted by Kazakhstan at independence was similar to the 
previous Soviet system of fiscal federalism where there was a functional division 
of spending responsibilities and revenue sharing between the local and republican 
levels. First reforms in this area were launched together with the 1992 price 
liberalisation reforms and included the introduction of a value added tax. A 
budget law followed in June of the same year introducing taxes on individual 
properties but the management of these reforms proved difficult.
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For instance, in 1992, four of the Oblasts were given 'free economic zone' status 
in that they could set their own fiscal regime and retain the revenues. It was hoped 
that the success of neighbouring China in this area could be replicated. However, 
these were relatively prosperous regions and in the absence of important sources 
of revenues the republican budget was clearly going to be unsustainable which de 
facto prevented the subsequent full application of such reforms. Also in 1992, a 
number of extra-budgetary funds such as the investment and privatisation funds 
were introduced with the aim of increasing transparency in expenditures. In 
reality, this move rendered the monitoring of expenses more difficult because of 
the lack of a treasury department while the monitoring of revenues was 
complicated by the fact that the tax inspectorate was independent from the 
ministry of finance. This latter problem was corrected towards the end of 1992 
with the annexation of the tax inspectorate to the ministry of finance but the 
establishment of the treasury had to wait for a WB/IMF initiative well into 1995.
Despite these difficulties, reductions in corporate taxes first to 35% in January 
1992 and later to 25% in June of the same year and increasing difficulties in tax 
collection, the government remained committed to containing budget deficits and 
managed to do so by cutting expenditures severely. The remaining deficit 
continued to be financed by credit arrears with Russia.
1.31994-1996
The second phase of privatisation consisted of a plan which included three sub­
programs: A case by case privatisation which concerned large firms (more than
5,000 employees) to be mainly sold to foreign investors; a mass privatisation 
programme for medium enterprises (between 200 and 5,000 employees) to be sold 
by state auctions to the public; and a small-scale privatisation programme for the 
sell-off of small businesses (less than 200 employees) also to the public. This 
phase was expected to start in the second half of 1993 but took really off only in 
1994.
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This second stage of privatisation proved to be more successful than the earlier 
experiment in relation to small businesses. Post-sale performance surveys showed 
real improvements indicating an increase in employment, investments and in the 
variety of goods offered. This was a substantial improvement as compared to the 
earlier privatisation phase, where only one third of the privatised businesses were 
said to do better after privatisation (Baietti 1995).
The same could not be said for the 'mass privatisation' component. This targeted 
medium enterprises which were to be converted in joint stock companies with 
workers entitled to no more than 10% of the stocks. Citizens were given coupons 
to be exchanged for shares of Investment Privatisation Funds (IPF) and these 
funds were to bid for enterprises in privatisation auctions using the coupons as 
means of payment. For instance, between April 1994 and September 1995, 18 
auctions were organised where blocks of shares were offered to the 169 
privatisation funds existing at the time. During that period approximately 1,000 
medium enterprises were privatised comprising about 400,000 employees. In a 
typical privatised enterprise 51% of shares were sold to a group of 5-10 
investment funds, 39% were retained by the government and the rest was given to 
employees.
Firms with more than 5,000 employees were to be privatised on a case by case 
basis. These were usually large kombinats that often produced a small variety of 
products for very large markets guaranteed by the Soviet Union. The privatisation 
of these enterprises proved very problematic. Initially, only 38 enterprises were 
put on the market but the list was soon expanded to 180 with increased focus on 
the sale to private foreign investors. By the end of 1995, about 40 transactions 
were prepared though only five enterprises were actually sold. In June 1995, a 
special programme for the gas and oil sector was approved but this was soon 
overtaken by the introduction of foreign management contract practises where 
principally foreign firms were given the right to manage large state owned 
complexes for a limited time, usually five years. In return, the foreign companies
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would receive bonuses or shares in profits. In October 1995, 27 firms were under 
management contracts and, of these, five were later cancelled.
Table 3.2 -  Number of privatised enterprises
1994 1995 1996 1997
Small-scale privatisation 2,748 2,477 3,393 5,590
Mass privatisation n.a. 147 497 1,122
Privatisation in agriculture 918 513 138 18
Case by case privatisation n.a. 5 28 47
Total 4,147 3,142 4,056 6,777
Source: EU (1998)
Land and natural resources remained state property but a privatisation programme 
for agriculture was launched to privatise non-agricultural assets. Assets' shares 
were transferred to farm workers together with inheritable land lease rights of up 
to 99 years. By the end of 1996, more than three-quarters of all state farms had 
been privatised in this manner. For agro-processing enterprises, after an 
unsuccessful attempt to transfer shares to insiders, this category was included in 
the small scale and mass privatisation programmes.
Housing privatisation was mostly left in the hands of local authorities and 
followed different patterns from place to place. Altogether, the process of 
privatisation reached 50-60% of its plan by the end of 1996. A third phase of the 
privatisation programme was under preparation in 1996 for the period 1996-1998 
and substantial progress was made in 1997 (table 3.2).
Following the drastic changes occurred in the prices and trade regimes, it soon 
became obvious that enterprise restructuring was to be a crucial element of 
reforms. The process of privatisation allowed for greater autonomy but did not 
guarantee per se a qualitative amelioration of enterprises' performances. For small 
businesses, private ownership made a substantial difference in performance as it is 
witnessed by post-privatisation surveys. But for medium and large enterprises, 
which relied much more on the integrated Soviet production system, problems 
were substantial ranging from the disruption of inter-republican exchange
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systems, to financial difficulties determined by a general scarcity of liquidity and 
credits, to loss of markets.
Moreover, the change in ownership from the state to a combination of insiders, 
investment funds, the state and occasionally private and foreign investors 
translated into little control rather than better management. Despite measures 
aimed at simplifying the ownership structure such as raising the ceilings of 
individual funds' maximum stake in any enterprise or allowing the funds to co­
ordinate their acquisitions, complex ownership remained a major obstacle to 
restructuring. The lack of a clear ownership guidance and control left the old 
managers in total control of their enterprises. These managers not only lacked a 
proper understanding of market mechanisms, foreign markets and business 
strategies but they also found in their own enterprises a quick source of easy cash 
ready to be extracted through improper management of wages and subsidies, 
depletion of stocks or sales of equipment. Where old managers have been replaced 
with new ones this in effect facilitated this kind of mechanism as loyalty to 
workers no longer stood as an obstacle to improper management.
Concerning state firms, slow progress was made by the government in imposing 
financial discipline. By October 1993, the government prepared a list of 389 
insolvent enterprises. For only eight of these liquidation procedures were 
established, while another group of fifteen was targeted for either restructuring or 
bankruptcy procedures. Also, in order to improve the management of state 
companies, state holding companies were formed in 1994. About 80 of these 
entities were created controlling about 2,000 enterprises. The holdings were 
expected to be in a better position than government bodies to monitor the 
activities and prepare restructuring plans. However, this experiment proved 
unsuccessful as these holdings replicated government attitudes and, by the end of 
1995, 30 units had been already dismantled.
In September 1994, the government initiated an additional enterprise restructuring 
programme to deal with highly indebted enterprises selecting them for liquidation,
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restructuring or rehabilitation. A rehabilitation bank was instituted in April 1995 
by presidential decree with the purpose of taking control of selected enterprises 
facing major financial crisis. The idea was to take by the hand enterprises in 
difficulty and help them in adopting a restructuring plan. This was supported by 
financial assistance to be decreased throughout a certain period of time. Up to the 
end of 1995, the role of the bank had been marginal accounting for only a small 
fraction of non-performing enterprises. A restructuring agency under the ministry 
of economy was also instituted to deal with the liquidation of other state 
enterprises in financial distress but, at the end of 1996, little progress was visible 
on this front.
Further measures were introduced to liberalise foreign trade. In February 1995, 
licensing and quotas on exports and imports were abolished, except for a limited 
number of strategic commodities, and all state-owned foreign trade organisations 
(14 at the time) were de-monopolised. A system of contract registration was 
introduced and barter transactions, which became particularly intense in the 
previous two years, were banned. Nonetheless, tariffs and import and export 
duties remained a tool often used by the government at its discretion when 
deemed necessary and changes in this area occurred frequently between 1992 and 
1996.
With the introduction of the local currency in November 1993, the Kazakh 
authorities became finally in full control of monetary policies. This allowed them 
to embark on an effective process of stabilisation. The new legal tender, the tenge, 
was left to float on the market with the central bank intervening on the foreign 
exchange market only when necessary. The value of the tenge which was initially 
introduced at 5 units per US dollar, devalued to reach 70 tenge per dollar by the 
end of 1996. In January 1994, the IMF approved a first stand-by agreement for 
Kazakhstan. The turbulent period 1992-1993, when monetary issues were beyond 
the control of the central authorities, was over and the IMF found itself in the 
position to negotiate with the government a number of stabilisation measures. 
Following a difficult first six months characterised by fast devaluation of the
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tenge and an inter-enterprise arrears clearing operation, by the summer of 1994 
tight credit policies were introduced. These had the almost immediate effect of 
reducing inflation, turning real interest rates positive and stabilising the exchange 
rate. The money-base targets established by the IMF were met and foreign 
reserves started to grow. Also, the balance of payments indicators were close to 
target despite a reduction in the overall trade flows.
Concerning the financial systema things started to ameliorate with the introduction 
of the national currency. In December 1993, ten of the NIS countries created an 
inter-state bank to deal with all payments and credit issues . Some improvements 
were also achieved by allowing commercial banks to deal directly with cross- 
border transactions reducing substantially the delay in payments. Also, during 
1994 and in the aftermath, a number of domestic clearinghouses emerged and 
payments systems were improved by the use of couriers and modem accounting 
practises. By then, however, inter-enterprises arrears had accumulated to dramatic 
levels. The 1994 clearing operation reduced inter-enterprises arrears substantially 
but, following the credit restrictions introduced with the stabilisation packages, 
arrears started to grow again and in 1997 they were still growing.
Banking legislation was also improved dining this period. A law on the national 
bank of Kazakhstan was passed in April 1995 and a law on commercial banks was 
introduced in August 1995. Bank supervision and reserve requirements were 
strengthened between October 1994 and October 1995 inducing more than fifty of 
the 191 banks to close down. The banking system now includes a number of state- 
specialised banks, some medium size joint ventures banks, foreign banks and a 
large number of small commercial banks. A money market was introduced in 
April 1995, the Almaty Inter-bank Financial House, for short-term operations. 
Also payments system were improved in 1995 with the introduction of electronic 
information systems and a national clearing house. A stock exchange, the Central 
Asian Stock Exchange, also exists where transactions have been small though 
growing.
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Budget revenues fell drastically in 1994 due to difficulties in tax collection, high 
tax exemptions, inter-enterprise arrears and appreciation of the real exchange rate 
which penalised exports. In response, the government tightened tax collection, 
introduced sales taxes on gasoline, increased rent payments by domestic oil 
producers and extended VAT coverage. Cuts were made to transfers and 
subsidies, infrastructure investments, operation and maintenance outlays and 
defence while some wage and social benefits payments were delayed. Thanks to 
these measures, and despite the adverse trend in revenues, the budget deficit from 
an estimated 16% in the first half of 1994 turned into a 4% surplus by the third 
quarter of the year. Budget deficits have been contained below the 3% target ever 
since.
3 For an extensive analysis of monetary and exchange rates issues among NIS countries see IMF 
(1994c)
2. Macroeconomic developments4
2.1 The initial trade shock
The industrial structure inherited from the Soviet Union by Kazakhstan could not 
and did not stand alone as an integrated system of production. The system of 
industrial relations was one of the tools designed by Soviet authorities to foster 
internal stability. The higher the number of inter-republic exchanges the higher 
the dependency of each republic on the others and the lower the economic 
incentives to break apart from the Union. Thus, in order to produce a finished 
good such a car engine, several republics would be involved, providing raw 
materials, metals, the different components and eventually a market. Labour 
allocation was also organised on a similar principle. Workers in a car factory in 
Southern Siberia would be originally recruited from different republics while a 
newly trained civil servant could expect to be sent almost anywhere in the Union. 
Trade was also an important element of the control that the Soviet Union 
exercised over other Eastern European countries while the CMEA could maintain 
a certain isolation from the rest of the world economy also thanks to its internal 
self-reliant industrial structure.
At independence, Kazakhstan production capacity relied extensively on Soviet 
supplies of intermediate and finished goods as well as on markets for finished 
products. This is different from any other country relying on foreign trade for 
production. Kazakhstan producers knew and usually dealt with only one supplier 
per production input and transactions were planned and executed in Moscow.
4 Data in this section should be treated with caution. There are several difficulties in estimating any 
figure for Kazakhstan between 1990 and 1996. Data for the period 1990-1992 is very scarce and 
the different sources used (CSAK, IMF, IBRD, EU, ADB, OECD) are consistently inconsistent. 
The accounting methods have been changing during the period particularly starting from 1994 
with the introduction of the UN System of National Accounts (SNA). Hyperinflation makes it very 
difficult to adjust annual figures correctly. The unit of account changed in November 1993 from 
Ruble to Tenge and the exchange rate was arbitrarily set at 500 Ruble per Tenge. Such difficulties 
explain the significant differences in data offered by different sources. Most o f the variance across 
sources seems to be explained by the deflators adopted. Perhaps the most reliable way of 
proceeding among these difficulties is to estimate figures in US dollars using the current exchange 
rate. This would not account for over and under-evaluation of the local currency but it allows to
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Producers did not have to seek suppliers, bargain for prices or market their 
products to the same extent as a typical producer in a Western country would have 
to. With independence, transforming these industrial relations into trade relations 
was not a straightforward exercise. In this respect, trade data may provide the first 
insight into the production difficulties encountered by Kazakhstan with 
independence.
Table 3.3 shows World Bank trade estimates for Kazakhstan between 1990 and 
1994. The decline in both exports and imports is very deep with exports declining 
almost four-folds and imports declining more than five-folds. The decline 
occurred almost entirely in inter-republican trade. This shifted the balance of trade 
from inter-republic to rest of the world trade. The most significant changes 
occurred in 1992, the first year of independence. In 1990, before independence, 
89% of exports and 88% of imports were with other Soviet republics. Right after 
independence, at the end of 1992, only 59% of exports and 72% of imports were 
from inter-republic trade. Though the scale of the decline may be overestimated 
due to the over evaluation of the ruble in 1990 (data are estimated in USD using 
the official/commercial exchange rate), it is quite clear that inter-republican trade 
relations experienced a severe shock following the declaration of independence in 
December 1991. Overall trade volume (exports + imports) also deteriorated as a 
percentage of GDP passing from approximately 37% in 1990 to 25% in 19945. 
Therefore trade reduced its contribution to production during the period despite 
trade liberalisation reforms.
anchor estimates to a stable measure and to have comparable numbers throughout the period. This 
was the method adopted when series had to be constructed.
5 Calculated from CSAK (1997a), p.84
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Table 3.3 -  Foreign and inter-republican trade
USD (m.) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Foreign trade
Exports 1777 1183 1489 1529 1327
Imports 3250 2546 961 1269 1694
Inter-republican trade
Exports 14310 14285 2141 3126 3213
Imports 24261 16949 2463 3576 3221
Total
Exports 16087 15468 3630 4655 4540
Imports 27511 19495 3424 4845 4915
Source: IBRD (1995a); Million of current USD at official/commercial exchange rates
On the capital accounts side, Kazakhstan attracted significant Foreign Direct 
Investments (FDI), though concentrated in the oil and mineral sectors. Total FDI 
between 1993 and 1995 amounted to 1.5bn dollars of which at least half came 
from Chevron Co. alone. Oil reserves attracted all major multinationals which by 
means of joint ventures secured the research and exploitation of the richest oil 
fields in the country. However, oil production is for export and the pipelines 
which can take the oil to open sea and international markets are still under 
construction. Oil revenues declined during the period. The external outstanding 
debt stood at 25.3% of GDP in September 1995 (IMF 1996b) and it was mainly 
due to outstanding credits to Russia (42.6%), commercial banks (26.9%), the IMF 
(13.7%) and other multilateral institutions (10.1%).
2.2. The structure of the output decline
According to recent revisions made by different sources (IBRD 1997a and EU 
1997), output declined by approximately 40% between 1990 and 1996. A first 
shock occurred in 1991 with an output decline estimated in between eight and 
nine percent. In 1992, output decline is apparently mild but this reflects a 
substantial increase in agricultural output due to an exceptional harvest while 
most other sectors experience the first significant losses. 1993 and 1994 are the 
worst years when all sectors including agriculture declined substantially while the 
recession slowed down in 1995 and stopped in 1996 (table 3.4).
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The decline has been uneven across sectors. Only five sectors not particularly 
strategic for the Kazakh economy (housing, public utilities, personal services, 
finance and credit and general administration) showed improvements while all 
other sectors declined considerably. Six strategic sectors declined by more than 
50% (industry, construction, transport, information and computer services, 
geology and science) with agriculture showing a comparable fall (-47%). The first 
sectors affected by the recession have been construction, transports and industry. 
These sectors declined sharply in 1992 and 1993 while most of the fall in most 
sectors occurred between 1991 and 1994. Agriculture declines irreversibly from 
1992, irrespective of weather conditions. Generally speaking, the material and 
production spheres suffered the most as compared to public services such as 
health and education.
Table 3.4 - GDP volume indices by branch
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1990% 1996%
Industry 100 100 83 72 52 47 48 20.7 24.5
Agriculture 100 77 100 93 73 55 53 34.3 14.1
Construction 100 89 53 39 33 20 16 12.1 5.1
Transport 100 94 76 64 46 40 41 8.7 11.2
Communication 100 100 93 89 89 85 84 0.8 1.9
Trade 100 99 82 76 63 67 77 8.2 20.0
Inform, and Computer services 100 93 66 47 39 32 20 0.2 0.1
Geology 100 102 65 54 45 39 33 0.9 0.5
Housing 100 102 104 104 106 105 105 1.7 4.4
Public utilities 100 103 104 99 95 107 104 1.6 5.1
Personal Services 100 100 102 97 93 94 109 0.8 0.5
Health care 100 96 100 95 89 86 85 2.2 2.9
Physical culture 100 96 100 95 90 84 78 0.0 0.0
Social security 100 95 99 94 99 101 95 0.1 0.1
Education 100 104 102 99 94 93 90 4.3 4.9
Culture 100 98 84 80 70 69 61 0.7 0.5
Science 100 95 80 70 35 34 29 0.7 0.4
Finance and credit 100 107 117 134 125 121 110 1.0 1.3
General administration 100 113 125 130 143 144 145 1.0 2.6
Total 100 91 88 79 65 60 61 100.0 100.0
Source: CSAK (1997a) and IBRD (1997a). Note that sectors’ shares have been calculated at 
current prices.
As a consequence of the asymmetric decline, the sectoral composition of output 
changed. In 1990, agriculture contributed for more than one third of output while 
by 1996 this share collapsed to a mere 14%. Construction also lost heavily in
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relative terms reducing its contribution to output by more than half. Industry and 
transport gained in relative terms as well as most of non-material sectors. The first 
six sectors listed (industry, agriculture, construction, transport, communications 
and trade) contributed to almost 85% of GDP in 1990 and about 77% in 1996. The 
shift is therefore from material to non-material sectors and from agriculture and 
construction to industry, transport and trade.
Within industry, the decline in production affected virtually every sector with very 
few exceptions but the decline has been very uneven across industrial sectors. 
Table 3.5 shows output for the most important industrial commodities. The 
decline in industry occurred most notably from 1991 onwards and light industry 
and food production are affected first. The cumulated decline of these two sectors 
shows exceptional losses. It is evident that losses at the top of the industrial 
production chain (extraction and raw materials by-products) have been much less 
severe than losses at the bottom end (clothing and other consumer goods). There 
is also a visible progression moving down the production line. Metals and fuels 
declined more than raw materials while clothing and ‘white goods’ almost 
disappeared from the production map. Food production (commercialised through 
official channels) declined by 70%.
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Table 3.5 - Volume indices for major industrial products
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Extraction (total) 100 99 96 85 79 63 58
Brown coal 100 114 121 136 139 107 104
Crude petroleum 100 102 101 90 86 83 97
Iron ore 100 92 74 55 44 63 55
Natural gas 100 111 114 94 63 83 90
Raw mat. by-products (average) 100 96 89 71 49 48 48
Building material, cement 100 91 78 48 24 21 13
Cast iron 100 95 89 68 47 50 49
Rental black metal 100 95 89 70 47 43 46
Steel 100 94 90 67 44 45 48
Benzine 100 102 97 83 59 63 65
Diesel fuel 100 101 91 87 70 66 67
Food (average) 100 97 69 54 44 34 30
Meat 100 94 70 61 46 30 19
Milk products 100 95 73 46 34 23 14
Butter 100 89 73 79 58 35 19
Cheese 100 94 66 63 51 34 23
Wine 100 119 72 36 20 14 13
Oil 100 106 62 46 45 45 43
Flour 100 103 100 98 98 77 78
Sugar 100 96 67 35 28 34 37
Non-alcoholic beverages 100 79 36 27 20 11 25
Clothing (average) 100 91 74 59 32 9 8
Cotton yam 100 100 98 88 50 10 8
Woven cotton fabrics 100 89 89 90 56 14 14
Woven woollen fabrics 100 91 68 59 29 9 6
Woven silk fabrics 100 83 66 20 6 6 4
Shoes 100 93 50 40 19 5 n.a.
Other consumers goods (average) 100 94 89 87 29 8 4
Washing machines 100 106 101 69 24 13 n.a.
Radio sets 100 116 130 97 5 0 n.a.
Tape recorders 100 65 57 62 57 11 n.a.
Paper 100 68 46 140 48 12 4
Tires 100 115 109 68 10 3 4
Source: Constructed from CSAK (1997b) and De Broeck and Kostial (1998)
Agriculture was initially the largest sector in the economy but following an 
overall decline of almost 50%, the sector fell behind industry and even trade by 
1996. According to De Broeck and Kostial (1998) such decline was due mainly to 
significant terms of trade losses: prices in agriculture as measured by the
sector’s implicit GDP price deflators, increased by only half as much as those in 
other sectors. According to World Bank estimates, in 1993, the prices o f inputs 
used in agriculture increased by 18.8 times while output prices increased by 7.8 
times” (p.41). This divergence no longer persisted after 1994 (CSAK 1997a), but 
it contributes to explain agricultural losses up until then. Cuts in subsidies
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throughout the period and the accumulation of credit arrears determined a 
reduction in further lending leaving the sector with severe shortages in 
agricultural inputs and little chance to invest in compelling technological upgrade. 
As a consequence, productivity as measured by output per hectare continued to 
decline for most products throughout the period (De Broeck and Kostial 1998, 
p.46).
The overall fall in output slowed down considerably from the second semester of
1994 onwards but intermediate sectors such as light industry and manufacturing 
continued to decline visibly after 1994, the period we referred to as the 
‘adjustment’ phase. This can be better observed from the input-output tables by 
sector of activity6. Table 3.6 was assembled making use of the 1994 and 1996 
intermediate consumption matrixes . After having deflated 1996 values with 
producers prices indexes, the difference in values between 1994 and 1996 were 
calculated. For clarity, only the signs of the real changes are reported in the table. 
Therefore signs indicate a decrease in activity between 1994 and 1996 and *+’ 
signs indicate an increase. The ‘O’ values show that there have been no exchanges 
between sectors during the period. The table has been divided in four main areas, 
heavy and light industry and consumers and public services. The categorisation 
does not reflect any international practice but it helps to reflect on the structural 
changes that occurred.
The sectors the most inter-related with the rest of the economy are those where 
very few zeroes are present; that is the top left hand comer of the table, the heavy 
and light industry sectors. Almost all cells in these areas show negative signs with 
few exceptions represented by electricity, oil and gas, food products and
6 These tables were compiled during the Soviet times for planning purposes and Leontief made 
them popular in the West by making an adaptation to the US economy. Recently, the tables have 
been revised to make them compatible with the 1993 UN System of National Accounts (SNA).
7 Prof. Ferrari of the University of Florence attracted my attention to these tables and provided the
1995 and part of the 1994 sets of data. Ms. Moldakulova of the Kazakh State Management 
Academy in Almaty arranged for the complete sets of 1994 and 1996 tables to reach me. Ms. 
Kairova of the Committee for Statistical Analysis provided the data. I am grateful to all of them 
for their help. Ferrari (1997) made use of the 1994 and 1995 tables to assess the Kazakh economy. 
In effect these tables are the only valuable tools to evaluate the structure of the recession. 
Unfortunately, pre-1994 tables were not available.
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communications. Basically inter-industrial relations in these strategic areas have 
been mostly declining during the adjustment phase. Consumers and public 
services sectors are much less integrated, especially within each category. This 
reflects the nature of these sectors which are directly reliant on final demand. Here 
the general picture is more positive with reprisal of activities in many areas. The 
group of sectors that show negative signs almost across the board is light industry 
which is also the group of sectors which has the least number of zeroes. In other 
words, the group of industries the most interrelated with the rest of the economy is 
also the group of industries that was still visibly declining between 1994 and 
1996.
Thus, the overall deceleration of the output decline during the adjustment phase 
reflects in fact a shift of activities from industrial manufacturing towards final 
services. Given that oil and gas are and will be supported in the future as a priority 
area, the economy has been in fact polarising towards the two tail ends of the 
economic structure, raw materials on the one hand and final services consumption 
on the other. This means that increases in output of less integrated sectors such as 
consumers’ services have little ‘multiplicatory’ impact on the whole economy. 
Conversely, further declines in strategic areas such as light manufacturing have 
large multiplicatory effects on the rest of the economy. As a consequence, the 
transition from the ‘adjustment’ to the ‘recovery’ phase and in particular the speed 
of such transition will very much depend from whether this ‘polarisation’ trend 
will continue to occur or not.
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Table 3.6 - Intermediate consumption matrix (1994-1996 changes at 1994 producer prices)
Heavy industry Light Consumers Public services
industry services
Elec Oil Coal Ferr. Nfm Ch& Ma Tim Buil Text Foo Con Agri Tran Com Cred Trad Inf. Hou Edu Heal Cult Scie Tot.
ber ding ile d str cult sport it e &T sing cat. th ure nee
Electricity - - - - - - - + - - - + - - - - + - - - + + - -
Oil and gas + + - + + + - -
Coal - 0 - - - - - - 0 - - - + - + - + 0 + - + - - -
Ferrous metals + + - - - + + - + + - + 0 + 0 0 0 - -
Non ferrous metals + 0 - - - + + + - - - + - - + - + + + 0 0 0 - -
Chemicals and petrochemicals + + - - - + - - - - - - - - + - + + + 0 + 0 - -
Machinery + + - - - - - + - - - - - - + - + + + + + + - -
Timber processing, pulp and paper + + + - - + + 0 + 0 0 -
Building and construction material + - - - + - - - + - - - - - + - - 0 - - - + - -
Textile and clothing - + - - + + - - - - - - - - + - - 0 - 0 + + 0 -
Food products + + - + + + + + + - - - - - 0 - - 0 + - + + + -
Construction 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Agriculture and Forestry 0 - 0 0 0 - - - 0 - - + - - 0 0 + 0 + + - 0 0 -
Transportation 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 0 + 0 -
Communications - - + - + - - - - - - - - - + + - + + + + - + +
Credit, finance, gen. admin, and soc. org. - - - - - - - - - - - + - + - - + - + - - - - -
Trade and catering 0 - + + + 0 + + 0 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 0 -
Information and computer services - - - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 0 - - + + + 0 + - 0 0 0 0 -
Housing services and communal services + - 0 + + + + + - +
Education 0 - 0 0 0 - - - + - + 0 + + + 0 0 0 +
Health care, phys. culture and soc. sec. 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 + + 0 +
Culture and arts - - - - - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
Science 0 + 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
Total + - + + + + + + - -
Source: CSAK (1995a and 1998a)
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2.3 Prices and wages
Following the price and trade liberalisation measures starting from January 1992, 
inflation boomed partly because of a large overhanging inflation and shortages of 
goods and partly because of lack of monetary discipline. Only after the 
introduction of stabilisation measures in 1994, inflation growth gradually declined 
(chart 3.1).
The two major inflation peaks are associated with price liberalisation 
implemented in April 1991 and in January 1992. Between January 1992 and July 
1993 we observe a period of instability when we explained that the central bank of 
Russia had difficulty in co-ordinating monetary policies of the ex republics and a 
certain monetary relaxation was in place. The period of accelerating inflation 
between July and November 1993 coincides with the period when pre-1993 rubles 
were flowing into Kazakhstan from other republics where the tender was no 
longer valid. After the introduction of the Tenge in November 1993, the currency 
depreciated quickly contributing to a new price increase. Tight monetary policies 
introduced in January and February 1994 slowed down inflation but between 
March and May, in an effort to clear inter-enterprises arrears, a large quantity of 
credits was injected into the system and inflation accelerated again. Finally, from 
the summer of 1994, tight monetary policies induced a deceleration of inflation to 
one-digit levels.
Q
Producer prices have increased generally faster than consumer pnces , especially 
in critical times such as during price liberalisation. This is partly due to policies 
aimed at protecting consumers and primary consumers products and partly to the 
fact that many of the locally produced consumers products have been substituted 
by cheap imports while supply of intermediate goods remained constrained by 
credit restrictions, trade and payments difficulties.
8 By producer prices I mean input prices for industrial producers.
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This producer-consumer prices constituted an additional pressure on industrial 
producers who could no longer transfer the increase in prices onto consumers, 
experiencing an additional squeeze in profits. Therefore, the increase in 
producers’ prices has been partly transmitted onto workers (by containing real 
wages growth) and partly has been bore by enterprises. This is also the opposite of 
what has been found for Poland and Czechoslovakia in the early years of 
transition where consumer prices rose faster than producer prices (Basu, Estrin 
and Svejnar 1997, p. 272).
Chart 3.1 -  Monthly percentage changes in prices and wages 1991-1996
- • - p p i
- ■ - C P I
- ■ - W a g e *
Source: Calculated from EU (1996), IMF (1993) and De Broeck and Kostial (1998). 1993 nominal 
wages are estimates. ‘W ages’ are the workers’ monthly earnings as reported by enterprises.
The chart also shows that nominal wages have increased less than consumers’ 
prices. The difference between the two measures represents the loss in real wages 
during the period. Nominal wages show significant swings explained by monthly 
variations but it is evident that during inflation peaks wages did not adjust, leaving 
real wages significantly reduced each time such peaks occurred. After 1994, when 
inflation decelerated, nominal wages showed faster growth than both consumer 
and production prices.
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This suggests that expectations have played a very significant role in determining 
wage adjustments. When inflation was growing at high-speed wages adjusted very 
slowly, when inflation was decelerating after a long hyperinflationary exposure 
wages were growing faster than inflation. The fall in real wages may also be 
explained by the fact that many enterprises entered the transition process already 
with excess of labour. With the consequent output fall and the general reluctance 
in shedding labour in the early years, inflation may have simply corrected the 
price of artificially high wages moving towards equilibrium.
Real wages decline has been nonetheless exceptional and did not occur evenly 
across sectors. Table 3.7 shows monthly average wages in USD equivalent and 
according to administrative sources. The early data should be treated with caution, 
particularly 1990, because the exchange rate adopted was what the Soviet 
authorities deemed correct at the time and does not reflect street value. However, 
a sharp decline in wages is evident and again very acute between 1991 and 1993. 
It is noticeable that the fall in real wages does not seem to follow the same pattern 
across sectors as the fall in output. Two sectors that performed rather badly such 
as industry and construction maintained relatively high wages while trade and 
catering which did relatively well did not close the original 1990 wage gap with 
other sectors. This is a theme that will be explored when we will be looking at the 
reallocation of labour across sectors in chapter 4.
92
Table 3.7 - Monthly average wages (USD equivalent) and prices
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Economy average 442 245 30 22 32 75 94
Material sphere 478 259 33 24 37 84 102
Industry 493 297 39 29 52 122 144
Construction 550 298 37 29 50 123 130
Agriculture 487 230 31 17 19 37 49
Transport 505 274 37 31 45 106 132
Communications 380 216 24 21 34 92 123
Trade and catering 338 186 18 15 22 52 62
Non-material sphere 338 198 18 16 22 55 76
Housing and public utilities 332 187 21 18 31 71 94
Education 303 177 16 14 17 46 69
Culture and Art 272 160 13 12 14 36 54
Science and scientific services 533 264 29 21 27 70 91
Health, physical culture and social insurance 297 196 14 11 15 42 62
Credit and insurance 590 413 53 50 78 171 180
General administration 558 263 30 24 33 70 98
Consumer prices
(end year, annual changes)
137 2984 2169 1160 60.4 28.6
Source: Calculated from CSAK (1997b) and IMF (1993)
2.4. Consumption and investments
From the production side, the general economic decline moved through wages to 
households. The compilation of GDP by final use (table 3.8) informs us about 
public and private consumption and investment. Households’ consumption 
declined by half during the period while government expenditure declined 
significantly but only in relation to the item ‘individual’ (transfers to households 
and enterprises). Both households’ consumption and government transfers to 
households and enterprises declined seriously starting from 1993 and experienced 
the worse decline between 1993 and 1995. Therefore, the decline in consumption 
(demand for goods and services) comes with approximately a two years delay vis- 
a-vis the first output decline. When this occurs, households are affected 
simultaneously by falls in consumption, government transfers and services 
provided by non-profit institutions.
93
As noted by Easterly and Fischer (1994) and as will be illustrated further, Soviet 
growth relied extensively on investments. With substantial labour hoarding within 
factories and slow technological development in most sectors, increases in 
productivity were a serious concern of Soviet authorities. In Kazakhstan, 
investments were mainly financed in the form of transfers from the Union budget 
and, not surprisingly, with independence these types of transfers were cut first. 
Gross Fixed Capital Investments declined by almost 80% between 1990 and 1996, 
twice as much as output. The decline occurred from the start with a 40% loss 
evident already in 1992. Large investment falls occurred in agriculture, 
construction, trade and catering while transport and communication decline was 
contained. In relative terms, this meant a gain of industry, transport and 
communication vis-a-vis other sectors. Within industry, the oil and gas and coal 
sectors alone represented in 1995 more than 50% of all investments in industry, 
the rest being for the quasi totality in metallurgy and electric power generation. 
Therefore the relative gain in industry reflects a gain in the energy sector and a 
loss in manufacturing. This means that manufacturing, other than the initial 
adverse shock generated by trade, suffered from a lack of investments throughout 
the transition.
Table 3.8 -  Consumption and investments
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Final consumption expend. (Total) 100 96.8 96.1 84.4 67.2 54.9 54.6
Households 100 96.8 96.1 86.6 64.9 51 52.7
Government 100 104.8 106.5 81.2 81.8 69.4 69.4
Individual 100 102.4 98.4 73.6 64.9 81.4 66.3
Collective 100 111 132 102.7 120.7 119.4 108.5
Non-profit instit. serving households 100 69.4 61.7 55.3 49.8 21.5 13.1
Gross capital formation 100 56.1 54.6 36.1 43.2 32.2 19.2
of which: Gross fixed capital invest. 100 74.2 61.9 61.6 48.6 34.7 21.6
Source: CSAK (1997a)
2.5. The government budget
With the process of privatisation under way, the economic decline and consequent 
fall in budget revenues, the government weight in the economy diminished 
considerably (table 3.9). Both revenues and expenditures declined substantially
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and the ability of the government has been to maintain small budget deficits in 
spite of the drastic decline in tax revenues and transfers from Russia (grants). 
Only in 1991 and 1992 was the budget deficit above target. The price of such 
stability has been a severe cut in expenditures. This concentrated on transfers’ 
cuts to households and enterprises and on a reduction in investments, while 
current expenditures such as salaries of public employees remained relatively 
high. The figures in table 3.9 are the more worrying given that they are in 
percentage of GDP, which we said declined by 40%.
Table 3.9 - The State Budget (% of GDP)*
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Total revenues and grants 32.7 25.0 24.1 24.4 18.0 17.9 16.2
Total revenues 22.8 20.5 22.4 24.4 18.0 17.9 n.a.
Current revenues 22.8 20.5 22.4 21.5 17.7 17.2 n.a.
Tax revenues 21.9 18.9 21.5 17.1 12.0 10.4 n.a.
Non-Tax revenues 0.8 1.7 0.9 4.4 5.7 6.8 n.a.
Capital revenues 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.9 0.3 0.7 n.a.
Grants 9.9 4.5 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 n.a.
Total expenditure 31.4 32.9 31.4 25.2 20.5 20.3 18.6
Current expenditure n.a. n.a. 24.7 20.1 14.9 17.7 n.a.
Consumption n.a. n.a. 17.5 17.5 11.3 13.7 n.a.
Interest payments n.a. n.a. 2.2 0.1 1.7 0.2 n.a.
Transfers to households n.a. n.a. 3.0 1.1 0.7 0.8 n.a.
Other transfers and subsisdies n.a. n.a. 1.9 1.4 1.3 2.5 n.a.
Capital expenditure n.a. n.a. 6.7 5.1 5.6 2.6 n.a.
Source: IBRD (1996b), IMF (1993); (*) It does not include extra-budgetary funds
The stages of the output decline should now be fairly clear. Sectors heavily 
dependent on trade and Soviet transfers declined first. Construction is the first 
sector to fall because it depended almost exclusively on investments determined 
by the central plan and accounted for in government spending. These were the 
first cuts in public investment to occur in 1990 and 1991 and building projects had 
to be stopped almost immediately. Transport also declined at an early stage partly 
for the general slowdown in trade which occurred between 1990 and 1992 and 
partly for sharp increases in fuel prices following the January 1992 price 
liberalisation. The second shock occurs in manufacturing around 1992-1993 
during the post-independence trade fall, when the hyperinflationary peaks in 
production prices were particularly severe. From 1993 onwards, the recession
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expands to the demand side in the form of public and private consumption 
declines.
During this process, the economy has compartmentalised, polarising around the 
energy sector on the one side and public and consumers’ services on the other 
side. The production multiplier effect generally supported by manufacturing 
progressively vanished compromising the capacity of the economy to ‘bounce 
back’. The fall in production turned into a substantial fall in government revenues 
with further cuts to expenditures on households and investments reducing the 
overall government role in the economy and households reliance on the state.
3. Explaining the recession
Several aspects concerning the causes of the output decline should be self-evident 
by now. Nevertheless, the causes of the output decline in transitional economies 
have been one of the most controversial issues in the transition literature. The size 
of the output decline in concomitance with transitional reforms made these same 
reforms an easy target for critique, especially from those who rejected a radical 
approach to structural changes. And as a reaction to such critiques, alternative 
paradigms have been developed either supporting the idea that reforms have not 
been successful only where they have not been implemented properly or shifting 
the attention to arguments other than transitional reforms.
Popular themes emerged from this debate have been the ‘statistical artefact’ 
hypothesis, the speed, timing and sequencing of reforms, the ‘soft budget’ 
constraint hypothesis, the role of the initial structural conditions, various supply 
and demand shocks hypotheses, the ‘misallocation of resources’ hypothesis, the 
‘credit crunch’ and the ‘disorganisation’ hypotheses. Here, some of these 
hypotheses will be discussed in relation to the Kazakhstan experience.
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3.1 The statistical artefact hypothesis
Several authors argued that the size of output in Soviet times was overestimated 
either because of over-reporting on the part of the statistical offices determined by 
political pressure or because of over-reporting on the part of enterprises keen to 
show good results and the achievement of planned targets. With the beginning of 
the process of transition and the growth of the private and informal sectors it has 
been argued that accountability and coverage diminished reducing artificially the 
size of output reported in official publications (Winiecki 1991, Berg and Sachs 
1992, Easterly and Fischer 1994).
These arguments have been contested on several grounds. For Poland, Nuti and 
Portes (1993) argued that the shadow economy may have been large already in the 
pre-1989 period, thus understating and not overstating pre-transition output. Also, 
enterprise over-reporting in countries such as Poland (since 1982) and Hungary 
(since 1968) where enterprises were free to set their output targets may not be a 
sustainable argument according to Rosati (1994). Balcerowics (1995) suggested 
that enterprises may have been encouraged to hide production capacity and stocks 
in order to negotiate lower output targets with the central authorities, thus 
underestimating pre-transition production.
As far as Kazakhstan is concerned, several arguments and recent evidence suggest 
that the statistical artefact hypothesis should be rejected. The IBRD (1997a) and 
the European Union (EU 1997) carried out independently and at different times 
revisions of the national accounts and of the output decline in Kazakhstan using 
different methodologies. The two sources come to very similar conclusions 
supporting the general estimate that output declined by approximately 40% 
between 1990 and 1996.
If we are sceptical about national accounts, we can follow Kaufmann and 
Kaliberda’s (1996) suggestion and use electricity consumption data as a proxy for 
output (table 3.10). Electricity consumption shows a smaller decline as compared
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to output by approximately 10 percentage points (30% as opposed to 40%). This 
is no small decline and it should not be underestimated the fact that many large 
enterprises involved in the transformation of metals use machinery (high 
temperature ovens for instance) which cannot be shut unless the firm decides to 
stop production altogether. These firms continue to use large quantities of 
electricity even if they are not producing at all. Moreover, household consumption 
remains high given that electricity provision cannot be physically interrupted to 
households who do not pay their bills, as electricity meters were not yet in use 
during the period considered.
Table 3.10 - Electricity use
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Total 100 97 92.6 85.2 75.8 70.2
Industry 100 94.2 85.4 72.8 59 57.7
Agriculture 100 102.9 110.2 119.7 116.1 90.5
Construction 100 100 86.4 72.7 63.6 63.6
Transport and Communication 100 96.9 87.7 76.9 67.7 58.5
Source: De Broeck and Kostial (1998)
A different but equally interesting measure of activity is freight traffic. Table 3.11 
shows that the decline in total freight traffic recorded in Kazakhstan declined far 
more than output. The sole exception is air traffic but in 1996 it counted for only
0.1% of total transport. In this case, an under reporting argument is difficult to 
sustain as most transport is by railways which is still state owned. An 
underreporting argument for motor freight traffic is also difficult to defend given 
the decline in tires’ production shown in table 3.5.
Other arguments such as the one that privatisation determined a growth of under 
recording of production are weak for Kazakhstan because the process of 
privatisation took really off only after 1994 when most of the output decline 
already occurred. If anything, there may have been an under recording of output in 
1995 and 1996 for which, however, we have no evidence. Therefore we shall 
conclude that the extent of the output decline is credible and not artificially 
inducted.
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Table 3.11 - Freight Traffic (Millions-net tons/Km)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 % in 1990 % in 1996
Railway 100 92.0 70.3 47.2 36.1 30.6 27.7 94.8 98.3
Air 100 83.8 78.8 82.5 108.8 172.5 171.3 0.0 0.1
Motor 100 96.8 79.3 53.9 20.8 11.2 7.5 4.3 1.2
River 100 89.0 65.5 40.1 21.2 20.8 11.5 0.9 0.4
Total 100 92.1 70.7 47.5 35.3 29.7 26.7 100.0 100.0
Source: CSAK (1997b)
3.2. The pre-transition conditions
Pre-transition conditions and in particular the structure of production and 
ownership may well have played a role on the profile transition took in FSU 
countries. It is instructive in this case to look at China. China benefited early on 
from a substantial increase in productivity in agriculture because reforms initiated 
by encouraging production in this sector and because households responded well 
to incentives as they controlled their means of production. Only 18% of 
employment was in state owned entities in 1978 as opposed to 60-90% in the 
republics of the Soviet Union (Cis-Stat 1998 and China Statistical Yearbook 
1995). This liberated from agriculture a mass of workers who became 
instrumental in subsequent reforms in the manufacturing and industrial sectors 
developed with Towns and Villages Enterprises (TVEs). These pre-conditions 
were simply not present in some CEE and all FSU economies where even 
agriculture was managed in an industrial fashion with large kolkhoz and 
cooperatives. Also, China in 1978 was for the quasi-totality an agricultural 
economy and it was much less dependent on world trade than CEE and CIS 
economies on CMEA or on the Soviet Union. Therefore, the country was less 
vulnerable to trade shocks and more likely to enjoy high productivity growth in 
the newly established industrial sector.
A comparison with CEE economies also underlines the importance of pre­
transition conditions. CEE economies which performed better such as Hungary 
and Poland dismantled central planning mechanisms years before the introduction 
of price and trade liberalisation in 1990 while CIS countries maintained the
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system well into 1992, more than a year after the first price and trade reforms. The 
share of the private sector in CEE countries was generally larger than in CIS 
countries in 1989 and this factor alone must have affected responses to price and 
trade liberalisation. Distances from alternative markets such as western Europe, 
which imply differentials in transport and transaction costs, may have been an 
additional factor in explaining the different extent of the recessions in CEE and 
CIS countries. CEE industrial producers found in Western Europe both alternative 
sources of intermediate supplies and alternative markets for intermediate and 
finished products. This would also explain why the Baltic States performed 
generally better than the rest of the Soviet republics. Estonia, for instance, owes 
its success to the trade and aid relations established with Finland. The country, 
together with Latvia and Lithuania has access to the Baltic Sea, a vital trade route 
for Scandinavian countries, Germany, Poland and Russia. These are also very 
small countries where the successful development of one or two sectors can lead 
to substantial improvements in total output.
The initial macroeconomic conditions of Kazakhstan were also an important 
factor in explaining the vulnerability of the economy, to trade shocks in particular. 
The republic relied heavily on budget transfers from Russia to support 
investments in extraction and heavy industry and benefited from terms of trade 
privileges for many commodities, including agricultural products. We saw in table 
3.9 that in 1990 almost 10% of budget revenues were still in the form of transfers 
from Russia while according to De Broeck and Kostial (1998) Kazakhstan 
imported from other republics more than 25% of its domestic consumption and 
exported more than 25% of its production of key commodities. Moreover, the 
geographical industrial layout of heavy industry made sense in a Soviet context 
but not in Kazakhstan alone. Even if extraction was a very large sector and the 
first export item, large quantities of raw materials were imported from Russia. In 
1996, fuel and oil products and ferrous metals and products still represented the 
major items for both exports and imports. This is due to the geographical location 
of mine and oil fields and the respective processing plants. Kazakhstan refineries 
in the East of the country were not connected with the oil fields in the West so
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that oil from the West went to Russian refineries while the refineries in the East 
were supplied by Russian oil. Similar problems existed with some metals and the 
respective processing industries.
Kazakhstan also entered the process of transition with excess capacity in terms of 
both labour and capital. This was an aspect common to the Soviet republics but 
the Central Asian republics were known to lag behind other republics in this 
respect. The Kazakhstan growth rate of Net Material Product (NMP) per worker 
and Total Factor Productivity (TFP) between 1970 and 1990 were 0.7% and -  
1.1% respectively, the second lowest figures after Turkmenistan among Soviet 
republics (Easterly and Fischer 1994, p.44).
The excessive reliance on extensive growth is most evident looking at the 
computation of TFP. Starting from Easterly and Fischer data, De Broeck and 
Kostial (1998) re-estimated TFP for Kazakhstan in five strategic sectors and for 
the period 1970-1995 as follows:
r " Lt ’t = 9k In t + 0, In t
U - . J
k
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With Y=output (NMP), K=capital, Z=Labour, 6= Average income share of factor 
i in total factor payment. Qk + 6t = 1
TFP is a measure of the amount by which (the log) of output would have 
increased had all inputs remained constant between periods t and t-i. Thus, TFP is 
a residual and it measures the ‘efficiency’ in the use of resources as well as all 
other factors that may contribute to explaining the output decline and are not 
included into the computation.
Table 3.12 reports the results. Capital accumulation has been very high during the 
1970s and it was still high in the eighties explaining to a great extent the output 
growth. Labour contribution has been more modest in both periods and total 
factor productivity fell since the early seventies. This seems rather similar across
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sectors. Thus, capital per worker increased and output per worker decreased 
between 1971 and 1990. Enterprises embarked into the transition process with 
large endowments of both capital and labour. During the transition, the rate of 
capital accumulation declined sharply while employment declined moderately and 
only starting from 1993. The greatest part of the output decline in this period is 
explained by total factor productivity suggesting that an important part of the 
story should be found in the use of inputs and alternative explanations. In effect, 
this particular approach measures the contribution to output of factors’ input but it 
says little about the causes of inputs swings and falls in productivity.
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Table 3.12 - Computation of total factor productivity
NMP growth TFP growth Lab. growth Cap. growth Inv./NMP Cap./NMP
Agriculture
1971-1994 -0.01 -0.06 0 0.06 0.26 2.96
1971-1980 0.01 -0.08 0.01 0.09 0.22 1.55
1981-1990 0 -0.04 0.01 0.04 0.33 3.65
1991-1995 -0.09 -0.05 -0.04 0 0.18 4.79
1990 0.12 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.32 3.91
1991 -0.23 -0.32 0.09 0.03 0.42 5.2
1992 0.29 0.22 0.03 0.03 0.18 4.15
1993 -0.07 -0.01 -0.09 -0.01 0.08 4.41
1994 -0.21 -0.1 -0.19 -0.04 0.02 5.4
1995 -0.21 -0.23 0.02 -0.05 0.01 6.53
Construction
1971-1994 -0.01 -0.03 0 0.03 0.07 0.74
1971-1980 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.53
1981-1990 0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.68
1991-1995 -0.2 -0.15 -0.14 -0.03 0.01 1.44
1990 -0.08 -0.13 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.8
1991 -0.02 0.04 -0.12 0.03 0.03 0.84
1992 -0.43 -0.53 -0.02 -0.03 0.02 1.42
1993 -0.19 -0.05 -0.21 -0.06 0.01 1.64
1994 -0.18 -0.04 -0.22 -0.07 0 1.87
1995 -0.21 -0.05 -0.24 -0.07 0 2.18
Industry
1971-1994 -0.01 -0.04 0 0.07 0.39 6.95
1971-1980 0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.1 0.42 3.91
1981-1990 -0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.06 0.46 6.66
1991-1995 -0.13 -0.11 -0.07 0.01 0.21 13.59
1990 -0.05 -0.07 -0.02 0.05 0.48 8.46
1991 0 -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.34 8.76
1992 -0.17 -0.18 -0.04 0.02 0.17 10.8
1993 -0.14 -0.07 -0.13 0 0.14 12.55
1994 -0.28 -0.27 -0.08 -0.01 0.24 17.21
1995 -0.08 -0.03 -0.09 0 0.15 18.62
Transp. And Comm.
1971-1994 0 -0.02 0.01 0.05 0.43 9.21
1971-1980 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.56 7.03
1981-1990 0.03 0 0.03 0.04 0.45 8.34
1991-1995 -0.16 -0.13 -0.05 0.01 0.12 15.29
1990 -0.02 0.04 -0.09 0.04 0.46 8.87
1991 -0.06 -0.03 -0.06 0.04 0.23 9.77
1992 -0.19 -0.2 -0.01 0.01 0.07 12.14
1993 -0.14 -0.11 -0.06 -0.01 0.07 14.06
1994 -0.26 -0.27 -0.03 -0.01 0.14 18.8
1995 -0.14 -0.1 -0.06 -0.01 0.12 21.7
Trade and procurement 
1971-1994 0.01 -0.01 0 0.03 0.08 1.76
1971-1980 0.05 0 0.04 0.05 0.1 1.48
1981-1990 0.02 0.01 0 0.03 0.08 1.7
1991-1995 -0.09 -0.06 -0.09 0 0.02 2.41
1990 0.01 -0.05 0.1 0.02 0.07 1.73
1991 -0.01 -0.04 0.03 0.02 0.08 1.79
1992 -0.14 -0.14 -0.05 0.03 0.01 2.15
1993 -0.11 -0.04 -0.12 -0.01 0 2.38
1994 -0.18 -0.16 -0.06 -0.02 0 2.86
1995 -0.02 0.11 -0.23 -0.02 0 2.86
Total
1971-1994 0 -0.03 0.01 0.07 0.38 5.69
1971-1980 0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.12 0.43 3.49
1981-1990 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.05 0.44 5.82
1991-1995 -0.1 -0.08 -0.03 0.01 0.15 9.81
1990 -0.01 -0.05 0.05 0.05 0.45 7.04
1991 -0.08 -0.09 -0.01 0.04 0.37 7.98
1992 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.14 8.46
1993 -0.1 -0.04 -0.09 -0.01 0.1 9.3
1994 -0.18 -0.16 -0.05 -0.01 0.1 11.19
1995 -0.09 -0.09 0 -0.01 0.06 12.1
Source: Constructed from De Broeck and Kostial (1998)
A final point on the initial conditions concerns the existence (or non-existence) of 
proper institutions. The role of institutions in economic development has been 
amply documented by the ‘institutional’ literature (North 1990, 1993). Applied to 
the process of transition, this literature would point to the necessity for a clear set 
of institutions for markets to be able to develop. The lack of these fundamental 
institutions (laws, rules, norms and enforceable contracts) would prevent markets 
from operating effectively preventing a correct allocation of resources and 
undermining growth. Some evidence on this front has been found by Dewatripont 
and Roland (1996) who argued, for instance, that a gradualist approach to reforms 
may be preferable “in a world o f aggregate uncertainty, reversal costs and 
complementarity between reforms ” (p.22), conditions which may well have been 
present during reforms. Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder (1997) looked across twenty 
transitional economies focusing on the explanatory power of institutional factors 
such as rules, political stability, security of property rights, the judiciary and 
corruption. They find that these institutional factors may explain a large part of 
differences in FDI and growth across countries.
Though difficult to measure, it was shown in section one of this chapter that 
institutional constraints existed in Kazakhstan due to the physiological time 
necessary to construct the new state. Market legislation came with a substantial 
delay over transitional reforms with the result that for a few years markets 
operated in a legislative vacuum. This allowed the development of adverse 
phenomena. Few well-connected groups profited from the privatisation process to 
quickly accumulate wealth that was then either employed in illicit activities or 
exported. The sell-off of strategic enterprises was not transparent in the early 
years and allowed some groups to cash in on short-term rents while avoiding 
investing in the regeneration of the firms. The growth of private banking was 
partly linked to this phenomenon as banks were often opened to keep and export 
these forms of rents. While these claims are speculative and difficult to be 
supported by data, illicit behaviour on the part of public officials during the early 
years of reforms are now subject of public investigations in both Kazakhstan and 
Russia.
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Generally speaking, the institutional vacuum is explained by the time lag that was 
necessary for the newly independent states to build the state institutions. The 
establishment of such institutions does not guarantee per se the correction of the 
distortions developed during early reforms (corruption exists whether the proper 
legislative framework exists or not) but at least it lays the foundations for a proper 
state to develop while it legitimises law enforcement where the will to crack down 
on illicit activities exists.
3.3. The role o f reforms
It would be very difficult to argue that without the reforms initiated towards the 
end of the 1980s the Soviet republics would have experienced in such a short time 
a recession similar to what has been witnessed to date. The Soviet decline 
appeared as irreversible but the time lag to achieve such a decline would have 
been much longer. Reforms had obviously a negative impact on output, at least in 
the medium term. What is not clear is whether the type, speed, timing or 
sequencing of reforms should be to blame.
The speed of reforms idealised as the ‘gradualist’ versus the ‘big-bang’ approach 
to reforms has been illustrated amply in the literature and it will not be resumed 
here. In effect this debate finds its roots in orthodox economic theory and the 
dispute between neo-classical/monetarists/laisser-faire vs. the Keynesian/public 
spending/ interventionists economists. De facto the process of transition in most 
countries has been dominated by a neo-classical/monetarist/laisser-faire ideology 
(not necessarily the reform agenda) and for many schools this practice has 
overshadowed important aspects of reforms such as institutional, organisational 
and industrial reforms (Knell 1996). For some scholars, the excessive 
restrictionary cycle that these policies entailed may have been at the root of the 
excessive output decline. Price and trade liberalisation have been acknowledged 
as important factors during the early years (Gomulka 1996b) but it is debated
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whether these measures were necessary pills to be swallowed by highly distorted 
economies or if they were the product of a distorted western ideology.
While this debate centred around two fundamentally distant ideological views it 
overshadowed the analysis of the actual content of each reform and the 
applicability and scope of reforms in different macroeconomic and institutional 
contexts. In a country such as Kazakhstan timing and sequencing seem far more 
important issues than the actual speed of reforms. For instance, it is not clear why 
a new bom state which is trying to set-up the basic institutions should embark in 
the process of privatisation prior to the establishment of a working parliament, 
judicial courts or even a constitution. Or why a country that does not have direct 
control over monetary institutions and the legal tender should promote price and 
trade liberalisation. Looking back, it is the order of reforms that seems to have 
followed an awkward sequence.
Not surprisingly, a theme now popular to explain the recession is the 
disorganisation of the production process due to disruption in input and output 
flows occurred in the early years of transition. Williamson (1992) highlighted 
early on the role played by the dismption in the production chains caused by the 
break-up of the Soviet Union. This argument was initially dismissed by some on 
the ground that entrepreneurs could simply shift to alternative suppliers if credit 
and working capital were available. Later, the disorganisation argument became 
more popular and we find it endogenised in transitional models such as in 
Blanchard (1997).
Disorganisation in Kazakhstan occurred in different forms and at different times. 
The initial disorganisation occurred when the Soviet republics started to acquire 
certain autonomy and applied Soviet trade directives unequally, creating inter­
republic price distortions and introducing the first barriers to inter-republican 
trade. Later, the disorganisation of the payments system played an important role 
in explaining the reduction of inter-republican exchanges. This occurred during a 
period of hyperinflation and monetary instability. With independence, the
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disorganisation of the state apparatus including the disorganisation of the central 
decisional bodies, the hierarchical system and the bureaucracy explained the slow 
pace and chaotic order of reforms, which in turn further disrupted exchanges. This 
was documented in section one of this chapter.
De Broeck and Kostial (1998) back the disorganisation hypothesis showing the 
extent of the disruption in intra-FSU deliveries with data on interstate deliveries 
between 1991 and 1995 which show profound declines for strategic commodities 
(p. 64). Also, a dispersion index of the monthly changes in output applied to 36 
industrial commodities shows a high variability until 1994, suggesting bottlenecks 
in the supply chain rather than swings in final demand (p. 25). In a footnote, the 
same authors report evidence from two enterprises’ surveys carried out in 1993 
and 1994 as follows:
“In a 1993 sample survey o f Kazakh enterprises by the 
International Development Center o f Japan (Mitsui, 1994), 
enterprises were asked which factors most negatively affected their 
production; difficulties in getting intermediate inputs were ranked 
first. Similarly, an end-1994 KNSA survey on the causes o f shut­
downs o f enterprises and individual production enterprises found 
that 47 percent o f the total loss o f working time was reported to 
have resulted from shortages o f intermediate inputs and power 
shortages. ” (p.24)
We saw how, at independence, the country relied on inter-republican trade. 
Considering that a large portion of these exchanges were in primary or 
intermediate products, it could be argued that a disruption of inter-republican 
trade might have had a multiplicatory negative effect on domestic production. 
Indeed, raw materials apart, production suffered most in sectors originally heavily 
reliant on trade (imports in particular) and the extent of the output decline is 
amplified moving down the production chain. This may also contribute to explain 
the ‘wait and see’ attitude of enterprises who hoped to re-establish production 
links and waited long before starting to lay-off workers, preferring to transfer the 
costs of such disruptions on real wages declines and wage arrears.
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Why entrepreneurs now free to seek their own suppliers and negotiate their own 
prices did not turn to alternative suppliers is not difficult to understand. First, this 
was a new activity for Soviet entrepreneurs that needed to be learnt. Very few 
direct contacts were in place between entrepreneurs and their foreign suppliers as 
trade boards dealt with most of the bilateral relationships in Soviet times. Second, 
distances from alternative suppliers were more often than not prohibitive. Central 
Asia is extremely isolated from large industrial economies except for China from 
whom the Soviet authorities always kept a distance and where an initial ‘contacts’ 
base was simply non-existent. Third, the intermediate supplies needed by the ex- 
Soviet firms were technologically obsolete and hardly replaceable by what 
industrial economies would be producing. It was not atypical for these firms to 
have a single and exclusive supplier of a particular commodity in the whole of the 
Soviet Union and alternative Western suppliers would not be an option for some 
firms. Fourth, the basic infrastructures to conduct business including the post and 
telephone systems, railways and air transport were very poor indeed and presented 
major obstacles when it came to implement payments and deliveries.
A further argument supporting supply-side recession dynamics and inter-linked 
with the sequencing question was the so-called ‘credit crunch". Restrictionary 
monetary policies and difficult access to credit reduced the financing capacities of 
enterprises who, as a consequence, experienced a reduction in production (Calvo 
and Coricelli 1992). For countries such as Poland this argument has been refuted 
(Berg and Blanchard 1993, Gomulka 1996b) but Kazakhstan presents some clear 
indications that credit was indeed a rare commodity.
Table 3.13 shows outstanding bank loans for the period 1990-1995. The decline in 
loans is sharp in all sectors and particularly evident starting from 1993. This 
should not be as surprising if we think that the economy was burdened with 
arrears in all areas of financial transactions including wage arrears, inter­
enterprises arrears, tax arrears, debts repayments arrears towards banks and the 
state and payments arrears towards foreign suppliers. In such a climate, business 
confidence is non-existent and banks require non-accessible guarantees or non-
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affordable interest rates. Besides, banks did not benefit from significant household 
savings but had to rely mostly on the central bank to borrow lending capital. In 
other words, commercial banks would borrow only if solvent customers had 
already been identified. Difficult access to credit is also one of the main 
complaints regularly reported by enterprises when questioned about their 
difficulties9.
Table 3.13 - Outstanding bank loans (Real terms)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Total 100 90.3 51 16.6 4 2.4
Short-term 100 108.9 67.8 21.8 5.3 3
Industry 100 209 70 19.8 11.8 4.8
Agriculture 100 75.7 45.4 14.6 4.4 0.4
Construction 100 46.7 16.1 3.1 0.9 0.8
Transport and Communication 100 90.1 63.2 163.7 3.7 4.9
Trade and Procurement 100 69.8 52.9 11.9 1.8 0.5
Other 100 218.7 191.3 67.7 13.6 14.9
Long-term 100 40.8 6.5 2.9 0.6 0.9
De Broeck and Kostial (1998)
One argument in contrast with the credit crunch story is the ‘soft-budget’ 
constraint argument. It could be that loss-making enterprises continued to be 
subsidised during transition turning public savings into bad investments and 
contributing to maintain a distorted price system and a misallocation of resources. 
In Kazakhstan this was partly true until 1992 but transfers to enterprises in real 
terms declined quickly afterwards and cannot be held responsible for the 1994 
slump for example. What, instead, may be argued is that a certain laxity 
concerning the closure of non-profitable enterprises persisted well into 1996 
because of the legislative vacuum and because of poor implementation of existing 
measures. However, while this may have slowed down the process of reallocation 
and restructuring, it can hardly be identified as a major cause of the output decline 
in the early years.
9 This was either the first or the second complaint reported by the management of enterprises I 
visited between April 1996 and September 1999 in the cities of Almaty, Kustanay, Aktyubinsk and
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3.4. Additional explanations
An alternative hypothesis points at a sectoral misallocation of resources. This 
argument suggests that price distortions and restrictions in factors’ mobility 
determine an incorrect allocation of resources among sectors contributing to a 
slow down in production in potentially viable sectors. De Broeck and Kostial 
(1998) are sceptical in regards to this argument in Kazakhstan. They argue that the 
pre-transition price structure was distorted as compared to world prices. For 
instance, prices in power, oil and gas and metallurgy sectors were below world 
market levels while prices for timber, paper, light and food industries were above 
world market. During the transition, a process of convergence of prices towards 
world levels has been observed. Investments and labour, according to the authors, 
adjusted moving from sectors such as light industry and into electricity, fuel and 
metallurgy. Sectoral composition of value added and the computation of sectoral 
productivity changes support the argument that factors have been moving in the 
expected direction. Therefore, the authors conclude that sectoral misallocation has 
not been a very significant factor in explaining the output decline.
A few comments about the above interpretation seem relevant. Concerning 
investments, these have indeed grown in relative terms in sectors such as 
extraction and fuel production and low relative prices have probably been 
instrumental in these shifts. It is not surprising that the oil and gas sectors 
benefited from the largest share of investments given Kazakhstan endowments. 
This is where FDI went and it is considered the national industrial priority. More 
complex is the interpretation of labour reallocation. De Broeck and Kostial use as 
evidence for labour reallocation sectoral shares data and data on labour turnover. 
While sectoral shares data show significant changes across sectors, they do not 
show whether the numbers have been growing or declining in any sector. We will 
see in Chapter 4 that employment declined in almost all sectors and that sectoral 
shares changes occurred because some sectors have experienced a deeper
Astana in the course of four successive visits.
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recession than others. Some workers may have moved across sectors, but it cannot 
be argued with such data.
Moreover, the data on labour turnover presented by De broeck and Kostial (p. 67) 
show turnover increasing over time. This is taken as evidence of an acceleration 
of the process of labour reallocation. What will be argued in Chapter 4 is that the 
high turnover is due to high instability and insecurity in labour conditions. 
Workers take up new jobs not knowing whether they will be paid or not at the end 
of the month and enterprises take up workers not knowing if they will be able to 
sustain production in the following month. Contracts are short-term and hiring and 
separations rates are very high. This is a symptom of a poor labour market rather 
than of a healthy reallocation of labour.
With De Broeck and Kostial we agree that few barriers were in place during 
transition for free movement of capital and labour resources. In any case, barriers 
during transition were less than those in place during the pre-transition period and 
price distortions determined by bottlenecks in resources mobility were more likely 
to be present before and not during transition. Hyperinflation contributed in 
complicating the picture of the relative price structure and we have to conclude in 
accord with the cited authors that there is little evidence in support of the sector 
misallocation argument as a substantial cause of the output decline.
A different set of explanations points to demand factors. A fall in real incomes 
characterised the transition in all economies with the subsequent fall in 
consumption and savings. Liquid assets in banks lost much of their value 
particularly during the January 1992 price liberalisation and during the first 
months of the new legal tender, the tenge. These events resulted in a loss of 
confidence in the banking system visible in a relative increase in consumption and 
currency in circulation. On the government side, expenditures have been cut 
severely both in the early periods of reforms and during the stabilisation period. In 
some cases cuts were larger than the decline in revenues and the reduction in 
public consumption and investments caused a further decline in aggregate
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demand. Private investments were small by definition in the early years of 
transition and the credit crunch described above did not help in boosting this side 
of demand. Foreign direct investment concentrated in few sectors and they did not 
compensate by any means the public investment decline. For CIS countries such 
as Kazakhstan, external demand declined and remained weak as all republics 
faced similar problems. Thus, the decline in aggregate demand is an important 
part of the story though it remains difficult to isolate the size of this effect and its 
components from the demand-supply cycle. Moreover, it is a ‘second round’ 
effect of the recession starting as a consequence of the first shocks and becoming 
only later a cause of further decline.
4. Summary and conclusions
Initial conditions, trade shocks, disorganisation of the former Soviet industrial 
apparatus, the organisation problems related to the formation of the new states and 
poor monetary policies in the early years have been identified in this chapter as 
the main causes of the output decline in Kazakhstan between 1990 and 1996. It 
could be argued that the real economic disaster has been the break-up of the 
system of the Soviet Union before the creation of its substitutes.
The first shock to the system occurred with the first disruption in inter-republican 
trade between 1987 and 1989. This was caused initially by political reasons as the 
republics progressively increased their decisional autonomy, and later by 
restrictions to trade introduced by the same republics in response to price 
distortions emerged. This situation continued over the period 1990 and 1991 when 
a certain monetary laxity was in place, Moscow was loosing monetary control, the 
ruble became increasingly overvalued and the payments system experienced the 
first serious difficulties. Overhanging inflation accumulated during the period and 
when price liberalisation was launched inflation took off. The hyperinflationary 
period that followed created uncertainty and a reduction in real wages and 
savings. The initial decline in investment and public spending contributed to a
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first contraction in aggregate demand. The first severe decline in output occurs in 
construction and transport due to cuts in Soviet subsidies, inflation and trade 
contraction. The cause of the subsidies cuts are political and linked to 
independence while the primary causes of inflation are the first uncertain 
enterprise reforms of the Gorbachev period and the first disorganisation of inter­
republic trade and of the monetary regime. Therefore, disorganisation, politics and 
bad monetary policies explain the first fall in the output decline.
In 1992, inter-enterprises arrears accumulate fast while the inter-republican 
payments system collapses. In an attempt to clear arrears, the government injects a 
large quantity of enterprise credits, pushing up inflation while monetary control is 
still in the hands of Russia. The first trade liberalisation reforms take place during 
this period while trade falls quickly because of the progressive break-up of inter­
industrial linkages across the Union and difficulties in settling exchanges. Later in 
1993, the new ruble is introduced and large quantities of old rubles flow into 
Kazakhstan, heating inflation again. The local currency is launched in November 
and the first protracted devaluation causes a further monetary shock. Investments 
continue to free-fall, union’s transfers are further cut and enterprises experience 
serious financial difficulties. Inter-enterprises and wage arrears start to accumulate 
again. The output contraction now affects sectors heavily reliant on imports such 
as manufacturing. Partial trade reforms in this case further complicated the 
existing inter-republic asymmetries and deepened the extent of the disruption in 
the flows of goods. Inter-enterprises arrears clearing operations and poor handling 
of currency reforms determined the monetary shock. Thus, the break-up of the 
Soviet Union, disorganisation of trade and the monetary system and poor trade 
and monetary policies are to be blamed for the output decline between 1992 and 
1993.
Following the introduction of the tenge in November 1993, the rapid initial 
devaluation of the currency and a second attempt to clear inter-enterprises arrears 
with public credits to enterprises, inflation experiences a new shock early in 1994. 
With the stabilisation packages adopted in 1994 and 1995, monetary stability is
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finally achieved, the tenge stabilises and interest rates turn positive. During the 
year, the protracted recession takes its toll on households and consumption 
declines severely. Together with the continued investment decline and the heavy 
cuts in government spending, aggregate demand declines. On the enterprise side, 
difficulties in supplies’ delivery, cuts in government assistance determined by the 
stabilisation packages, the consequent credit crunch and the loss in both internal 
and external demand slows down production dramatically in 1994. During 1995, 
production decreases further and in 1996 the decline finally comes to a halt. In 
1994 and 1995, the output decline is most visible in manufacturing and 
consumers’ goods. This time it is an equal combination of supply and demand 
side factors that determined the output decline in the form of a contraction in 
public and private consumption and credit crunch.
On the whole, it is not the speed or type of transitional reforms that should be 
blamed for the recession but the timing and sequencing of these same reforms. 
Prices and fiscal reforms (including stabilisation) have certainly had an impact, 
but price liberalisation is not a cause in itself of a recession (it only exposes 
unbalances present in the system determined by other factors) and fiscal reforms 
have had both positive and negative outcomes depending on when and how they 
have been implemented. State system reforms and privatisation started to operate 
in a significant way when the recession was almost completed. Restructuring 
occurred only on paper with some state initiatives achieving very little success. It 
is not possible to measure and assess the role played by something that did not 
happen and we cannot blame these non-reforms for the recession. However, the 
total lack of effort of Soviet authorities in maintaining the Soviet economic 
system as long as necessary to carry out proper institutional reforms in the 
Republics is evident. Paradoxically, it is the lack of a reform ‘plan’ that can be 
blamed for a very poor record of initial economic reforms, the disorganisation of 
production and consequent fall in output.
Trade reforms have been important but the decline in trade is to be attributed to 
the disorganisation of the Soviet organisations rather than to world prices
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exposure and decline in export. Imports declined far more than exports. The loss 
of international markets due to poor competitive standards may have played a role 
later when Kazakhstan trade started to increase with non FSU countries, but by 
then the output decline was coming to an halt.
The recession affected the structure of the economy seriously damaging 
manufacturing, the heart of the industrial system. The energy sector is supported 
by FDI and by the government but it will not be able to deliver rents for some 
years to come. It is also a capital-intensive sector and cannot address employment 
problems. Moreover, the fact that it is export oriented signifies that it will hardly 
be able to foster production in other domestic sectors and that terms of trade are 
likely to suffer.
By the time the recession gradually came to a halt, life savings and Soviet 
subsidies had disappeared and enterprises’ profitability had declined sharply. 
Local commercial banks no longer had the resources to finance enterprises, 
foreign investments had been limited in size and concentrated in the oil and gas 
sectors and foreign borrowings (mainly IMF and credits from Russia) went into 
stabilisation measures and import subsidies. The monetary policy implemented 
post-1994 exemplified by the stabilisation packages found a solution to monetary 
stability but absorbed almost entirely the policy agenda and prevented the use of 
public funds for reforms in the production sphere. As the state remained the only 
realistic possible source of investment and growth, monetary austerity shut the 
door to this last resort.
The question that remains to be answered is what other entity in the economy but 
the state could have gathered the necessary resources to invest in restructuring and 
technological upgrade and what other entity but the state should have been (and 
should be) in charge of a comprehensive industrial reform. These are two areas 
where the Kazakh state has been absent and where it will be called to deliver in 
the years to come if the private sector is unable to re-emerge on its own from the
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standstill it is currently in. Growth has been estimated at 1.7% in 1997 (EU 1998) 
while it turned negative again (-2.5%) in 1998 (CSAK 1999c).
Also, private enterprises prosper in environments where the basic infrastructure 
for a market economy including energy supply, transports and communications, a 
proper financial system, contracts and contract enforcing mechanisms work 
sufficiently well. An enterprise does not live in a vacuum but in a complex tissue 
of industrial relations that relies to a great extent on collective goods 
(infrastructures and institutions) for which the state is ultimately responsible. In an 
early stage of industrial development, such as the one in which most CIS countries 
now find themselves, the establishment of market infrastructures for collective use 
can hardly rely on private finance or initiative. This seems to be the fundamental 
paradox of the current state of transition in Kazakhstan.
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CHAPTER 4
THE REALLOCATION OF LABOUR
The previous chapter looked at the causes of the recession in Kazakhstan so that 
now we have a better sense of the difficulties encountered by enterprises during 
the transition. This chapter turns to the supply side of the labour market measuring 
labour variables and attempting to determine the form, direction and causes of the 
reallocation of labour. Section 1 overviews some general features of labour 
markets in the CEE and Russia. Section 2 attempts to identify who is who is the 
labour market in Kazakhstan making use of administrative and survey data. 
Section 3 turns to flow measures determining the main features of the reallocation 
of labour and discussing the possible determinants. Section 4 concludes.
1. The reallocation of labour in the CEE and Russia
The dichotomy in labour market dynamics between the CEE and CIS countries 
exposed in chapter 1 persists if we take a closer look at some general stylised 
facts.
In the CEE1, employment declined significantly and in line with output. Private 
sector employment has been growing both as an outcome of the privatisation 
process and as the emergence of a new private sector. There has been a significant 
outflow from paid employment into self-employment. Labour turnover is high 
relatively to Western countries. The reallocation of labour tends to avoid the 
unemployment pool. Recruitment seems to take place from employment rather 
than unemployment. The size of the labour force and labour force participation 
have declined in most countries. Numerous workers took the path of economic 
inactivity either by taking early retirement or by taking over household 
responsibilities and dependency ratios (the ratio of pensioners to contributors) 
have increased.
1 This paragraph and the next are a summary of the main findings of two large surveys of labour 
markets in the CEE, Allison and Ringold (1996) and Boeri, Burda and Kollo (1998)
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Unemployment in the CEE has been growing rapidly and stabilised on high 
levels. The unemployment pool has been fairly stagnant in most countries with a 
low inflow and a lower outflow. Long-term unemployment has been growing. 
Unemployment seems to be higher among women, the young and the unskilled 
and these characteristics seem to be associated with long-term unemployment. 
The number of discouraged unemployed has increased. Regional disparities are 
evident and serious mobility constraints exist in the forms of poor housing 
markets and high transport costs. Real wages devalued quickly in the early years 
of transition and re-valued slowly afterwards. Overall, CEE labour markets have 
experienced a process of convergence towards Western European labour markets 
behaviour (Allison and Ringold 1996; Boeri, Burda and Kollo 1998).
Many of these features have been found in Russia but the Russian labour market 
presents deeper problems, some additional peculiarities and paradoxes which 
makes it a more complex case. According to administrative data, employment 
decline has been contained in relation to the output decline and unemployment has 
been growing relatively slowly. This view has been maintained until recently by 
some authors (Commander and Tolstopiatenko 1998, p. 170; Lehmann, 
Wadsworth and Acquisti 1997, p. 1). According to this view of the labour market, 
employment has declined little because of soft budget attitudes on the part of the 
government, real wages decline, wage arrears, wages paid in kind, unpaid leave 
and shortening of working hours. Workers have traded wages for employment 
(Commander and Yemtsov 1995). Others argued that employment is much 
smaller than it appears while real unemployment is high by any standards if we 
only take a closer look at real employment in enterprises, population dynamics 
and economic inactivity (Standing 1997, p. 29). Households surveys (table 1.5) 
have shown that real unemployment in Russia is much higher than registered 
figures.
Private sector employment in Russia has been growing fast but more as a by­
product of privatisation than as a genuine creation of new private jobs. Generally,
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work conditions in the private sector seem better than in state enterprises but job 
tenure is shorter, labour turnover higher and wage arrears are widespread 
(Gimpelson and Lippoldt 1998, p. 16). The role of the new private sector in 
labour dynamics is also uncertain. When this has been observed with surveys, the 
understanding is that enterprises in this sector perform on average better than state 
and privatised enterprises (Richter and Schaffer 1996). However, this sector is 
small, confined to few economic areas and not particularly healthy (Clarke 1999, 
p. 54-56). Private employment tend to be in small entities and it is particularly 
large in the trade and catering sector.
Concerning the reallocation of labour in Russia, labour turnover is high in most 
sectors but employment has declined in almost all sectors. Hiring tend to be from 
employment rather than unemployment as it was the case for the CEE countries. 
In the early years of transition, the unemployment pool seemed more dynamic 
than in the CEE with low inflow rates and larger outflow rates but in recent years 
a tendency to stagnation has been observed and long-term unemployment has 
been increasing. Russia has also experienced a demographic crisis of much larger 
proportions than the one reported for some CEE countries in the early years, with 
declining birth rates, soaring death rates and large migration flows (Ellman 1997, 
Comia and Paniccia’ 1996).
As it was argued in chapter 1, efforts aimed at disentangling the apparent 
contradictions of the Russian case have focused on the enterprise, the process of 
restructuring and its determinants and the reallocation of labour between 
economic sectors. In chapter 2, it was suggested instead that transitional models 
built around the demand side of the economy fail to perceive important labour 
market dynamics such as the reallocation of labour from wage to non-wage 
employment which constituted a very important aspect of the reallocation of 
labour in the CIS. A labour supply model was proposed to take a more 
comprehensive view of the process of transition and it was argued that this 
approach might be more appropriate in a CIS context. In chapter 3, we saw that
2 Newly established entities with private ownership
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privatisation and restructuring have not been fundamental elements of real 
changes in Kazakhstan. Privatisation did not determine per se a qualitative 
amelioration of management practices while restructuring hardly occurred. Thus, 
if privatisation and restructuring have not been important elements of change in 
Kazakhstan did the reallocation of labour occur at all? And, if it did, what is the 
form and what determined such reallocation?
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2. Labour market stocks: Who is who in the labour market
In this section we look at the adult population in Kazakhstan and explore first 
levels and changes in labour market stock variables. A standard ILO approach is 
followed. After a few demographic considerations, employment, self- 
employment, underemployment, unemployment and economic inactivity will be 
analysed in this sequence.
2.1 Population
As it was the case for other CIS economies, Kazakhstan underwent an 
unprecedented population crisis during the transition with a declining birth rate, 
an increasing death rate and strong emigration. Table 4.1 presents the basic 
demographic statistics between the last two censuses carried out in 1989 and 1999 
respectively. The time series has been reconstructed by the CSAK recently on the 
basis of preliminary results of the last census4.
Between 1989 and 1998 the population of Kazakhstan declined by approximately 
lm people passing from 16.2m in 1989 to 15.2m in 1998. Birth rates declined by 
more than one third while death rates increased by almost a third reducing the 
natural growth of the population by more than 70% of its 1989 value. Both 
immigration and emigration have been important phenomena during the period 
but while immigration was rather strong during the early years, it declined 
significantly later on. Emigration instead continued to be the most significant 
factor in population changes throughout the period with major peaks in 1994 and 
1995. Almost 3.5m people emigrated during the period. This trend has been partly 
compensated by a natural cumulated growth of 1.5m people and a cumulated 
immigration of lm people. Internal migration has also been a significant
3 The data in this section could not have possibly been put together without the help of the staff in 
the national statistical agency (CSAK) and in the Ministry of Labour and Social protection in 
Almaty who provided published and unpublished material and took the time to explain 
classifications.
4 Data are not published and were obtained for kind concession of CSAK staff during my last visit 
to Kazakhstan in September 1999.
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phenomenon. An estimated 2.2m people moved from rural to urban areas and an 
estimated 1.7m people moved from urban to rural areas accounting for a net rural- 
urban migration of about half million people.
Table 4.1 -  Demographic trends
/ l ,000 Population Birth
rate
Death
rate
Nat. growth Immigr. Emigr. Net
migrat.
Popul.
growth
Rur/Urb
flow
1989 16194 23.52 7.79 15.73 11.40 20.69 -9.29 6.44 0.85
1990 16298 22.22 7.89 14.33 11.04 21.67 -10.63 3.70 0.74
1991 16358 21.59 8.21 13.38 10.44 18.70 -7.96 5.42 0.54
1992 16452 20.52 8.36 12.16 9.82 24.96 -14.42 -2.26 0.36
1993 16426 19.21 9.50 9.70 6.76 22.90 -15.71 -6.01 0.38
1994 16335 18.71 9.82 8.89 4.31 36.38 -32.06 -23.16 0.59
1995 15957 17.30 10.57 6.74 4.46 28.81 -24.34 -17.61 0.79
1996 15676 16.15 10.59 5.56 3.44 21.50 -18.04 -12.48 0.68
1997 15481 15.01 10.34 4.67 2.46 26.04 -23.57 -18.90 0.73
1998 15188 14.64 10.16 4.48 2.67 22.38 -19.68 -15.19 0.69
1989-1999 
(% change)
-6 -38 30 -72 -77 8 112 -19
Source: Constructed from CSAK(1999b)
Population changes of this kind are usually observed in times of major 
catastrophes such as wars, famines or natural disasters. None of these factors can 
explain the population changes observed in Kazakhstan and the process of 
independence together with reforms and the economic crisis seem the only 
candidates available to explain such trends.
The causes of the demographic crisis in transitional economies and in particular 
the causes of the mortality crisis are widely debated in the literature.5 Some 
authors argued that the mortality crisis in is in fact a statistical artefact (Eberstadt 
1994) while others pointed to adverse and long-term environmental degradation 
and changes in health behaviour (Feshback and Friendly 1992). An alternative and 
popular explanation links such crisis to the economic recession and the labour 
market insecurity generated during the transitional period, the so-called mortality- 
stress hypothesis (Comia and Paniccia’ 1996). Using the 1996 Kazakhstan Living 
Standards Measurement Survey (1996 KLSMS6 henceforth), I found elsewhere
5 See Comia (1996) for an overview
6 See appendix for details on the survey
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that the odds of suffering from death-related morbidity are significantly higher for 
the unemployed, particularly male unemployed in age 35-54 (Verme 1998). Crude 
Death Rates (CDR) show the sharpest increase among men in working age in 
Kazakhstan (WHO 1996) which is in contrast to most population crises where 
mortality rates increase particularly for the most vulnerable, children and the 
elderly above all. Moreover, the latest census shows that the mortality crisis is not 
a statistical artefact while the environment degradation and health habits 
hypothesis seems rather implausible in the light of the speed of the crisis and its 
close association with the output decline.
Labour market stress, insecurity and perhaps discrimination can also explain the 
emigration trend observed. The share of the ethnic Kazakh population increased 
from 40.1% to 53.4% between 1989 and 1999 (CSAK 1999a). Little is known 
about who died or who emigrated in relation to skills, profession and occupation, 
though it is known that the Slavic population constituted the bulk of emigration 
and that the same population previously occupied key positions in industry and in 
the administration. The government also encouraged ethnic Kazakhs living abroad 
to repatriate by means of generous housing schemes and labour market policies.
These particular trends affected the structure of the population. Given that birth 
and death rates typically affect the population at the two tail ends, by reducing the 
number of old people and the number of children, the short-term effect should be 
a decrease of the non-working age population. However, the increase in the death 
rate and emigration have been particularly acute among the working age 
population. WHO (1996) figures confirm that Crude Death Rates (CDR) show the 
sharpest increase among men in working age while UNDP (1996) estimated that 
up to 60% of the emigrants have been people in working age looking for better 
working opportunities abroad. As a result of this process and during the period we 
are concerned with (1990-1996), the population below working age declined, the 
population in working age remained approximately the same and the population 
above working age increased. In conclusion, the potential workforce as described
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in chapter 1 did not change significantly in size but it did change in ethnic and 
skills’ composition.
2.2. Employment
The impact of the reforms and of the economic recession on employment has been 
multi-fold. On the one hand, the recession determined a general decline in 
employment, which affected almost every sector of the economy, and a general 
decline in working conditions in the form of reduced working hours, wage arrears, 
wages paid in kind and unpaid leave. The process of privatisation, on the other 
hand, determined a change in ownership from state ownership to other forms 
including joint ventures, mix state/private, collective and individual ownership. 
Privatisation also entailed a de-scaling of production units from large to small. 
This has been mainly determined by the privatisation of large state distribution 
networks in the trade and catering sector, by the sale of assets to the public such 
as trucks in the transport and communication sector, by the sub-division of large 
kolkhoz and cooperatives into smaller units in the agricultural sector and, to a 
minor extent, by a process of industrial restructuring implemented by means of 
sub-dividing large enterprises into smaller units of production.
These changes did not spark a visible reallocation of labour across sectors except 
for a movement of workers from various sectors of the economy to trade and 
catering. Nor, these same changes increased visibly the share of fully private 
ownership in enterprises. Most enterprises with more than fifty employees have 
been turned into some form of shared ownership where the state typically 
maintained a significant share together with one or more investment funds and the 
employees (chapter 3). It is doubtful whether this type of ownership can be 
classified as private given that decision making is in the hands of a collection of 
bodies that are accountable to different masters. Employment in this group of 
enterprises has declined in all sectors. Enterprises with less than fifty employees 
are more likely to be private but this group did not show any significant 
improvement in terms of employment (CSAK 1994-1999). As far as type of
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ownership is concerned, the only form of private employment visibly growing has 
been a substantial growth in self-employment.
Administrative data on employment are usually provided in two forms: by sector 
of activity and by type of ownership. Table 4.2 presents the official figures as 
reported by the CIS statistical body7. Between 1990 and 1996, employment 
declined by approximately 1.3m people, equal to 16.5% of initial employment. It 
is evident that employment declined in all sectors of economic activity with the 
sole exceptions of trade and catering and credit and insurance. Trade and catering 
is in fact the only sector which shows a substantial net growth in employment. 
The sector showing the worst employment decline is construction followed by 
industry, transport and communication, education culture and art and science and 
scientific services.
As a consequence of the asymmetric decline across sectors, sectoral shares have 
changed. In the material sphere, industry and construction have lost out in favour 
of transport and communications, trade and catering and to a minor extent 
agriculture while very little changes are visible in the non-material sectors. From 
these data, we are not able to discern whether workers have moved across sectors 
and how. However and given what we just said, we can infer that trade and 
catering has absorbed workers from industry and construction unless the growth 
of this sector has been due to previously inactive individuals turning active. This 
is very similar to what has been reported for Poland and Hungary, especially 
between 1989 and 1992 (Boeri, Burda and Kollo 1998, p.37) and for Russia 
between 1990 and 1996 (Richter 1998, p.3).
CIS-Stat (1998) also reports the shares of state employment by sector. How ‘state’ 
is defined is not reported in the publication and we cannot speculate about the 
definition adopted but what is visible from table 4.2 is how privatisation has 
affected the different sectors. The primary material sectors of industry,
7 The national statistical agency does not publish employment data by sector for the whole 
economy but only for large and medium enterprises. However, these data are produced and 
supplied to the CIS statistical body which then publish them in the CIS labour market review.
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construction, and agriculture, once almost the exclusive domain of the state, have 
been turned largely into non-state ownership. Transport and communications 
maintains instead an important state share due to the fact that large state 
companies such as railways and airways remained state property. Trade and 
catering, traditionally the least ‘public’ of the sectors, became almost exclusively 
the domain of non-state entities by 1996. Overall, state ownership passed from 
83% in 1991 to 34.6% in 1996. Therefore, employment by ownership became 
split across the lines of a mainly private material sphere and a mainly public non­
material sphere. This is obviously due to the fact that public services represent the 
bulk of employment in the non-material sphere and that privatisation was not 
extended to public services such as education and health.
Table 4.2 -  Employment by sector
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 90-96 1990 1996 1991 1996
Industry 1539 1561 1502 1305 1201 1088 1061 -478
Sector
19.7
share
16.3
State
89.5
share
22.7
Construction 908 796 780 620 482 364 307 -601 11.6 4.7 84.3 20.9
Agriculture and 1726 1876 1933 1759 1419 1444 1523 -203 22.1 23.4 70.8 8.6
forestry
Transport and 704 673 657 448 551 507 491 -213 9.0 7.6 95.6 70
communications 
Trade and catering 561 576 549 481 847 1035 1387 826 7.2 21.4 49.1 3.4
Information, 21 17 13 11 10 6 6 -15 0.3 0.1 93.1 70.2
computer services 
Housing and 292 252 232 282 270 274 217 -75 3.7 3.3 88.3 62.7
public utilities 
Education, culture 886 813 753 837 788 781 679 -207 11.4 10.5 97.7 98.7
and art
Science and 136 121 122 43 38 37 35 -101 1.7 0.5 96 80.1
scientific services 
Health, Physical 456 453 462 429 428 417 383 -73 5.8 5.9 97.9 97.9
culture and social 
ins.
Credit and 39 42 49 54 49 50 43 4 0.5 0.7 82.4 53.3
insurance
General 155 166 181 180 147 148 144 -11 2.0 2.2 85.8 93.8
administration 
Others 383 
Total 7806
370
7716
339
7572
477
6926
352
6582
400
6551
219
6495
-164
-1311
4.9
100.0
3.4
100.0 83 34.6
Source: CIS-Stat (1998)
The fact that state share in total employment declined substantially in the material 
sphere does not tell us much about what alternative forms of ownership prevailed. 
Administrative data by forms of ownership are available but the classification
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adopted has changed significantly in 1994 due to the need of accounting for new 
forms of ownership and because of the adoption of ILO recommendations. The 
IBRD (1996, p. 196) published the old classification for the period 1990-1995 but 
the series is consistent only until 1993s. Looking at the period 1990-1993, we 
learn that state sector employees declined from 5.9 to 4.5 millions, that employees 
in leased enterprises, economic associations and cooperatives have declined and 
that employees in joint-stock companies and the number of subsidiary and private 
agricultural workers have increased9.
The traditional official document providing summary information on the labour 
market in Kazakhstan is the so-called ‘Balance of Labour Resources’. The CSAK 
has revised the format in 1994 and a consistent series is now available for the 
period 1994-1998. Such document contains information on employment, 
unemployment and economic inactivity. In table 4.3 the employment data are 
reported. It is evident a sharp decline in employment in enterprises with more than 
fifty employees and a sharp increase of self-employment and, to a lesser extent, an 
increase in small farms employment. The trend in employment in small businesses 
is not clear but it seems that a certain recovery has been occurring starting from 
1995. Overall, we observe a shift from large to small entities.
Table 4.3 -  Employment by size
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Total employed 6582 6552 6519 6472 6128
All legal entities with more than 50 employees 5415 5039 4402 3666 3100
Small farms 69 102 209 277 255
Small businesses 344 159 148 204 294
Self-employed (1) 541 1069 1568 2157 2304
Other(3) 213 182 193 168 174
Source: CSAK (1995,1996,1997,1998,1999)
8 These data are not entirely clear as items do not add up to totals. They are also not informative 
starting from 1994 as the classification changed.
9 In contrast with macro data on ownership, it is interesting to note that in 1996 and according to 
the KLSMS respondents, more than 72% of enterprises’ employees declared to be working for the 
state or public organisations. This would suggest that ownership changes occurred in many 
enterprises have not been understood or perceived as significant management changes by workers.
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The pre and post 1994 employment series by type of ownership we dispose of are 
not entirely compatible but a complete series can be put together taking into 
account only wage labour (employees) against non-wage labour (self- 
employment). We can also use the 1996 KLSMS to compile comparative figures 
so that we can get a flavour of the solidity of administrative data. This is done in 
table 4.4. Overall, a drastic decline in wage labour is visible from 93.4% of total 
employment in 1990 to 59.5% in 1998. The growth of self-employment is 
consistent throughout the series reaching a staggering 37.6% of employment in 
1998. The 1996 figures put together using the KLSMS have been located in the 
table between 1995 and 1996, given that the survey was conducted in July and 
that the rest of the figures are annual averages. As it can be seen, survey figures 
are quite close to administrative estimates fitting the trend very well indeed10.
Table 4.4 -  From wage labour to self-employment
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996* 1996 1997 1998
Wage labour (employees) 93.4 93.4 84.9 79.3 88.5 80.9 78.7 73.0 64.1 59.5
Non-wage labour 
(self-employment)
3.8 4.4 5.4 5.9 8.2 16.3 21.3 24.0 33.3 37.6
Others non defined 2.8 2.1 9.7 14.8 3.2 2.8 0.0 3.0 2.6 2.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total employed 
(as % of population)
47.9 47.2 46.0 42.2 40.3 41.1 40.5 41.6 41.8 40.3
Source: CSAK (1995,1996, 1998, 1999), 1994-1998 IBRD 1996b, (*>1996 KLSMS
Table 4.4 also shows the employment rate as percentage of the population. 
Estimates of population by age emerging from the 1999 census were not yet 
available at the time of writing and population estimates provide the only terms of 
reference in place of the population in working age. However, in the population 
section it was argued that the working age population remained approximately 
stable between 1990 and 1996 and we should not expect employment rates 
calculated as a percentage of the working age population to show a radically 
different trend. As it can be seen from the table, the employment rate declined by 
about seven percentage points, not as dramatically as the employment figures 
would suggest. It is also remarkable that the figure calculated from the 1996 
KLSMS fits the trend observed in administrative data almost perfectly. It may be
10 See appendix for an explanation on how the employment figures have been calculated from the
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that there are significant under or over estimation of employment figures at a 
disegregate level, but overall administrative figures seem rather realistic.
2.3. Self-employment
Self-employment is perhaps the most complex category to define in employment. 
The ILO in the 1993 resolution on the International Classification of Status in 
Employment (ICSE 1993) identifies six categories of workers according to status: 
Employees, employers, own-account workers, members of producers’ 
cooperatives, contributing family workers and workers not classifiable by status11. 
The resolution makes also a clear distinction between paid employment and self- 
employment jobs. The distinction is based on the degree of control that 
individuals have on their income and on the degree of responsibility that they 
have in relation to the welfare of the entity where they work. Following this 
principle, the resolution categorises in paid employment the employees and in 
self-employment the employers, own-account workers, members of producers’ 
cooperatives and contributing family workers. This is the most internationally 
recognised classification as it has been absorbed into the 1993 UN System of 
National Accounts.
According to the description provided in the 1995 Balance of Labour Resources 
presented in table 4.3, self-employed individuals include persons who are engaged 
in trading and services activities and work on their own account and expenses, 
persons helping family members, people working without payment in family 
enterprises and others. According to Koulakeev12 and Katarvaeva (1997), self- 
employment includes employers, persons working on their own account, members 
of production cooperatives and individuals assisting family members as suggested 
by the ILO.
survey.
11 http ://ilo.org/public/english/120stat/res/icse.htm
12 Head of CSAK at the time of writing
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Thus, the ILO definition is now recognised and accepted in Kazakhstan while it 
was argued before that this measure is fairly accurate as compared with the survey 
measure we dispose of The actual accounting of such measure, meaning the 
individual items used by the CSAK to assemble the self-employment figures, 
remains unclear.13 However, what I learned is that self-employment figures are 
estimates assembled putting together information from the various ministries, 
including the ministry of revenues.
The information from the ministry of revenues is in fact fundamental. All self- 
employed individuals are registered with the ministry and they are assigned a tax 
code. This code is essential for any individual because it is required when opening 
a bank account or when paying utilities such as gas or electricity. The code can 
obviously be fabricated but the Ministry reckons that this is a small phenomenon. 
That is because having a tax code does not imply paying taxes. In theory, the self- 
employed are taxed with the purchase of a so-called ‘patent’. This patent 
legitimises the activity, it is estimated according to the type of activity performed 
and it includes income taxes as well as social benefits and pensions contributions. 
It is a ‘forfait’ that can be paid annually or monthly. In practice, a little more than 
100,000 patents were paid in 1998 when the number of registered self-employed 
was more than 2.3 millions. Moreover, one person can buy more patents for 
different activities. We could estimate that roughly 4% of the self-employed paid 
taxes in 1998. This does not necessarily mean that the rest of the self-employed 
have regular income and enjoy tax freedom because many people may be 
registered as self-employed to ‘earn’ a regular status when in fact they are doing 
nothing. A formal status is needed to undertake any administrative procedure 
whether it is applying for an identification document or a residency permit.
13 In interviews I conducted with government officials at the central statistical office, two regional 
administrations and the Ministry of revenues in different rounds and over a period of four years, I 
came to the conclusion that the number of self-employed produced in administrative data is in 
effect the number of people registered as self-employed at the Ministry of Revenue as the 
following paragraph would suggest. However, this was never clearly stated in any of the 
interviews.
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Thus, a large number of self-employed do not pay taxes while it seems that 
altogether very few employed escape some form of registration. This is not that 
surprising giving that control was a great ability of the Soviet state and that it 
remains an important feature of the Kazakh state today. This paradox causes, in 
my view, confusion when we have to distinguish between formal and informal 
activities. It really depends what we mean by informal. If informal is meant to be 
‘escaping the government eye’, than this is a very small phenomenon in 
Kazakhstan today as survey figures show (though illicit activities are likely to 
escape surveys as well) and as far as the employment count is concerned. If 
informal means not paying taxes at all, than the informal sector is very large 
indeed and found mainly among the self-employed (and illegal activities) as one 
would expect. In other words, informal or ‘invisible’ may be the activity that is 
actually performed and/or the income that is actually perceived but not necessarily 
the employment status.
Therefore the distinction between the informal sector and self-employment is a 
question of definition and we should expect self-employment containing a large 
portion of informal activities14. This is not surprising giving that informal 
activities are more likely to be of a very small scale. In fact the use of self- 
employment as a proxy for the informal sector is a rather common practice in the 
study of labour markets in developing countries. Magnac (1991) in a study of the 
Colombian labour market uses self-employment as a proxy for the informal sector 
and so do Pradhan and van Soest (1995) in a study of informal employment in 
urban areas of Bolivia.
In conclusion, self-employment as calculated in administrative statistics should be 
thought of as a box that contains individuals with their own business, whether
14 Kolev (1998) carried out a study of labour supply in the informal economy of Russia making use 
of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, Round IV. In his work, individuals are classified 
as informal job holders if they have a second paid occupation or if they perform any kind o f paid 
work having declared not to work when asked about their main occupation. The definition of self- 
employed used in this and the following chapter and calculated from the 1996 KLMS includes 
owners of enterprises, business owners working on their own account and providers of personal 
services. If second jobholders are added to the category and the informal sector is measured
131
formal or informal, and other individuals who prefer a formal self-employed 
status to other statuses either because they cannot justify belonging to any other 
status or because the self-employment status is more convenient for different 
reasons including tax purposes.
Table 4.5 shows the distribution of the self-employed among different categories 
according to the classification that could be made from the survey15. The self- 
employed are naturally a very heterogeneous category and small groups had to be 
identified for each category to contain similar individuals. The owners of 
enterprises are the largest category. This group includes individuals who claimed 
to own the enterprise where they work. This may mean that respondents are single 
entrepreneurs but also that they are members of collective organisations or 
shareholders who feel they have some degree of control on their activity. As the 
distinction between employees and self-employed is based on the degree of 
control that individuals have on their own activity and income, this category 
belongs to the self-employed according to the ILO16.
according to Kolev definition, self-employment contains two thirds of individuals included in the 
informal sector.
15 The total self-employment figure calculated from the household survey is rather close to the 
administrative estimate but in reality the sub-categories from the two sources may not overlap 
entirely. For instance, a formally registered self-employed in administrative data who is not 
engaged in any activity is classified as inactive by the survey while survey respondents who 
declare to own the enterprise where they work and are therefore classified as self-employed may 
be classified as employees by administrative data.
16 In the following chapter, when sectors will be compared, ‘owners of enterprises’ will be dropped 
from self-employment to render the category as homogenous as possible.
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Table 4.5 - Self-employed
obs. %
Total 622 100
Owners o f enterprises 241 38.7
Business owners 159 25.6
of which: traders 99 15.9
goods producers 17 2.7
service providers 23 3.7
others 20 3.2
other service providers 97 15.6
Professionals 40 6.4
Other employed not working 11 1.8
Other unpaid family workers 53 8.5
Other farming or trading 14 2.3
Other employed not classifiable 7 1.1
Source: 1996 KLSMS
The second largest category is business owners, those who declared to run their 
own business and who are not employees. It is noticeable the small number of 
people involved in the production of goods, only 2.7% of total self-employment. 
Most business owners seem to be traders, probably mostly shopkeepers and street 
vendors. Service providers are also a very large category if we include the 
category ‘other service providers’ which represents those providing personal 
services. All together, 19.3% of the self-employed provide some sort of service 
and most of these are personal services such as cleaning, driving, guarding and the 
like. Administrative data suggested that the largest flow of workers was into self- 
employment activities in the trade and catering sector and these data seem to 
support this aspect of the labour market.
2.4. Underemployment
According to the ILO, underemployment exists when a person's employment is 
inadequate in relation to specified norms or alternative employment, taking into 
account the person’s occupational skills. The ILO suggests to adopt the definition 
of ‘visible underemployment’ defined as all persons in paid or self-employment 
whether at work or not at work, involuntarily working less than the normal 
duration of work determined for their activity, and who were seeking or available 
for additional work during the reference period. It is obvious that such distinctions
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can be made with sample surveys designed ad hoc and cannot be established with 
administrative data or with surveys not designed for this specific purpose. 
Therefore the indicators of underemployment we use here are reduced income and 
reduced working hours, the two fundamental criteria that justify and define 
employment.
The employment service in Kazakhstan has been collecting, starting from 1993, 
data on hidden unemployment in large and medium enterprises, by means of 
questionnaires sent to enterprises. These data are gathered on a monthly basis and 
provide information on the number of enterprises which totally stopped 
production, partially suspended production, totally shifted to part-time regime or 
partially shifted to part-time regime. Also, the number of workers working for 
these enterprises is given as well as the total number of workers on forced leave. 
The aggregate data offer a picture of the quantity of labour not employed to its 
full extent in large and medium enterprises (table 4.6).
The number of enterprises which totally stopped production increased steadily 
during the period. This indicates that economic and financial conditions have been 
particularly hard, but also that many enterprises virtually shut have not been 
liquidated or bankrupted. This can be due to the soft-budget constraint and slow 
development of the legislative framework, as well as to social obligations which 
tie enterprises to the provision of social services, or to other factors such as small 
rents occurring to managers and hopes of re-establishing production in the 
medium term.
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Table 4.6 - Enterprises in difficulty (end of period)
1993 1994 1995 1996
No. o f ent. which stopped production completely 83 230 390 559
No of workers (.000) 16 50.9 81.6 61.9
Average workers per enterprise 193 221 209 111
No. o f ent. which partially suspended production 514 1016 1231 1129
No of workers (.000) 257 372 368 304
Average workers per enterprise 501 367 299 269
No. o f ent. which totally shifted to part-time regime 131 264 A ll 410
No of workers (.000) 73 100 88 90
Average workers per enterprise 559 380 207 217
Total enterprises 728 1510 2048 2098
Total workers 346.5 523.6 538.1 454.5
Total average workers per enterprise 417 322 238 199
Source : RK (1995, 1996, 1997), ADB AND UNESCO (1995)
The number of enterprises which partially suspended production or totally shifted 
to part-time regime increased until 1995 and decreased in 1996. This may signify 
that some of the enterprises under these categories survived during a period of 
uncertainty thanks to reduced regimes, but that eventually some of them entered 
the category of enterprises which totally stopped production or closed down 
altogether. If this is the case, the good news is that inflow into the enterprises in 
difficulties group started to decline in 1996. On the other hand, outflow of 
enterprises (bankruptcy and liquidation) and the number of related workers were 
still growing in 1996. If the number of workers working for enterprises which 
partially shifted to part-time regimes is added to the figures (not in table), the 
number of workers working for enterprises in difficulty as a percentage of 
employment in large and medium enterprises can be estimated at 6.9% for 1993, 
11% for 1994,12.7% for 1995 and 12.3% for 1996.
While these data offer some information on the general malaise of enterprises, 
they say little about actual working conditions including income and working 
time. We saw in the previous chapter that real wages deteriorated severely 
explaining in part labour retention on the part of enterprises, state enterprises in 
particular. However, work conditions deteriorated also in relation to other aspect 
of employment including a growth in wage arrears and unpaid leave practices, the 
use of alternative forms of payments such as wages paid in kind and a general 
reduction in working time. Administrative data offer little information on these
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aspects while a more comprehensive picture can be assembled making use of the 
1996 KLSMS.
According to the survey, most of the employees declared to work at the level of 
their qualification (78%) though more respondents work at a lower level (16%) 
than on a higher level (6%). Only 18% have subordinates suggesting that the great 
majority of employees are blue collar, though this question was not specifically 
addressed in the survey. Less than 5% of employees own shares of the enterprise 
where they work and only a little more than two percent received some form of 
dividend. About 7% declared to have a second occupation.
Employees seem to suffer considerably in terms of wages and working time. 
Table 4.7 cross-tabulates wages actually paid (in tenge = 72 USD at the time of 
the survey) with time actually worked during the 30 days previous to the survey. 
Data are reported in percentage of total employee respondents. It is shown that 
more than 15% of employees did not work at all, though a few of these have 
received some payments. More than 42% did not receive any salary, though only 
a little more than 10% did not perform any work. In fact, almost one fourth of the 
sample worked full-time or more without receiving any salary at all. More than 
10% of the whole sample did not work and did not receive any salary though only 
3.7% of the sample were officially on unpaid leave. Technically speaking, it is 
hard to argue that these people are employed. It is evident that, as compared to 
income, those who work supply a fairly substantial amount of time, or at least 
they report to do so.
Table 4.7 — Employees: wage vs. working time
Tenge
Hours
0 1-5,000 5,001-10,000 > 10,000 Total
0 10.48 2.71 1.64 0.76 15.59
1-150 (part-time) 8.13 7.02 2.22 1.24 18.61
151-200 (full-time) 17.06 21.55 8.71 4.44 51.75
> 200 (over-time) 6.62 4.35 2.13 0.93 14.04
Total 42.29 35.63 14.70 7.37 100.00
Source: 1996 KLSMS
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Many of those who are not paid do not work for factories completely at a 
standstill but probably work for a reasonable number of hours in low productivity 
jobs and activities generating a low or sporadic cash flow. Alternatively, they may 
be producing goods which are not sold or they may not be paid with the income 
generated, as it is the case for state enterprises employees. It is not even the case 
that a large amount of employees produce the goods with which they are paid. 
According to the survey, less than 5% of the employees received some amount of
1 7salary paid in kind .
For the self-employed the information is scattered across the different categories 
considered. Among the ‘owners of enterprises’, most work at the level of their 
qualification as for the employees, though the share of respondents who work at a 
higher level is marginally higher than for the employees. Owners of enterprise are 
more likely to have subordinates (25.3%) and much more likely to possess shares 
(30.3%) as well as to be paid dividends (10.2%) than the employees. Also, around 
11% of respondents in this group declared to have a second occupation. 
Therefore, it seems true that many of those who responded to own the enterprise 
where they work did so because they enjoy a certain degree of participation in 
ownership and profits and they are, generally speaking, a more ‘entrepreneurial’ 
category.
Concerning ‘business owners’, traders is the only category large enough to 
provide any meaningful statistics. Most trading businesses seem to be rather 
young. Over 70% of trading activities were less than one year old at the time of 
the interview and more than 94% were less than two years old. Only 5.8% of the 
traders declared to purchase goods abroad while trading does not seem to be a 
full-time activity for many workers. Almost 42% of the traders declared to have 
been busy six months or less during the 12 months before the survey.
Business owners were also asked to estimate the current value of their activity. 
Table 4.8 shows the distribution of answers divided in four classes. Over 50% of
17 Wages paid in kind are estimated and included into the wage as calculated in table 4.7.
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activities had a smaller value than a good monthly salary (10,000 
Tenge=approx.l39 USD) while two thirds were below twice the amount of this 
measure. It is obvious that these businesses are very small and do not require 
significant capital investment. For the ‘other services provider’ we know that for 
76.6% of respondents it is an occasional activity. The survey does not offer any 
other general information for the residual self-employment categories.
Table 4.8 - Business owners: Value of business
Percentage Cumulative percentage
No value 25.31 25.31
1-10,000 25.31 50.62
10,001-20,000 13.58 64.20
> 20,000 35.80 100
Total 100
Source: 1996 KLSMS
Given the general difficulties which employment presents, it is not surprising that 
job insecurity runs high while expectations about the future are grim. Almost 80% 
of employees respondents declared to be either anxious or very anxious about 
losing their job while more than 70% said to be not much sure or not sure at all 
about finding a new job if made redundant. The questionnaire also provides 
information on happiness and expectations for the employed as a whole. 
Generally speaking there is very little satisfaction with life and very poor 
expectations about the future. There is also not much difference between the 
employees and the self-employed with the self-employed only marginally more 
satisfied and optimistic than the employees (Box 4.1).
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Box 4.1 -  Employed: Expectations, satisfaction and poverty self-perception
Questions Answers Employees Self-employed
Do you think you and your family % of resp. % of resp.
would be better or worse off in 12 
months time?
Much better 2 3.0
A bit better 12.1 15.4
Nothing would change 48.6 44.6
A bit worse 21.9 20.4
Much worse 15.4 16.6
Imagine a staircase with 9 stairs where 1 
are the poor and 9 the rich. Where are 
you personally?
1 5.5 5.8
2 14.8 11.3
3 29 28.7
4 26.7 31.0
5 19.6 18.8
6 3.5 2.5
7 0.7 1.7
8 0.2 0.2
9 0.0 0.0
To what extent are you satisfied with 
your current life?
Completely satisfied 3.0 3.5
Satisfied 13.4 13.8
Yes and No 18.1 20
Not much 35.3 32.1
Not at all 30.2 30.6
To what extent do you worry that you 
won’t be able to provide for your family 
during the next 12 months?
Very much 74.1 74.2
A bit 16.8 15.8
Yes and no 5.4 5.7
Not much 3.0 2.7
Not at all 0.7 1.6
Source: 1996 KLSMS
139
2.5. Unemployment
Before we embark in any estimate of unemployment, it is necessary to be clear 
about what is meant by unemployment. The concept is not unique across 
countries, which is cause of relevant difficulties when it comes to international
1 ficomparability . The ILO defines as unemployed a person who is without work, 
currently available for work and seeking work during the reference period (usually 
one-week). There are generally two means to count the unemployed using this 
criterion. The register kept at employment services and households surveys. In 
western economies, the two measures obtained through these two channels tend to 
be very close and the register is considered a good approximation of the real size 
of unemployment. In CEE countries, it has been found that a discrepancy between 
registered and surveyed figure is more common, though this discrepancy can be 
positive or negative depending on the country and the time considered. In CIS 
countries, the register persistently underestimates by several fold real 
unemployment (chapter 1, tables 1.4 and 1.5).
Kazakhstan is no exception in the CIS scenario and registered figures 
underestimate by several fold the survey measure we dispose of as it will be 
shown. This is due to a combination of reasons including distances from 
employment services and transport costs and poor assistance in terms of 
unemployment benefits and labour market policies provided by the service. 
However, it is also the case that the criteria adopted in Kazakhstan to register the 
unemployed were quite strict during the period considered. According to Art. 5 of 
the law on employment, the unemployed are persons without income, registered at 
the State Employment Service as seeking employment, willing and able to work 
and who have not been offered a suitable job by the service.19
18 See Bean (1989) for a comparative statistical study of unemployment in OECD economies.
19 Isteleulova (1997)
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When a job seeker approaches the employment office, the person is given a list of 
employers to contact . The candidate visits the employers during the first week. 
If, during this week, the person declines two ‘suitable’ offers, the right to be 
registered as unemployed is lost. The same is true if two job offers are declined 
after retraining. ‘Suitable’ is what the employer service thinks it is for the 
candidate. However, the employment service has little information on the actual 
working conditions offered by employers such as whether the wage is regularly 
paid or not. This kind of information is more likely to be available to job seekers 
who contact the potential employer and many offers are turned down simply 
because vacancies are just not proper jobs. Also, those who qualify to register as 
unemployed can stay on the roster for only six months. After this period another 
six months have to pass by before they can actually re-register. Control is also 
severe given that during the time applicants are on the record they have to appear 
to the employment offices on a regular basis (every one or two weeks). Therefore 
the criteria used in Kazakhstan to classify the unemployed was generally more 
restrictive than the ILO definition.
Moreover, the standard ILO definition is not exactly what the ILO itself would 
theoretically apply to a country such as Kazakhstan. In fact the ILO would tend to 
be more permissive in certain particular situations as the following extract from 
the 1982 resolution indicates:
‘In situations where the conventional means o f seeking work are o f 
limited relevance, where the labour market is largely unorganised 
or o f limited scope, where labour absorption is, at the time, 
inadequate or where the labor force is largely self-employed, the 
standard definition o f unemployment (...) may be applied by 
relaxing the criterion o f seeking work’.21
Arguably, the above scenario would correspond to many transitional economies, 
especially those of the former Soviet Union. Therefore the unemployment pool 
has flexible boundaries determined by the definition we like to chose. As different
20 Information in this paragraph was gathered in the course of visits at employment offices in the 
cities of Aktyubinsk and Kustanay in April 1996 and September 1997 respectively.
21 http://www.ilo.org/public/english/120stat/res/ecacpop.htm
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criteria serve different purposes, it seems that the most objective and reasonable 
approach is the one of estimating different unemployment rates using different 
and well-specified definitions. This is the approach we prefer to follow here once 
we turn to estimate unemployment from the 1996 household survey.
Official data on registered unemployment were non-existent during the Soviet 
times as the phenomenon was not recognised although existent . From 1991, the 
CSAK produces every month a document called ‘About the labour Market and 
Social Support of the Unemployed’ which contains information gathered through 
employment services. Table 4.9 presents statistics compiled on the basis of this 
document. It is shown that the total number of applicants to employment services 
tripled during the period . Not all the applicants are unemployed and the number 
includes students, pensioners and employed people in search of an occupation. 
These last three categories together represented 15% of all applicants in 1991, but 
in 1996 their share was only 0.6%. Perhaps, the poor success of these categories 
in receiving support from the employment service explains this trend and indeed 
the strong growth of the unemployed applicants must have left scarce resources 
available for the other categories. Students, pensioners and employed applicants 
cannot be registered as unemployed, they are not entitled to benefits and they are 
only assisted with the job-search.
Some of the unemployed applicants find an occupation during the year, exiting 
the count of the unemployed. This share declined from 47.5% of the total number 
of unemployed applicants in 1991 to 17.8% in 1996. It is obvious that placing 
people into jobs became harder for the employment service. As a consequence, 
the number of people registered as unemployed has grown from 2.5% to 70.1% of 
the unemployed applicants. The rest of the unemployed applicants (those who do 
not find a job or are not registered as unemployed) are those who are omitted from
22 Towards the end of the 1980s emerged that a large number of bezrabotizsa (without work) were 
to be found in Central Asia. This number has been estimated at 3.5m people for the region as 
reported in Mamie (1992)
23 The figures do not contain double counts but they may include people who are recorded for very 
short periods of time because they find employment quickly.
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the register for reasons such as refusing a job offer twice or nor being able to 
provide the necessary documentation to register.
Table 4.9 - Employment services statistics
(.000) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Employed 2,118 10,775 2,420 3,065 2,526 601
Students 11,395 12,091 5,173 5,944 2,371 455
Pensioners 3,273 3,226 1,988 1,836 1,598 2,333
Unemployed 157,348 256,683 227,179 259,833 345,419 558,607
Total Applicants (1) 184,798 282,775 236,760 270,678 351,914 561,996
Registered unemployed (1) 4,000 70,400 78,100 112,900 203,100 391,747
Registered unemployed (2) 4,000 33,700 40,514 70,078 139,557 282,409
(%)
% of applicants unemployed registered as 2.5 27.4 34.4 43.5 58.8 70.1
unemployed(l)
% of applicants unemployed placed into jobs 47.5 36.8 44.0 34.2 26.1 17.8
I V
% of registered unemployed on benefits(2) 25.3 53.9 38.1 47.4 52.7 61.2
Source: CSAK (1991-1996); (1) Jan.-Dee.; (2) End of period
Since 1994, the central statistical office (CSAK) produces estimates of total 
employment on the basis of a variety of informations provided by different 
ministries and on the basis of demographic changes. These figures are published 
in the ‘Balance of Labour Resources’ and show that unemployment increased 
from approximately 536,400 people in 1994 to 970,600 in 1996, equal to 7.5% 
and 13% of the labour force respectively. In other words, the CSAK recognises 
that real unemployment is several times registered figures.
The 1996 KLSMS offers a wide range of questions through which the 
unemployed can be counted and estimating this measure is inevitably a subjective 
exercise. The ILO guidelines offer a valuable help in deciding where to draw the 
line but definitions are subject to interpretations and the standard features of 
transitional labour markets have not yet sunk into international definitions, though 
the ILO has made a real effort to adapt classifications.24 Table 4.10 shows 
unemployment figures calculated using different definitions of unemployment. 
The most ‘relaxed’ of the definitions (U1 -  Wish to work and not employed) 
shows an unemployment rate of 17.2% keeping in mind that we included into
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employment all individuals who performed any amount of work for pay or not. 
Definitions are in order of magnitude and at the bottom of the scale are the 
registered unemployed on benefits who represent only 6.4% of those who 
declared a wish to work.
Table 4.10 -  Unemployment
freq. % lab. force
U1 - Wish to work (not employed) 608 17.2
U2 - Job seeker (self-evaluation) 420 12.6
U3 - Job seeker past 30 days or registered 365 11.1
U4 - Job seeker past 30 days at employment centres 198 6.3
U5 - Job-seeker past 7 days 139 4.5
U6 - Registered unemployed 106 3.5
U7 - Registered unemployed on benefits 39 1.3
Source 1996 KLSMS
The registered unemployed figure shows an unemployment rate of 3.5%. If we 
take the registered unemployment figure for July 1996 from the employment 
service statistics (260,000) and we calculate the respective registered 
unemployment rate we obtain a figure of 3.8%. A rather close figure given the 
different sources. For accounting purposes and in the rest of the work, U3 will be 
used as the figure for total unemployment in Kazakhstan. U3 includes those who 
actively sought work during the 30 days previous to the survey or who were 
registered at the employment services. Given the poor labour market conditions it 
is unlikely that job seekers search for jobs on a weekly basis and it seems sensible 
to count on the basis of at least 30 days. The U3 figure of 11.1% is also not too 
distant from the 13% figure (1996 average) estimated by the CSAK in the balance 
of labour resources. Again survey and administrative figures seem to support each 
other.
The unemployed (U3) as captured by the survey seem to be very young and well 
educated while they do not show either a gender or an urban bias (table 4.11). 
More than half of the unemployed are between 14 and 25 years of age. Average 
education is 11.2 years, well above the average for the population 14 and older of
24 See Chernyshev, I. (1997 and 1994) for a discussion of labour statistical issues in transitional 
economies
144
10.3 years but below the average for the employed of almost 12 years. This is a 
well-educated group by international standards but still less educated relatively to 
the employed. Women are slightly over represented among the unemployed while 
an urban or rural bias is not evident.
Once we distinguish between those who approach the employment services and 
those who don’t the outlook changes significantly. Among those who do not apply 
to employment services the majority are males while the opposite is true for those 
who apply. The difference between the two groups is very visible and it increases 
moving to those who are actually registered. It is obvious that men tend not to 
apply to employment offices and have also fewer chances to be registered as 
unemployed. There is not much difference instead in terms of location between 
those who apply and those who don’t but rural applicants have definitely better 
chances to be registered once they have applied. A major difference is again 
visible when we look at age classes. The young tend to apply less to employment 
services and have a smaller probability to be registered as unemployed. Instead, 
the best educated seem to be more successful in registration.
Table 4.11 -  Unemployed, applicants to employment services and non
% males % urban 14-25 26-59 >=60 edu. av.
U3 - Unemployed 47.8 50.68 50.41 47.95 1.64 11.2
U3a - Unemployed, did not apply empl. Off. 51.9 49.7 57.8 39.5 2.7 11.1
U3b - Unemployed, applied to empl. Off. 43.6 51.7 42.8 56.7 0.56 11.3
U3c - Unemployed, registered 41.6 40.6 34.6 64.4 1 11.6
Source: 1996 KLSMS
Being mostly young, the unemployed have also little working experience. More 
than 61% of the unemployed have worked at some stage though less than 20% of 
those who have worked have worked for more than two years. The quasi-totality 
(96%) left employment after 1989 as one would expect and about 50% during or 
after 1994, the year of the massive lay-off. Also, turnover is not very high within 
the unemployment pool. Less than 10% of the unemployed have been hired at 
least once during the 12 months before the survey. More than one third declared 
that would accept any job offered while one fourth said they were looking for a
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professional job. A little more than 20% said they were looking specifically for a 
well-paid job while a minority (about 8%) said to be looking for part-time or 
flexible jobs.
2.6. Population and the labour force
It is now possible to calculate the labour force (or economically active population) 
by simply adding the employed to the unemployed. As we explained in the 
population section, revised estimates of the population in working age were not 
yet available at the time of writing and we have to calculate the employment and 
the labour force participation rates as a proportion of the entire population. Also, 
unemployment statistics for the period 1990-1993 are only available for the 
registered unemployed and estimates of total unemployment for the period had to 
be made on the basis of registered figures.
The employment rate declined by approximately seven percentage points which is 
less than what one would expect when looking at the employment decline (table 
4.12). The explanation is to be found in emigration trends and the general decline 
of the population. The unemployment rate grows steadily until 1996 and then 
seems to stabilise around 13% of the labour force. The labour force participation 
rate decreases up to 1994 and then increases again. This is explained by the fact 
that the employment decline effect is offset by the unemployment increase effect 
around 1994. As we showed before, the 1996 KLSMS estimates seem to be 
consistent with the administrative series presented.
25 To do so, the 1994 ratio between registered and total unemployment was calculated and then 
applied to the period 1990-1993. This is obviously a rough measure and data until 1994 should be 
treated with caution.
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Table 4.12 -  The labour force
(.000) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996* 1996 1997 1998
Employed 7806 7716 7572 6926 6582 6552 2925 6519 6472 6128
Unemployed (1) 0 31 261 315 536 808 365 971 968 925
Labour force 7806 7747 7833 7241 7118 7360 3290 7490 7440 7053
Out of labour force 8492 8611 8619 9185 9217 8597 3886 8186 8041 8136
Population 16298 16358 16452 16426 16335 15957 7176 15676 15481 15188
Employment rate (% pop) 47.9 47.2 46.0 42.2 40.3 41.1 40.8 41.6 41.8 40.3
Unemployment rate (% If) 0.0 0.4 3.3 4.4 7.5 11.0 11.1 13.0 13.0 13.1
Labour force participation 47.9 
rate (% pop)
47.4 47.6 44.1 43.6 46.1 45.8 47.8 48.1 46.4
Source: CSAK (1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999), CIS-Stat(1998), 1996 KLSMS;
(1) Values until 1993 are estimates on the basis of registered unemployment (*)KLSMS
3. Labour market flows: The reallocation of labour
The insecurity and poor labour conditions offered by employment in enterprises, 
the alternative opportunities offered by self-employment, the scarce assistance 
provided to the unemployed and the general decline in social assistance 
contributed in activating a number of flows between employment in enterprises, 
self-employment, unemployment and the inactive pool. All these ‘pools’ have 
experienced significant changes during the transition. Table 4.13 shows the now 
familiar trends of a severe reduction in employees, sharp growth in the self- 
employment and unemployment pools together with certain stability in the 
inactive pool.
Table 4.13 -  Labour market ‘pools’
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Employees 46.1 45.1 43.6 39.7 37.0 34.4 31.6 27.9 25.2
Self-employed 1.8 2.0 2.4 2.5 3.3 6.7 10.0 13.9 15.2
Unemployed 0.0 0.2 1.6 1.9 3.3 5.1 6.2 6.3 6.1
Inactive 52.1 52.6 52.4 55.9 56.4 53.9 52.2 51.9 53.6
Population 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Constructed from CSAK (1995, 1996,1997,1998, 1999) and IBRD (1996)
These four pools generated in effect six bilateral flows, all of which have been 
fairly active during the transition. For instance, it is evident from table 4.13 that 
during the first massive lay-offs in 1993 and 1994 many workers have been
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accommodated into the inactive pool. On the contrary, between 1995 and 1997 the 
further decline in enterprises employment has been absorbed by self-employment 
and unemployment and the two categories managed to pull in people from the 
inactive pool too. In other words, a reflux from inactivity back into the labour 
force has occurred. Such phenomenon explains in part the growth of 
unemployment irrespective of what has been happening within the enterprise 
sector. Schematically, we can illustrate the labour market flows as follows:
Potential workforce
EXITENTRY
Immigration 
New cohorts
Emigr.
Death
Retirem.
Where Ei = Economic Inactivity, Em = Employment in enterprises (wage 
employment), Se = Self-employment and U = Unemployment
Flows ‘b’ and ‘g’ are what transitional and labour market models put at the centre 
of analysis, ‘b’ is the flow from formal employment to unemployment and vice- 
versa. ‘g’ is the reallocation of labour across enterprises which can take the form 
of either a state-private reallocation or a cross-sector reallocation. This is what 
will be analysed in the next section.
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Other two flows rather well documented have been flows ‘e5 and ‘d \  Flow ‘e5 is 
constituted in essence by early retirement schemes and by women turning to 
household activities, two phenomena that have been very strong in the early years 
of reforms. A ADB/UNESCO report (1996) reported that between 1990 and 1995 
about half of the kindergartens in Kazakhstan have been closed. Many hospitals 
either closed or reduced inpatient intakes forcing families to keep ill relatives at 
home. These and other factors have encouraged women in particular to leave the 
labour force irrespective of employment conditions. Flow ‘d5 is mainly 
determined by the existing degree of ‘seeking5. An ‘inactive5 person who start 
seeking a job moves by definition into unemployment and, vice-versa, an 
unemployed who stop seeking falls into inactivity. A certain job seeking fatigue 
visibly occurred in Kazakhstan from 1996 onwards and labour force participation 
rates have been shown to decline in most transitional economies.
The remaining flows, ‘a5, ‘c5 and ‘f , the ins and outs of the self-employment 
pool, are perhaps those flows we know less about. Flow ‘a5 is what we 
documented in the section on employment. It is the flow from enterprises in 
various sectors of the economy to self-employment mainly in the trade and 
catering sector. Flow ‘c5 is constituted by people who take up self-employment 
activities after a period of unemployment or who fall into unemployment because 
unable or unwilling to run a business. Flow ‘f  is composed by people who move 
with agility from running a household to home production, helping out relatives, 
occasional trading or providing small services such as cleaning or driving. This 
flow is very ‘fluid5 and cannot be captured with accuracy in any interval of time.
Thus, outside the world of enterprises a whole set of labour flows has occurred as 
a result of transitional changes. Such flows are naturally less affected by changes 
in wages and productivity while they are sensitive to changes in other factors such 
as social benefits regimes, quality and availability of community services, 
pensions5 real values and personal and household characteristics. These are ‘real5 
factors that affect people's labour decisions. These factors also naturally tend to
149
increase in weight when formal employment conditions are poor and when there 
is high unemployment and a high degree of labour market instability.
3.1. The reallocation of labour across enterprises (the ‘g'force)
Compelling evidence of a significant cross-sector reallocation of labour in the 
enterprise sector (the ‘g’ force) has not been found in previous sections while the 
state-private reallocation has been largely explained in terms of privatisation and 
of growth of self-employment rather than in terms of growth of a new private 
sector. However, before we accept the hypotheses that labour reallocation in 
enterprises has in fact not occurred or that the forces of change have not been 
working in the expected directions we may want to look at and try to make sense 
of a number of other elements including labour turnover in enterprises and the 
relationship between sectors performance, wages and productivity.
The classic evidence proposed to support the reallocation of labour argument is 
the high degree of hirings and separations observed throughout transitional 
economies. A high labour turnover is taken as an indication of a buoyant labour 
market and a healthy reallocation of labour. The CSAK provides data on 
employment and unemployment turnovers. In table 4.14 the share of arrivals (A), 
separations (L) and the difference between the two measures (D) is computed as a 
percentage of total employment for large and medium enterprises. It is shown that 
both arrivals and separations rates are high with separations rates offsetting 
arrivals rates, given the overall decline in employment. Also, turnover is generally 
high in all sectors and both hiring and separations seemed to increase during the 
period.
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Table 4.14 -  Employment turnover rates
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Industry A 17.2 23.7 21.6 21.9 22.7
L 20.1 29.1 31.3 32 39.3
D -2.9 -5.4 -9.7 -10.1 -16.6
Agriculture and forestry A 9.1 9.4 5.4 13.6
L 10.9 15.5 9.8 27.6
D -1.8 -6.1 -4.4 -14.0
Construction A 24.8 30.3 27.7 31.6 30.8
L 30.2 38.6 46.3 48.5 58.6
D -5.4 -8.3 -18.6 -16.9 -27.8
Transport and communication A 14.5 14.6 15 13.6 21.6
L 21.8 30 27.1 26.1 34.3
D -7.3 -15.4 -12.1 -12.5 -12.7
Trade, catering and procurement A 16.4 26.6 27.3 37.2 32.2
L 29 36.2 43.2 61.5 70.6
D -12.6 -9.6 -15.9 -24.3 -38.4
Health, Physical culture and social insurance A 18.1 21.8 19.5 17.2
L 16.1 24.9 21.5 26.1
D 2 -3.1 -2 -8.8
Science and scientific services A 25.2 23.2 19.5 19.4
L 31.4 27.4 26.8 29.4
D -6.2 -4.2 -7.3 -10
Credit and insurance A 17.1 21.2 19.6 27.9
L 12.9 27.8 26 41.9
D 4.2 -6.6 -6.4 -14.0
Total A 18.2 18.5 17.8 23.4 15.0
L 24 23.6 26.5 35.5 27.0
D -5.8 -5.1 -8.7 -12.1 -12.0
Source: De Broeck and Kostial (1998) and Cis-Stat (1998); A=Arrivals, L=separations, 
D=Difference (Arrivals-Separations)
A closer inspection reveals that there is not a visible relation between turnover 
level and sectors’ output. The correlation coefficient calculated across sectors and 
between 1992 and 1996 gives a negative value of -0.4502 . Sectors with bad 
records such as industry and construction have very high turnover rates as well as 
the best performing sector, credit and insurance. This is a feature similar to what 
has been observed in Russia. Kupriyanova (1997)27 noticed that the incidence of 
changes in professional status is lower in areas that have performed relatively 
better such as in Moscow and St.Petersburg (p. 14).
26 The correlation index is: p  cov(A- , where x is annual changes in output by sector and y is
x,y=— —
the turnover rate.
27 Quoted in Clarke and Donova (1999), p. 14, note 24
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Moreover, from labour turnover rates, it is not possible to know whether high 
figures are due to workers moving across sectors, within sectors or even within 
the same enterprises. Piecing together the available evidence, it seems that a large 
portion of the turnover is explained by workers who are in fact not moving across 
sectors. For many enterprises defensive restructuring meant an internal 
reorganisation of labour with movements of workers within the enterprise. Clarke 
and Donova (1999) well documented this form of internal reallocation in Russia 
and explained how workers have been willing to move across shops, occupations 
and hierarchy to maintain their employment and how internal mobility has 
increased during the transitional period (p.6).
In other cases, workers leave their occupation during production downturns only 
to come back when work picks up again. Relevant output swings have been 
documented in chapter 3. This may well be the case, for instance, in the 
construction sector, where work is sporadic and workers are hired on a temporary 
basis to accomplish piece works. Indeed construction is the single sector with the 
highest turnover while being the single sector with the largest output and 
employment decline. In other cases, enterprises waiting for input deliveries send 
workers home for indefinite time only to recall them when inputs are available 
and production can be reactivated. It is also the case that many new enterprises are 
simply spin-offs of old ones. Enterprises are split in smaller production units or 
reorganised with different lay outs and departments. Often, when these types of 
restructuring occur, contracts are re-signed with the new entity and this appears in 
statistics as new hirings and separations.
An additional significant factor in explaining labour turnover is migration. It was 
shown in the population section that both emigration and immigration have been 
very significant phenomena. Immigrants have been mostly ethnic Kazakhs living 
abroad encouraged to return by housing schemes specifically tailored for re­
entrants and by job opportunities left vacant by Slavic emigrants. Thus these are 
probably the same jobs changing hands from ethnic Slavs to ethnic Kazakhs.
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A less important factor may have been the growth of private employment. 
Gimpelson and Lippoldt (1998) documented that employment in the Russian 
private sector shows higher turnover and greater employment fragility than 
employment in the state sector. We don’t have evidence to support this claim in 
Kazakhstan and this factor can only have played a marginal role given the limited 
growth of employment in truly private enterprises. In conclusion, the observed 
high labour turnovers seem to be a symptom of poor employment conditions 
rather than of a healthy reallocation of labour. Such employment fragility carries a 
high degree of insecurity and instability which is very much in line with what was 
documented in the underemployment section.
Did entities that changed ownership away from state ownership offer better 
opportunities and have they been able to attract workers? Trade and catering, the 
single sector which has been able to attract a large number of workers has also the 
highest share of workers working for non-state entities. However, measuring the 
cross-sector correlation between the change in non-state ownership and output 
across sectors and during the period 1991-1996 suggests that sectors which 
managed to increase non-state ownership significantly have also performed 
relatively worse. The correlation is highly negative whether we consider all 
sectors or we exclude trade and catering as table 4.15 shows . More dubious is 
the correlation between changes in non-state ownership and employment. This 
seems slightly positive all sectors considered, and negative if trade and catering is 
excluded. These numbers should be treated with caution because the time series 
are short and because most of the change in ownership happened when most of 
the output and employment changes already occurred (chapter 3). However, at 
least from these macro data, the change in ownership does not appear to be 
positively and significantly correlated with either output or employment.
28 The sectors considered are: Industry, Construction, Agriculture and Forestry, Transport and 
Communication, Trade and Catering, Housing and Public utilities, Education, Culture and Arts, 
Science and Scientific services, Credit and Insurance, General administration. These were the 
sectors for which the full set of data was available. The correlation coefficient is as in note 26 and 
is calculated on annual changes in employment or output against annual changes in non-state 
ownership.
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Table 4.15 -  Cross-sector correlation between non-state ownership (NS), 
output (O) and employment (E), (1991-1996)
NS-E NS-0
With T&C 0.07798 -0.61738
Without T&C -0.19739 -0.63645
Source: Estimated from CIS-Stat (1998) and CSAK (1997a)
Did real wages changed in line with productivity? With employment declining 
less than output, enterprises in Kazakhstan experienced a fall in productivity. 
During the same period, real wages declined and it is natural to argue that 
enterprises opted to maintain labour in exchange of lower real wages. What, 
however, is less clear is the scale of the different declines. If we compute 
productivity as a simple ratio between output and employment, we observe a 
decline of about 22% between 1991 and 1996 (table 4.16). Other conditions being 
equal, this decline should have been reflected in a similar decline in real wages. 
Instead, real wages declined much more. Deflating wages is not a simple matter 
given the size of inflation and the introduction of the national currency in 1993 
but the deeper decline in wages as compared to output per worker is evident 
however we deflate wages.
Table 4.16 - Output, employment and wages
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Output 100 97.0 87.0 71.5 65.2 65.9
Employment 100 98.1 89.8 85.3 84.9 84.5
Output/Employment 100 98.8 96.9 83.8 76.8 78.0
Real consumer wages 100 45.7 38.7 37.5 40.6 39.9
Source: Calculated from Cis-Stat (1998)
One reason which may explain such a fall in real wages is that, as noted in chapter 
3, Kazakhstan entered the transitional period with large endowments of both 
capital and labour. Therefore, part of the fall in real wages may be explained as an 
‘overhanging’ labour hoarding from previous periods. Yet, as large as this
29 For a discussion on price indexes in Central Asia see Koen (1997) while De Broeck, De Masi 
and Koen (1995) discuss inflation in Kazakhstan. There is a variety of price indexes and methods 
one could use to deflate wages and I found results to be quite sensitive on the choice. In table 4.16, 
I used the CSAK official annual Consumer Price Index (CPI).
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overhanging labour hoarding may have been, the fall in wages is still not fully 
explained and it seems plausible to argue that wages have been simply slow in 
catching up with inflation. The inflationary peak was in January 1992 and by the 
end of that year most of the wage devaluation had occurred. Since then, output 
continued to decline and unemployment has been growing steadily thus 
explaining why wages have not been able to re-gain the pre-1992 value.
Table 4.17 shows changes in output, employment, productivity and relative wages 
across ten sectors. The decline in productivity is visible in most sectors, but the 
size and sign of the changes occurred between 1990 and 1996 is very different 
across sectors. Industry, construction, agriculture, transport and communication 
and trade and catering show the largest falls. All other sectors show either a 
proportional decline of both output and employment or, as in the cases of housing 
and public utilities and general administration, a relative large decline in 
employment vis-a-vis output and a consequent increase in productivity.
Did sectors changes in relative wages followed changes in sector productivity? 
The apparent behaviour is quite contrary to what one may have expected during a 
process of transition. There seems to be an inverse correlation between 
productivity and relative wages. The correlation index calculated between annual 
changes in productivity and relative wages across all sectors and years gives a 
value of -0.25.
It should be noted that wages are contractual wages and do not necessarily 
correspond to what workers effectively get at the end of the month. Also, the 
wages observed are those reported in formal questionnaires sent to enterprises by 
the national statistical agency. The picture may be different if all real and paid 
wages could be observed. Nonetheless, economic sectors that aim at attracting the 
best workers should be able to formally offer on the labour market contractual 
wages higher than other sectors and the fact that this is not visible should not be 
dismissed simply on the ground that what is not observed is necessarily different 
from what is observed. Perhaps the high level of aggregation used does not allow 
detecting the reallocation of labour and relative wages accurately, but when we
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considered output of single products in chapter 3 this seemed to behave fairly 
consistently within sectors. Also, generally speaking, wages tend to be more 
homogeneous within economic sectors than across sectors because of the nature 
of national contractual agreements and the sector specificity of skills, professions 
and productivity. Wage dispersion across sectors increased during the period as it 
is shown by the standard deviation calculated for relative wages (table 4.17).
In conclusion, neither a reallocation of labour across enterprises nor a real 
reallocation of labour from state to new private enterprises is visible in 
Kazakhstan. In fact non-state ownership does not seem to be positively correlated 
with output and real or relative wages did not change in line with productivity, as 
one would have expected during a reallocation of labour from depressed to 
growing sectors. In other words, the labour market does not seem to have 
functioned as labour economics would suggest.
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Table 4.17 -  Total employment (E), output (O), productivity (O/E) and 
relative wages (RW)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Industry E 100 101 98 85 78 71 69
0 100 100 83 72 52 47 48
O/E 100 99 85 84 67 67 69
RW 100 113 125 125 149 148 135
Construction E 100 88 86 68 53 40 34
0 100 89 53 39 33 20 16
O/E 100 101 62 57 62 51 47
RW 100 102 108 113 127 130 115
Agriculture and forestry E 100 109 112 102 82 84 88
0 100 77 100 93 73 55 53
O/E 100 71 89 91 89 66 60
RW 100 85 92 81 58 47 49
Transport and Comm. E 100 96 93 64 78 72 70
0 100 94 77 66 50 45 41
O/E 100 99 82 103 64 63 59
RW 100 104 107 120 126 136 140
Trade and catering E 100 103 98 86 151 184 247
0 100 99 82 76 63 67 77
O/E 100 96 83 89 42 36 31
RW 100 106 96 109 103 101 106
Housing and public utilities E 100 86 79 97 92 94 74
0 100 103 104 101 101 106 105
O/E 100 119 130 105 109 113 141
RW 100 106 103 112 130 80 127
Education, culture and art E 100 92 85 94 89 88 77
0 100 103 99 96 92 91 88
O/E 100 113 116 101 104 103 115
RW 100 109 77 . 92 76 86 105
Science and scientific services E 100 89 90 32 28 27 26
0 100 95 80 70 35 34 29
O/E 100 107 90 221 126 124 113
RW 100 95 86 80 72 81 83
Credit and insurance E 100 108 126 138 126 128 110
0 100 107 117 134 125 121 110
O/E 100 100 93 97 99 95 99
- RW 100 138 150 201 186 174 144
General administration E 100 107 117 116 95 95 93
0 100 113 125 130 143 144 145
O/E 100 105 107 112 150 151 157
RW 100 85 87 94 84 75 96
Relative wages Stand. Dev.(*) 23.5 29.8 39.6 53.0 54.5 53.1 39.2
Source: Calculated from CSAK (1997a), CIS-Stat (1998) 
(*)Calculated on relative wages not adjusted to base year (not in table)
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3.2. Frictions and obstacles to the reallocation of labour across enterprises
Thus, neither a genuine reallocation across sectors and enterprises seem to have 
occurred nor variables such as wages and productivity have changed in the 
expected directions. It is sensible therefore to turn to those factors that may have 
hampered such processes such as labour market rigidities.
The minimum wage, which existed in Kazakhstan throughout the period, has been 
too low to discourage firms from hiring and workers from leaving. The minimum 
wage has been consistently below 27% of the average wage, touching 5.5% in 
1995 (table 4.18). In 1996, the minimum wage was significantly less than the 
value of the minimum consumption basket and below unemployment benefits (see 
below). Given the depreciation of wages, it is unlikely that the minimum wage 
had any meaning for workers and certainly did not discourage firms from hiring. 
Moreover, with significant wage arrears, it is not the difference between wage and 
minimum wage that matters to workers but the actual cash they get at the end of 
the month.
The reservation wage represented by unemployment benefits has also been rather 
low but, more importantly, it reached only a small number of the unemployed. 
Unemployment benefits, according to legislation, were tied to the value of the 
minimum wage and remained low accordingly. At the end of 1996, the average 
unemployment benefit was 2,215 Tenge (30 USD), slightly higher than the formal 
minimum wage but less than half of the estimated subsistence wage (64 USD) 
and about one third of the average wage. This value is similar to what has been 
reported for CEE economies in 1995 (Commander and Tolstopiatenko 1997) and 
is not insignificant if compared with the actual wage received by workers on 
average (1996 KLSMS). However, the number of people on benefits is so low that 
unemployment benefits are unlikely to influence labour market dynamics on the
30 Estimated by the trade union federation in 1996.
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whole. In 1996, and according to the KLSMS, only 10.7% of the unemployed
*3 1
(U3) were receiving benefits .
Table 4.18 - Monthly nominal wages and pensions (annual averages)
1991* 1992* 1993 1994 1995 1996
Minimum wage 115 589 13 122 262 1550
%Av. wage 26.1 12.7 10.2 7.1 5.5 23.0
Average pension 187 2237 122 998 1876 3283
%Av. wage 42.4 48.4 96.1 57.8 39.2 48.8
Average wage 441 4625 127 1728 4786 6730
100 100 100 100 100 100
Source : UNDP (1997), IBRD (1996), EU (1997); (*) Rubles
The question of whether benefits and services provided by enterprises represented 
a real disincentive to reallocation is disputable. Commander and Schankerman 
(1997. p.4) have argued that in former Soviet enterprises benefits remained a 
substantial component of total compensation32. On the whole, social protection 
expenditure in Kazakhstan has declined from 11.2% to 7.9% of GDP between 
1992 and 1997 (Murthy, Pradhan and Scott 1998, p.25) which translates into a 
decline of about two thirds in real expenditure. The provision of social protection 
benefits has shifted away from enterprises and towards local administrations 
which determined a deterioration in the capacity of enterprises to compensate 
workers with non-cash benefits. According to the 1996 KLSMS, only 2.7% of 
respondents who were asked if they received any subsidy (children care, pre­
school institutions, medical services, housing, transportation, etc,) from their 
enterprise during the 30 days before the interview said to have received any sum 
in cash or kind. This seems a rather small share to have had any impact on overall 
job retention in 1996, though the general argument was probably valid in the early 
years of transition.
Trade unions are generally of two forms, the trade unions heritage of the Soviet 
system and the new independent trade unions. None of these is currently a serious
31 Calculated from table 4.10
32 The authors observe only the share of enterprises still providing benefits in two rather small 
enterprises surveys where questions were addressed to management rather than workers. Therefore 
the actual decline in benefits effectively provided to workers is not observed.
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candidate to claim responsibility for employment rigidities. The first were in 
substance an additional state institution meant to voice workers needs and manage 
different services such as recreational activities. These had little say in wage 
determination and often did not speak for the workers but for the management 
(OECD 1995, p. 12). The new independent trade unions are instead still very 
small, poorly Organised and certainly not powerful enough to reach tripartite 
negotiations and influence wage setting, except occasionally when strikes are 
organised in critical sectors such as mining or transport33.
Residency restrictions, the housing market and transport costs are instead real 
potential frictions in the labour market. Residency restrictions and mobility rules 
and regulations have been removed to some extent but having a registered 
residency is a strict requirement for accessing all sorts of state benefits, including 
unemployment benefits. Housing is no longer the legal entitlement it used to be. 
Generally speaking, households have been given the right to purchase the property 
in which they lived for a nominal sum. Many families took this opportunity 
though others have not because of the costs attached to ownership such as 
maintenance of common grounds or local taxes. Non-state rents are high, 
generally more than the average wage, and workers move to other regions if they 
have relatives or friends capable of offering shelter. Distances across regions and 
transport costs are often prohibitive for temporary migrant labour given that the 
country is almost eleven times the size of the UK.
Regional mismatches can be an asset in times of reallocation as they provide 
incentives for mobility while skills mismatches across regions can undermine this 
force. Regions were highly specialised during the Soviet times and remained so in 
the aftermath. The ‘virgin lands’ regions of Southern Siberia (North of 
Kazakhstan) specialised in agriculture, most of the other northern regions 
specialised in heavy industry or mining, one region relied on the Baikonur space 
programme, another on the nuclear industry, the southern regions relied more on
33 Lines (1995) supports this argument in describing public services trade unions in Central Asia. 
Strikes, including hunger strikes, have been reported by local media in several occasions
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commerce and husbandry. Regional disparities have been increasing during the 
transitional period partly because the different output declines in the different 
sectors have been reflected on the regions and partly because regions applied 
transitional reforms unevenly. At the same time, such regional disparities are 
strictly intertwined with skills disparities across regions. As the regions are rather 
specialised, the regional educational systems were often designed to supply local 
industries. Mining regions, for instance, trained miners as well as mineral 
engineers. Workers attracted by better pay in other regions are likely to have to 
change profession and qualifications which may be costly and time consuming, 
thus becoming an additional form of barrier to mobility.
Thus, certain classic potential sources of labour market frictions such as the 
minimum wage, unemployment benefits, trade unions and to a lesser extent social 
assistance provided by enterprises have not been identified as major obstacles to 
labour reallocation across enterprises and sectors. More important may have been 
factors such as residency restrictions, the housing market, distances and transport 
costs and skills mismatches. What it remains to be explained, however, is how 
mobility constraints might have affected selectively only the reallocation of labour 
across enterprises and industries. As it was shown in the population section, 
internal migration was estimated at 3.9m people while external migration was 
estimated at 4.5m people between 1990 and 1998. When real needs and real 
incentives exist people seem to find means to move.
3.3 The reallocation of labour from and to self-employment
The general picture emerging for Kazakhstan is that the labour market is rather 
flexible in terms of pay and rather segmented in terms of regions and economic 
sectors. This historical segmentation partly explains a low cross-sector mobility 
but the crux of the matter is that none of the sectors really managed to flourish and 
pull workers out of other sectors, except for trade and catering. This last sector 
attracted a substantial number of workers without showing a particular good
particularly in mining areas, but these were a reaction to wage arrears rather than an organised
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record in output, wages or productivity. Wage differentials and regional and 
sectoral segmentation cannot explain why so many workers have been pouring 
into trade and catering and self-employment. So, what can explain such a 
reallocation of labour?
An alternative option is to think about an economy divided into a wage and non 
wage sectors constituted by employees and self-employed respectively as it was 
proposed in chapter 2. If a non-wage sector exists that offers income opportunities 
similar to the wage sector, workers may be induced to move in and out the wage 
and non-wage sectors for a combination of non-wage reasons. In other words, the 
wage in paid employment is not perceived by workers as the main motive for 
mobility. Moreover, if the non-wage sector is associated with a particular sector of 
the economy, changes in this sector are incidentally induced by changes in the 
balance between wage and non-wage employment. This may explain the 
association between the growth of trade and catering and self-employment. It is 
not trade and catering per se that attracts workers by performing better as a sector 
but the fact that this sector is structurally suited to host self-employment activities 
better than any other sector. Self-employment is what workers may be seeking as 
a defensive mechanism in times of acute recessions.
This may well be one of the missing pieces of the enigma. Chart 4.1 depicts a 
non-parametric density function (kernel) of the natural logarithm of total income 
for the employees and the self-employed respectively. The two distributions 
almost overlap suggesting that it is unlikely that the wage determined such a 
migration of workers from one status to the other. The two distributions are also 
very ‘compressed’ around the mode. If we exclude those workers whose income 
is zero (the left tail in the chart), the average income for the employees (state and 
private) was 6527 tenge as compared to an average of 6278 for the self-employed.
wage negotiating measure.
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Chart 4.1 -  Income distributions for the employees and self-employed
a  Employees □ Self-employed
.6 -
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Source: 1996 KLSMS; Kernel estimates using a Epanechnikov function34 
4. Summary and conclusions
The picture presented for the labour market in Kazakhstan is one of a deeply 
depressed labour market. The demographic shock, the employment decline across 
sectors, the severe underemployment and unemployment are all elements which 
confirm that the recession experienced by Kazakhstan between 1990 and 1996 has 
been fully reflected onto the labour market. The only single relevant phenomenon 
that occurred is the reallocation from various sectors of the economy to trade and 
catering in the form of self-employment. In such an environment the relations 
between output, employment, productivity and relative wages are upset and 
confused and do not offer a valuable tool to analyse and explain labour market 
dynamics.
Cross-sector labour reallocation as initially imagined from depressed to healthy 
sectors is not visible as almost all sectors are depressed. Nor it is visible a
34 See Greene (1997, p.904)
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reallocation from sectors which have suffered more to sectors which have suffered 
less. A significant labour turnover in enterprises has been observed but mainly 
determined by workers entering and exiting the same economic sectors or moving 
from various sectors of the economy to trade and catering as self-employed. A 
very large number became unemployed, though less than one third register at 
employment offices. There has been also a certain ‘osmosis’ between 
unemployment and economic inactivity so that unemployment at times grows 
because of a reflux from the economically inactive pool. Therefore, in the labour 
market observed, the size of the unemployment pool has been partly determined 
by the inflow and outflow from the economically inactive pool and partly by the 
capacity of trade and catering to ‘create’ self-employment opportunities. These are 
elements that do not normally enter labour market models of unemployment.
There is virtually a vacuum in the transitional literature when it comes to explain 
the flow into self-employment and conventional labour economics instruments 
seem in a weak position to explain this form of reallocation in Kazakhstan. This 
calls for a reconsideration of the labour market using a different framework of 
analysis adapted to recessional and transitional labour markets dynamics with 
self-employment as the focus of attention. One proposed framework is the wage- 
non-wage framework which allows to better isolate the formal wage and consider 
its relevance for labour mobility.
The questions which arise in such a context are: a) how relevant is the wage in 
explaining the reallocation of labour; b) what are those non-wage elements which 
determine the reallocation from wage to non-wage employment and c) whether 
this is a free choice - i.e. workers are pulled in non-wage employment - or, rather 
it is a forced decision - i.e. workers are pushed into this sector. Moreover, when 
non-wage factors gain relatively to wage factors in workers’ participation 
decisions, economic inactivity becomes an additional sector that may compete for 
labour time and that, at least for some workers, should be looked at as a possible 
and viable alternative choice. These are some of the themes explored in the next 
chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
LABOUR SUPPLY1
This chapter compares the individual, household and location characteristics of 
private employees, the self-employed, the unemployed and the economically 
inactive found by the 1996 Living Standards Measurement Survey. The purpose is 
to understand whether the process of transition has determined a clear sector 
specific pattern in the reallocation of labour from the state sector to the three 
relatively new pools of private employees, self-employed and unemployed. An 
‘occupational choice’ model is used to explore the determinants of sector 
participation2.
1. Introduction
From the previous chapters we learnt that poor conditions in enterprises and a 
non-growth of a new private sector have facilitated the migration of a significant 
number of workers into self-employment. Taking a labour supply viewpoint, we 
want to see now the determinants of sector participation.
The study of sector participation has been applied in a wide variety of contexts but 
the branch of literature that comes closer to what is proposed in this chapter is the 
study of sector participation in developing countries. This started from the 
traditional framework of the ‘dual’ labour market hypothesis where the distinction 
between the two sectors has been either the urban/rural or the formal/informal one 
(Lewis 1954, Harris and Todaro 1970). More recently, using variants of a sector 
choice model initially developed by Roy (1951), these studies looked at more than 
two sectors testing at times for segmentation (Gindling 1991, Pradhan 1995,
11 am grateful to two anonymous referees for comments on an article version of this chapter.
2 Occupational choice models fall into what Heckman (1993) calls labour supply models at the 
‘extensive’ margin as opposed to labour supply choices at the ‘intensive’ margin concerning work­
time.
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Magnac 1991), sector ordering (Pradhan and van Soest 1995) or assessing search 
strategies (Fields 1989).
In a transitional context of the kind we have explored in chapters 3 and 4, a sector 
participation model seems best suited to continue maintaining the distinction 
between the state, private and self-employment sectors and explore further the 
determinants of sector participation. This is also an indirect way of looking at the 
determinants of the reallocation of labour critical to understand the direction that 
the process of transition is taking as well as an opportunity to test some of the 
assumptions of early transitional models.
In section 2, I present the empirical model derived from chapter 2. Section 3 
presents data, variables and estimation methods. Section 4 presents the results 
separately for income and non-income factors. Section 5 concludes.
2. Empirical model
The underlying supply model is what it was presented in chapter 2. The empirical 
modelling implies the consideration of a latent variable Yy* representing the 
expected utility for individual i choosing sector j:
y;  = a)w ; + /? ;* ;+ * ,
where W y*  is the potential or expected wage, Ky* is a lxk vector of non-income 
variables influencing the individual’s choice of sector j. a'j and P’j are the 
parameters to be estimated and sy is the random component. At time t, the 
individual i will maximise the expected utility and, as a result, the sector choice is 
made. Yy  is the utility associated with choice j  at time t+1 that satisfies the 
condition Yy>Yik for all other krf. It is the situation ex-post decision that we are 
able to observe in the data.
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Ex-ante, a well-informed worker is aware of the potential wage that each sector is 
willing to provide given K y * .  The potential wage arising to worker i in sector j  can 
be modelled as follows:
where W y*  is the potential wage, D j  are the parameters to be estimated, R y  is a 
vector of explanatory variables and Hy is a normally distributed error term.
As explained in chapter 2, the choice of the sector (N y )  is the outcome of both 
individual preferences and labour market rationing or, more explicitly, of the 
expected wage (W) and individual (Z), location (X) and household (H) 
characteristics. The estimation of the wage and participation equations can be 
done simultaneously or, alternatively, the expected wage can be estimated first 
and then it can be used as explanatory variable in a binary probabilistic sector 
participation model where '1' stands for participation and 'O' stands for non­
participation as follows:
Where Ny is participation of worker i in sector j , wy is the expected wage accruing 
to worker i in sector j , Xy is a vector of variables describing the status of the local 
economic and labour market conditions, Z y  is a vector of personal characteristics 
such as age and education, H y  is a vector of variables representing household 
responsibilities and characteristics, vn and v^ are normally distributed error terms
W ij - A j Z y  +  f i j X y  +  V U with i = 1, ,N
and j  = 1, 2, 3, 4
0 -  otherwise
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and yjy ®i> ¥j> $> §  and X  are parameters. Note that Zy and Xy enter both the wage 
and sector selection equations. It is assumed that employers determine the wage 
according to the individual characteristics of the employee and the local economic 
conditions. Workers know how employers behave and estimate their expected 
wage accordingly. However, personal characteristics and the local economic 
conditions also affect workers’ choice independently from the expected wage. For 
instance, a worker may expect a relatively good wage from private employment 
but chose self-employment because local transport between home and the 
enterprise is simply not available.
The model can be applied to both the private and self-employment sectors. The 
difference is that ‘Z’ entering the wage equation represents factors affecting 
employers’ choices in the private sector and individual characteristics that affect 
productivity and profits in self-employment. The ‘H’ factor simply states that, if 
the recession affected family structures and assets, the impact is transmitted in the 
labour market via labour supply schedules. A decrease in birth rates, for instance, 
reduces the average family and increases the probability of women seeking private 
employment. An increase in divorces may have the same effect while an increase 
in male mortality turns some women into heads of households and pushes them to 
seek work. Household attributes affect labour supply choices in any context but 
what makes the transition case different is the magnitude in the changes of some 
of these attributes experienced over a very short period of time.
The estimation of the parameters in the model should give some indication of 
what factors are relevant in sector choice. The model also allows testing for 
segmentation by comparing incomes across sectors. Segmentation is defined as ‘a 
situation where, because o f institutional barriers to occupational mobility across 
sectors, a worker in the lower sector has less than full access to a job in the upper 
sector’ (Gindling 1991:585, see also Dickens and Lang 1985). With no barriers, 
workers move to the upper sector until wages are brought down to the level of the
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lower sector. If segmentation exists differences in wages between sectors for 
identical workers should be observed .
In the case of transitional economies, with sectors supposedly developing at a 
different pace, we should expect the private sector to be in a position to chose and 
ration workers according to their personal characteristics. We should also expect 
the private sector to reward these personal characteristics with comparatively 
better wages than the state or the self-employment sectors (the efficiency wage 
argument). In other words, we should expect a certain degree of segmentation 
based on wages to exist as a fundamental feature of transition that would comply 
with transitional models. Therefore testing for segmentation is an implicit test of 
models predicting a two-tier sector development.
3. Data, variables and estimation methods
3.1. Sectors classification
Data are taken from the 1996 Kazakhstan Living Standards Measurement Survey 
(KLSMS)4. Five groups of individuals are considered in this chapter: State 
employees, private employees, self-employed, unemployed and economically 
inactive. The state sector is defined as all employees in state enterprises, public 
organisations and municipalities. Following the model, this sector does not hire 
but it is used as a reference sector for comparative purposes. Private employees 
have been defined as those who declared working for a private owner or company, 
including foreign companies. Following ILO recommendations5, the self- 
employed are defined as the employers, own account workers, members of
3 Testing segmentation only on the basis of wage differentials between sectors may be misleading. 
Heckman and Hotz (1986) warn that the estimated wage equations should be corrected for 
endogeneity o f the selection in the sectors. Pradhan (1995) notes that such models do not allow 
distinguishing between wage differentials resulting from individual preferences for non-wage job 
characteristics and those resulting from restricted mobility between sectors. Magnac (1991) 
reminds that even if wage differentials across sectors exist these may be due to the fact that 
workers may have sector specific skills.
4 Details o f the survey are described in Annex.
5 See ILO resolutions on employment, unemployment and economically inactive at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/120stat/res
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producers’ cooperatives and contributing family workers. However, given the 
heterogeneity of such classification, the self-employment sample was restricted to 
own account workers providing services, producing goods or trading. This allows 
self-employment to be reduced to a rather homogenous group that is also fairly 
representative of the category. The economically inactive were restricted to two 
categories: the discouraged unemployed, defined as those not employed who 
declared a wish to work, and housekeepers, defined as those not employed who 
declared to be housekeepers. No age restrictions were necessary. The five 
categories so defined include only adult individuals either already employed or 
not employed and able to work. Pensioners, students, disabled or ill are not 
included. This reduced the sample to 2,894 individuals (1669 state employees, 
215 private employees, 256 self-employed, 365 unemployed, 165 discouraged 
unemployed and 224 housekeepers) of which only 1.3% were either below the age 
of 14 or above the age of 60.
The sectors’ classification used here reflects two aspects. One is that the 
respondents determine what sector they belong to by ticking the category they feel 
best reflects the ownership structure of the employer. This may not coincide 
entirely with the true structure because employees may be badly informed. 
However, it reflects the information available to the supply side of the labour 
market and it is the supply decision we are concerned with in this chapter. The 
second aspect is that the private sector should reflect truly privately owned 
businesses and not mixed form of ownership that emerged from a ‘nominal’ 
process of privatisation. It is only by isolating workers who during the survey 
worked for fully private activities that we can observe whether these workers are 
substantially different or not. Therefore the private sector in this study is smaller 
than what administrative data report while the state sector is larger. The self- 
employed, defined according to the ILO definition, approximately reflect 
administrative estimates but the sub-sample selected for this study is smaller.
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3.2. Income
Before estimating the expected income (wy in the model), it is necessary to 
discuss a number of issues related to the measurement of income in a country such 
as Kazakhstan and with the data available.
First it was necessary to find a measure that could be used to compare the income 
of the employees with the income of the self-employed. The survey offers 
separate information for the two categories. Employees were asked about the 
formal wage (the contractual or official wage agreed between employer and 
employee) and paid income (the total amount of compensation, including salary, 
bonus, subsidy and allowance effectively paid by the enterprise to the employee 
during the 30 days previous to the interview). Instead, the self-employed were 
asked about the business cash-flow. The information on the self-employed 
producers of goods is on the cost of production, the information on traders is 
about the cost of purchases and the value of sales and the information on service 
providers is about earnings and costs. If we estimate income for the self-employed 
using this information we find negative values for those who have been 'stocking 
up' on supplies at the time of the survey. Information on yearly income is not 
available and we also do not know how the income reported in this way can be 
attributed to other family members, if these contributed to the business.
The only available alternative offered by the survey is to use a question that was 
addressed to all the employed, employees and self-employed alike. That is about 
all earnings including salary, bonus, profit, allowance, occasional earnings and 
other money income effectively paid during the 30 days before the interview took 
place (income henceforth). Comparing these responses with those on purchases 
and sales shows that the self-employed evaluated a sort of average income 
accruing to themselves as individuals rather than the business cash flow. This is 
perhaps not an optimal choice but the best allowed by the survey and also a 
recurrent practice in the literature on the informal and self-employment sectors in 
developing countries (Pradhan and van Soest 1995, Magnac 1991). The choice of
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such question is also justified by the fact that wages are paid irregularly and 
employees value the occupation in relation to the various sources of earnings and 
benefits accruing at the end of the month rather than simply the wage. For the 
self-employed, income measured in this way better captures the different sources 
of earnings in one measure. Also, the fact that such question was addressed to 
both employees and self-employed renders the comparison between the two 
sectors easier.
Second, measuring income rather than wage for the employees presents some 
additional difficulties. I compared the formal wage with the income paid. In 
principle, the difference of the two measures should be explained by bonuses, 
profits and allowances. In practice, I found that income could be more, less or 
equal than the formal wage. If it is more, we could assume that the difference is 
explained by bonuses, profits and allowances but it could also be that arrears 
accumulated during previous months have been paid for some workers. The 
survey does not offer questions that would allow discriminating between the two 
effects.
Similar reasoning applies where income is equal or smaller than the formal wage. 
A smaller income may mean that respondents are suffering from partial wage 
arrears but also that they may have profited from enterprise assets for personal use 
at a cost agreed with the enterprise (this is not an uncommon practice in 
Kazakhstan) or, alternatively, that there is an informal agreement between 
employers and workers that wages are reduced during production slow-downs. 
There may be many different reasons explaining why paid income is equal or 
smaller than the formal wage and the survey does not allow to discriminate 
between the different reasons. This is a recurrent feature of the first World Bank 
living standards measurement surveys implemented in CIS countries because they 
were not designed to take specifically into account measurement issues related to 
these type of problems.
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I use a feature of the data to correct, at least partially, for respondents paid less 
than the formal wage. In principle, the literature suggests to use the logarithm of 
hourly earnings as the dependent variable in the wage equations. I calculated 
hourly earnings using information provided in the time budget section of the 
survey. Respondents were asked how many hours were dedicated to work during 
the week previous to the interview. This allowed measuring the working time of 
the self-employed otherwise undetected in the questionnaire while again it offered 
the possibility to compare private employees and the self-employed making use of 
the same question. Unfortunately, using the time budget information a 
considerable number of observations were lost (9.1% for the private employees 
and 47.4% for the self-employed) because of non-respondents in the time budget 
section. Given that the sample we disposed of was already small, I needed to use 
as many income observations as possible.
In effect, the survey shows that 83% of the private employees respondents and 
70% of the self-employed worked more than 35 hours during the week before the 
interview. Therefore the great majority are full-time workers. Moreover, I checked 
whether using income or income per hour would alter the results of the income 
equations and found that none of the explanatory variables changed either sign or 
significance for the private employees. For the self-employed I found one change 
of sign for a non-significant variable and the change from significant (in the 
income equation) to non-significant (in the income per hour equation) for the 
dummy of the young in age 14-25. This is a small difference that would not justify 
losing almost half of the income observations for the self-employed.
Therefore, I finally opted to use the logarithm of income rather than the income 
per hour. This also allows correcting partially for those who have been paid less 
than the formal wage. I simply assume that this group is the group that has been 
working less than full-time. This is not necessarily true (though likely) and also 
the two groups may not be of similar sizes but this seems the best option to cancel 
out in part two potential measurement errors. Finally, for those who have not been 
paid at all, I assume that the cause is wage arrears. This is a standard assumption
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though again we cannot be certain that this is the case for the same reasons 
explained above. Income equations will be estimated with Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS).
Measuring the expected wage (wy) presents additional problems. One is the usual 
selection bias problem (Gronau 1974) whereby the income observed in the data 
for one particular sector may not be representative of those who opted for other 
sectors. This problem can be treated with a Heckman selection model (Heckman 
1976). In such model the wage and the participation equation are estimated 
simultaneously. The peculiarity is that the participation equation contains two sets 
of variables; the set used in the wage equation and a set of variables thought to 
determine whether the wage is observed or not. If the data are affected by 
selection bias the Heckman selection model should provide better estimates and 
the coefficients in the wage equation should be interpreted as representative of all 
workers.
The second form of selectivity bias may arise because of wage arrears. Some 
incomes are not observed because incomes have not been paid and the sample of 
the paid employees may not be representative of the non-paid. In our sample, 
29.3% of state employees and 16.3% of private employees were not paid. Also, 
4.9% of the self-employed did not produce any income (table 1). Given that the 
state sector is not a choice option and that wage arrears do not affect self- 
employment, I need to correct for this form of selectivity only for the private 
employees.
However, before treating wage arrears in the private sector, I compare graphically 
expected incomes in the three sectors (state, private and self-employment) under 
three different assumptions. This is done to see where the distributions of income 
in the private and self-employment sectors locate themselves vis-a-vis the 
distribution of income in the state sector and also to assess how different 
assumptions about expected incomes can lead to different results.
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I assumed first that workers are not informed about arrears and compared formal 
wages in the different sectors (income for the self-employed). If workers do not 
know about the actual income paid, they make their choice on the basis of the 
wage that sectors offer on the market and the formal wage seems the best measure 
of such wage. Then I assumed that workers are perfectly informed and compared 
actual incomes. In this case workers know precisely the full income package 
actually paid by enterprises and take decisions accordingly. Next, I assumed that 
workers are only informed about wage arrears but not about other forms of 
compensation such as allowances or profits. In this case, I compared the formal 
wage multiplied by the probability of income being paid observed in the data 
(income times the probability of making an income for the self-employed). 
Results of these comparisons are presented graphically by means of a Kernel 
density distribution.
For wage arrears in the private sector, I first try to establish if the ‘paid’ group is 
significantly different from the ‘non-paid’ group. I do it by running a probit 
equation where ‘1* is assigned to the ‘paid’ group and ‘0’ to the ‘non-paid’. The 
explanatory variables are those used in the model, ‘Z’, ‘X’, and ‘H’. I can identify 
in this way the significant variables determining the probability of being paid. If 
the two sub-samples are found to be significantly different, I could attempt to 
correct selectivity with a Heckman selection model using two sets of 
discriminatory variables, one for the wage arrears bias (the variables significant in 
the probit) and the other for the selectivity bias determined by non-choice of the 
sector (if different from the former set of variables). If, instead, the two sub­
samples are not statistically different, than the selectivity bias determined by wage 
arrears is not an issue and I simply need to correct for the classic selection bias.
Table 1 shows the formal wage and income for the sectors considered. Income in 
self-employment is more regular across the sample with only 4.9% of incomes 
equal to zero as opposed to 16.3% in the private sector and 29.3% in the state 
sector. The average private formal wage is clearly larger than the state wage. The 
difference is still visible if we look at income while income for the self-employed
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seems to position itself in between the state and private sectors. Using the 
logarithm of income or the logarithm of income per hour almost cancel the 
differences across sectors.
Table 1 -  Income
State Private Self-emp
Total no. of observations 1669 215 256
Formal wage (% of resp. in total obs.) 96.6 97.2 -
Income (% of resp. in total obs.) 95.7 97.2 96.5
Income>0 (% of income resp.) 70.7 83.7 95.1
Income=0 (% of income resp.) 29.3 16.3 4.9
Formal wage (monthly, average, tenge) 4952 7683 -
Standard deviation 4239 7568 -
Income (monthly, average, tenge) 4563 7367 6574
Standard deviation 7670 12510 11013
Ln of income 8.40 8.64 8.32
Standard deviation 0.84 0.99 1.01
Ln of income per hour 3.24 3.45 3.48
Standard deviation 0.89 1.07 0.99
Source 1996 KLSMS; 1 USD=72 tenge
3.3. Non-income variables
Following the model, the explanatory variables have been grouped in three 
categories: individual characteristics (Z), location attributes (X) and household 
related variables (H). ‘Z’ includes age in years, age years squared/100, a dummy 
for the youth in age 14-25 and years of education6. The youth dummy was thought 
necessary as it emerged that workers in age 14-25 suffer from higher 
unemployment and sector discrimination as compared to other age categories. ‘X’ 
includes the regional employment rate (meant to represent the local labour market 
conditions) and the regional average household consumption per capita (meant to
6 Work experience was not included for different reasons. Specific questions on the employment 
history were not asked in the survey. The alternative was to calculate work experience as a 
difference between age and years of education but by 1996 many workers had experienced 
unemployment spills with consequent gaps in their employment history. Moreover, when in the 
trials the variable work experience (calculated as a difference between age and education) was 
used, either age or education were automatically dropped by the software for multicollinearity.
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nrepresent local economic welfare) . ‘H’ includes a dummy for head of household 
and a variable for the number of children in the household (meant to represent the 
degree of household responsibilities), the natural logarithm of annual household 
consumption (meant to represent household welfare) and a dummy if the 
household owns a car (meant to represent an household asset that potentially
O
influences the choice of the sector) . During the trials with different variables 
representing household assets such as land or home ownership, car ownership 
persistently emerged as a critical variable for the participation in self-employment 
and unemployment and I decided to maintain this variable in the final choice.
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables considered. As compared 
to the state sector, the private employees tend to be males, from urban areas, 
younger on average with a larger share of young adults while they show the same 
level of education on average. Perhaps because mainly urban, private employees 
also show to belong to families with less children. The self-employed do not show 
a gender bias while they are also more present in urban areas. They are on average 
as old as the private employees, less educated and belong to families with more 
children. The self-employed also show to be less likely to be head of household 
than the other two employment categories while they have the highest incidence 
of car ownership.
Both the unemployed and the discouraged unemployed show considerably lower 
average age, lower education, the incidence of head of households is much lower 
while they come from families with average number of children and they have a 
lower incidence of car ownership than any other category. These features are more 
marked among the discouraged unemployed than the unemployed. The
7 Household consumption variables were calculated from the household section of the survey by 
the World Bank for a poverty study ‘Kazakhstan: Living Standards During the Transition’, Report 
No. 17520-KZ. I am grateful to Kinnon Scott at the World Bank for providing these variables.
8 Car ownership may be endogenous to self-employment participation. It may be that traders are 
more likely to buy a car. However, the cost of a car is disproportionate when related to self- 
employment income and it is much more likely that those who had already a car in Soviet times 
were more likely to become self-employed. I checked this by comparing the year the car was 
bought with the age o f the business and found that for 85.7% of the self-employed the car was 
older than the business. These are the people who own the old ‘Giguli’, trade in food commodities 
and offer lifts on the streets.
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discouraged unemployed are also prevalently rural. Housekeepers seem to 
position themselves in between the employed and the unemployed being younger 
than the employed and less educated while they show the highest average number 
of children as one would expect.
Table 2 -  Sectors’ profile
State Private Self-empl. Unemp. Disc.
unem.
Housekee
pers
Observations 1669 215 256 365 165 224
women (%) 53.3 37.2 49.8 52.2 49.1 100
urban (%) 56.5 78.1 66.0 50.7 33.1 48.9
age (average) 37.6 35.5 35.7 29.5 26.5 31.9
age 14-25 (%) 14.4 20.9 20.3 51.0 60.1 28.9
education (average, years) 12.2 12.2 11.5 11.2 10.8 11.0
head of HH (%) 46.8 47.0 44.9 21.6 17.8 11.1
number of children (average in HH) 1 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.8 1.6
respondents living in HH with car (%) 23.9 21.9 29.7 18.9 16.5 27.1
Source: 1996 KLSMS
Estimation of the participation equations will be done initially with a multinomial 
logit. This is the standard estimation method used in sector choice models 
(Schmidt and Strauss 1975, Pradhan and van Soest 1995) and allows comparing 
the different sectors relative to a base category which in our case is the state 
sector. Then, sectors are compared in pairs by means of probits and discriminating 
between males and females and urban and rural areas. First the private and self- 
employment sectors are compared to test differences of workers characteristics in 
the two sectors. Second, the private and self-employment sectors are compared in 
turn with unemployment. This is done to see how the two sectors ration workers 
given that the unemployed is the single group rationed by definition. Third, I 
compare the unemployed with the discouraged unemployed. This is to see what 
factors may determine seeking or non-seeking actively employment. Fourth, I 
compare females employed in the private and self-employment sectors with the 
housekeepers. This is done to explore females’ employment participation and see 
if housekeeping is a hidden form of unemployment.
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4. Results
I look at income and non-income factors determining the choice of the sector 
separately, except for the Heckman selection model where income and 
participation equations are estimated simultaneously. Given the generally poor 
quality of income data and given the results on income presented below, I chose 
to keep expected income out of the explanatory variables in the sector 
participation equations. This prevents poor income data from polluting non­
income factors and restricting further the already small samples9.
4.1. Income
The model assumes that the state sector is not really an employment option for 
workers in transition. Employment in the state sector is assumed to decline 
irreversibly. As indicated by the model, workers in the private and self- 
employment sectors come from the state sector and for this reason the state sector 
is best kept as a reference category.
The determinants for observed incomes are explored first using OLS estimations 
in table 3. For the state and private employees, the equations represent how 
employers de facto value workers’ characteristics. For the self-employed, the 
equations represent the returns to self-employment activities based on individual 
characteristics. The state sector (column 1) pays comparatively lower incomes to 
women. Education increases income very slightly while living in urban areas 
makes a significant and large difference. Living in wealthier areas also seems to 
be a significant factor, though the effect is very small. For the private sector 
(column 2), the only significant factor that affects income seems to be living in 
urban areas. For self-employment (column 3), being a woman or very young are 
very important factors that reduce income while living in urban areas increases
9 Initially during the trials I estimated predicted income for each working sector and then used it as 
explanatory variable in the sector participation equations (probits). Expected income appeared to 
be consistently non-significant. That is because the standard explanatory variables of income do 
not explain income variance as it will be shown further. Therefore using expected income in the 
participation equation does not add value to the equations.
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significantly income as for the other sectors. A small positive effect is also visible 
for individuals living in wealthier areas10.
Table 3 -  Income equations
Dep. Var.: ln income State
(1)
Private
(2)
Self-emp.
(3)
women -0.377 -0.266 -0.514
(8.07)** (1.76) (4.08)**
age (years) 0.031 0.105 -0.040
(1.91) (1.63) (1.49)
age squared/100 -0.040 -0.131 0.040
(2.12)* (1.73) (1.38)
age14-25 -0.019 0.151 -0.539
(0.17) (0.43) (2.35)*
education (years) 0.074 0.034 0.017
(7.40)** (1.02) (0.70)
urban 0.415 0.835 0.294
(8.56)** (4.37)** (2.12)*
regional employment rate 0.005 -0.017 -0.020
(1.36) (1.20) (1.62)
regional average consumption per capita 0.005 0.009 0.014
(2.25)* (1.17) (2.66)**
Constant 6.265 6.228 9.632
(14.86)** (3.91)** (11.01)**
Observations 1128 175 234
R-squared 0.17 0.14 0.14
Absolute value of t-stat in parenthesis; * significant at 5% level; ** Significant at 1% level
Concerning expected income, the distributions of income in the state, private and 
self-employment sectors are compared first. Chart 5.1 shows such distributions 
using the logarithm of income or the logarithm of the formal wage under different 
assumptions. In figure ‘A’ the assumption is that workers are not informed about 
arrears. The distributions of the formal wages (income for the self-employed) 
show that the private sector offers on the market the best wages, followed by self-
10 It would be better to treat urban and rural areas separately. However, table 2 showed that 78.1% 
of private employees and 66% of the self-employed were in urban areas. Given that income is zero 
for 16.3% of the private employees (table 1), the number of observations in rural areas for this 
group becomes excessively small. Chart 1 will offer an urban/rural income comparison across 
sectors which is allowed by the fact that a Kernel distribution can ‘smoothen’ data with few 
observations.
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Chart 5.1 -  Expected income under different assumptions (kernel distributions11)
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employment and the state sector. In figure ‘B’, it is assumed that workers are 
perfectly informed about the total money package available in each sector and 
about wage arrears. The distributions of incomes show that there is no significant 
difference between the different sectors. In figure ‘C* it is assumed that workers 
are only informed about total wage arrears and the formal wage is multiplied by 
the probability of income not being paid (71 = 1 -  percentage of income observed 
and not paid). In this case, the self-employment sector emerges as the best sector 
followed by the private and state sectors. In sum, if we assume that workers have 
a certain degree of information about wage arrears, then the self-employment 
sector appears as a potential competitor of the private sector.
I now take a closer look at private and self-employment income distributions. 
Chart 5.2 compares the distributions of income in the two sectors using kernel 
density estimates as before. The purpose is to see if there are major differences 
according to location and if using the logarithm of income rather than the 
logarithm of income per hour severely distorts the distributions. Incomes in the 
two sectors show very similar distributions irrespective of the choice of location 
or income (figures A, B, C and D). The private sector shows higher peaks around 
mode values and is slightly shifted to the right in urban areas (figure A). Equality 
of the distributions in figures A and B was tested with a Kolmogorov-Smimov
19test . The test suggests that, at least for urban areas, no major differences in the 
distributions of private and self-employment incomes are observable. Using the 
logarithm of income per hour rather than the logarithm of income (figures C and 
D) changes slightly frequencies around the mode but does not shift the
12 The Null hypothesis is that one of the two distributions contains significantly smaller or larger 
values. The combined estimated differences between the two distributions were 0.2417 and 0.1363 
while the corrected P-values were 0.000 and 0.7421 for urban and rural areas respectively. The test 
is not very reliable for less than 50 observations which is the case for the number of private 
employees in rural areas (Chart 1, figure B, rural). See Stata release 5 reference manuals p.301-305 
for details.
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distributions. However, it comes with a substantial cost in terms of observations 
lost.
Next, I attempt to correct for selectivity bias in the private sector. In order to 
identify those variables that may determine wage arrears selectivity I run a probit 
equation for the state and private sectors giving a value of ‘1’ to respondents 
whose incomes were observed and ‘O’ to those whose income were zero (table 4). 
I did it separately for urban and rural areas using all Z, X and H variables as
1 'Iexplanatory variables . The state sector is not a choice option but it is kept as a 
reference as before. The latter shows that gender and location variables seem to be 
the relevant factors in explaining wage arrears with opposite signs in urban and 
rural areas (columns 1 and 2). Instead, for the private sector, none of the variables 
is significant in either urban or rural areas (column 3 and 4). I conclude that for 
the private employees the group with wage arrears is a random sample and that 
there is no need to correct for this type of bias.
For the selectivity bias determined by non-participation, I run a Heckman 
selection model for both the private and self-employment sectors using as 
discriminatory variables the location variables ‘X’ and the household variables 
‘H’ (table 5). I assume that incomes may not be observed either because the 
individual lives in depressed areas where the private or self-employment sectors 
may not be an option or because individuals opted to stay in or out of these two 
sectors because of family related reasons14.
13 The ‘H’ variables are not thought to determine whether income is paid or not but they are used 
as conditional variables.
14 The sample considered here are private employees, self-employed, unemployed and discouraged 
unemployed. For instance, for the Heckman model applied to the private employees and in the 
selection equation, I gave a value o f '1' to the private sector and 'O' to the other three sectors.
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Table 4 -  Paid Vs. Non-paid employees (Probit)
Dep. var State State Private Private
Paid=l Urban Rural Urban Rural
Non-paid=0 (1) (2) (3) (4)
women -0.286 0.262 0.323 -0.565
(2.73)** (2.20)* (1.04) (0.81)
age (years) 0.038 0.007 -0.074 -0.334
(1.00) (0.19) (0.53) (0.79)
age squared/100 -0.021 -0.005 0.066 0.563
(0.46) (0.12) (0.39) (0.94)
age14-25 -0.103 0.021 -1.249 -1.181
(0.45) (0.09) (1.68) (0.66)
education (years) 0.022 0.001 -0.113 -0.028
(0.99) (0.04) (1.62) (0.13)
regional employment rate 0.021 -0.021 0.033 -0.168
(2.53)* (2.28)* (1.24) (1.39)
regional av. consumption/capita -0.012 0.011 -0.010 0.047
(2.97)** (2.15)* (0.74) (0.90)
head of household 0.124 0.349 0.214 0.539
(1.15) (2.76)** (0.61) (0.76)
household number of children -0.074 0.081 -0.340 -0.367
(1.19) (1.67) (1.80) (0.89)
ln annual household consump. 0.359 0.078 0.510 0.737
(3.52)** (0.82) (1.64) (1.09)
household owns a car -0.043 0.094 0.445 -1.923
(0.35) (0.79) (1.02) (1.88)
Constant -4.826 -0.546 -2.348 6.218
(3.55)** (0.41) (0.54) (0.53)
Observations 905 691 166 43
Absolute value of z-stat. in parenthesis; * significant at 5% level;
** Significant at 1% level
Table 5 -  Income equations corrected for selectivity
Dep. var. = Ln of income Private
Income
0 )
Private 
Sel. eq. 
(2)
Self-em
Income
(3)
Self-em 
Sel. eq. 
(4)
women 0.276 -0.536 -0.200 -0.189
(1.52) (5.33)** (1.24) (2.15)*
age (years) 0.002 0.073 -0.049 0.009
(0.03) (1.99)* (1.45) (0.39)
age squared/100 -0.021 -0.081 0.039 -0.002
(0.27) (1.89) (1.07) (0.07)
age14-25 0.091 0.017 -0.221 -0.292
(0.25) (0.08) (0.78) (1.65)
education (years) -0.049 0.073 0.002 -0.008
(1.32) (3.27)** (0.07) (0.44)
urban 0.178 0.673 0.027 0.249
(0.82) (5.84)** (0.16) (2.69)**
regional employment rate 0.007 0.004
(1.01) (0.53)
regional av. consumption/capita -0.001 0.000
(0.31) (0.12)
head of household 0.336 0.204
(3.86)** (2.26)*
household number of children -0.006 0.077
(0.11) (1.84)
ln annual household consump. 0.361 0.239
(5.07)** (3.48)**
household owns a car -0.134 0.188
(1.39) (2.18)*
Constant 10.911 -7.862 11.298 -4.018
(7.32)** (7.19)** (12.77)** (4.42)**
Observations 1222 1222 1222 1222
LR test 30.38 6.31
Absolute value of z-stat. in parenthesis; * significant at 5% level; ** 
Significant at 1% level
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The coefficients in the wage equations (columns 1 and 3) should be interpreted as 
if income was observed for all respondents. The Likelihood Ratio test (LR) of 
independent equations suggests that the use of the Heckman model is justified for 
both sectors, the private sector in particular15. As compared with the non­
corrected equations in table 3, the explanatory variables in the income equations 
lose significance. The urban dummy in the private sector and the gender, youth 
and urban variables in the self-employment sectors are no longer significant. 
Therefore it appears that, once we correct for selectivity, the expected 
determinants of income do not explain variations in income any longer.
Instead, the selection equations (columns 2 and 4) seem to indicate that, in both 
sectors, women are less likely to participate while those living in urban areas, 
head of households and those living in wealthier households are more likely to 
participate. These factors have a greater effect for the private sectors than for self- 
employment. Private sector participation is also marginally more likely for the 
better educated which is not the case in self-employment. Instead, self- 
employment participation significantly increases if the household owns a car.
In substance, the private sector seems to offer better formal wages on the labour 
market but then pays as other sectors at the end of the month. Personal and 
location characteristics do not seem to explain variation in income.
4.2. Non-income factors
I start by comparing the private employees, self-employed, unemployed and 
discouraged unemployed using a multinomial logit (table 6)16.1 do this separately 
for urban and rural areas. The base category is the state sector.
15 Hp(0): Rho=0. The test compares the joint likelihood of an independent probit model for the 
selection equation and a regression model on the observed wage data against the Heckman model 
likelihood.
16In a multinomial logit model, die disturbances are assumed to be independent, identically 
distributed and homoscedastic. This implies the validity of the Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives (ILA) hypothesis. The IIA implies that the odds ratios calculated from a multinomial 
logit model for each sector considered are independent from the other sectors. If we add or remove 
one category this should not affect the relative risks of the regressors in the other categories. The
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For the private sector (columns 1 and 5), whether urban or rural, the only 
significant variable is women with a large coefficient. No other variable 
distinguishes the private sector from the state sector relatively to other sectors. 
This would suggest that workers in the private sector are more similar to workers 
found in the state sector than those found in other sectors. This may be explained 
by the fact that workers in the two sectors are both employees as opposed to own 
account workers or unemployed (they may self-select themselves into wage 
employment according to personal characteristics). Or, more likely, the private 
sector is in fact a 'privatised' sector that is not significantly different from the state 
sector in terms of employees’ characteristics.
The self-employed (columns 2 and 6) distinguish themselves for age and for 
education with education decreasing the likelihood of being in this sector as 
compared with the state sector in both urban and rural areas. In rural areas car 
ownership significantly increases participation in self-employment with a large 
coefficient.
IIA can be tested with a Hausman type specification test which, according to Hausman and Me 
Fadden (1984), performs best with multinomial logit models. If the tests fail, the IIA hypothesis is 
rejected indicating that the sectors considered are not independent. On the samples considered, 
such test could not be carried out because small samples do not meet the asymptotic assumptions 
of the test. A multinomial probit model, where the error terms in the different equations for each 
sectors are correlated, could be a better choice than the multinomial logit but the computational 
difficulties are severe and most statistical packages do not offer such model as a standard routine.
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Table 6 -  Sector participation (Multinomial logit)
Dep. var =State=l Private Self-emp Unemp Discun Private Self-emp Unemp Disc un
Pr=2; Se=3; Un=4; Urban Urban Urban Urban Rural Rural Rural Rural
Disc=5 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
women -0.646 0.156 0.099 0.042 -0.816 -0.486 -0.273 -0.350
(3.63)** (0.89) (0.56) (0.14) (2.20)* (1.77) (1.29) (1.38)
age (years) -0.002 -0.152 -0.197 -0.154 -0.025 -0.012 -0.155 -0.096
(0.03) (3.08)** (4.08)** (1.66) (0.23) (0.13) (2.63)** (1.23)
age squared/100 -0.023 0.163 0.203 0.113 -0.010 -0.013 0.174 0.037
(0.28) (3.00)** (3.76)** (0.95) (0.07) (0.11) (2.33)* (0.34)
age14-25 0.165 -0.414 0.178 0.007 -0.564 -0.226 0.903 0.620
(0.40) (1.09) (0.50) (0.01) (0.83) (0.44) (2.46)* (1.42)
education (years) 0.011 -0.130 -0.126 -0.123 -0.041 -0.155 -0.095 -0.187
(0.30) (3.50)** (3.19)** (1.83) (0.59) (3.06)** (2.19)* (3.64)**
reg. empl. rate 0.010 0.002 -0.027 0.002 -0.013 -0.033 -0.101 -0.129
(0.66) (0.11) (1.87) (0.08) (0.51) (1.51) (6.23)** (6.15)**
reg. av. cons/cap -0.007 -0.003 0.020 -0.006 0.003 -0.020 0.032 0.020
(0.98) (0.43) (2.71)** (0.49) (0.18) (1.70) (3.59)** (1.81)
head ofHH -0.067 0.298 -0.434 -0.718 0.068 -0.555 -0.690 -0.442
(0.36) (1.60) (2.07)* (1.76) (0.17) (1.75) (2.52)* (1.26)
HH no. of children -0.200 0.177 -0.153 -0.433 -0.099 -0.048 -0.046 -0.264
(1.74) (1.68) (1.32) (2.00)* (0.61) (0.41) (0.49) (2.13)*
ln annual HH cons. 0.211 0.050 -0.747 -0.620 0.321 -0.109 -0.439 -0.487
(1.25) (0.30) (4.21)** (2.05)* (1.10) (0.49) (2.55)* (2.32)*
HH owns car -0.149 0.360 0.433 0.182 -0.478 0.664 -0.604 -0.347
(0.71) (1.80) (2.06)* (0.48) (1.16) (2.51)* (2.25)* (1.06)
Constant -3.423 2.166 12.595 9.701 -3.398 4.840 11.805 14.917
(1.46) (1.00) (5.88)** (2.69)** (0.84) (1.57) (5.27)** (5.47)**
Observations 1515 1515 1515 1515 1149 1149 1149 1149
Absolute value of z-stat in parenthesis; * significant at 5% level; ** Significant at 1% level
For the unemployed (columns 3 and 7), most variables are significant in both 
urban and rural areas indicating that this is a group significantly different from all 
the others and finding difficult to access employment for rationing factors 
determined by both individual characteristics and location. Age is a significant 
factor in both urban and rural location. Being in age 14-25 significantly increases 
the probability of being unemployed in rural areas. Education, being head of 
household and living in wealthier families significantly decreases the probability 
of being unemployed in both urban and rural areas. Those living in wealthier areas 
are more likely to be unemployed. Interestingly, having a car increases the 
probability of being unemployed in urban areas and decreases it in rural areas. 
Perhaps a transport increases the probability of actively seeking jobs in urban 
areas while in rural areas a car is better suited for self-employment activities.
The discouraged unemployed (columns 4 and 8) seem to be so only for household 
related variables in urban areas while in rural areas poor education and poor local 
labour market conditions increase the probability of participating in this sector. In 
both urban and rural areas the larger the number of children in the household or 
the wealthier the household, the less likely a person is to be found in this category. 
Therefore the discouraged unemployed seem to be a less 'rationed group' as 
compared with the unemployed and this status seems more of a choice for those 
found in it, at least in urban areas.
Tables 7-11 show bilateral comparisons of the different sectors. This is assuming 
that workers have only two choices at the time and it is done to see more precisely 
how workers differ in the different groups. The comparisons are carried out 
separately for gender and type of location. This reduces significantly the number 
of observations per equation but it reflects more accurately the 'segmentation' 
observed so far between males and females and between urban and rural areas.
In table 7, the private employees are compared with the self-employed. Urban 
males (column 1) do not differ significantly for any of the variables considered.
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Urban females (column 2) in the private sector tend to be more educated and live 
in households with less children than the self-employed counterparts. Rural males 
(column 3) are more likely to be private employees than self-employed if they live 
in relatively wealthier households and they tend to be much less likely to be in the 
private sector if they own a car. Rural females (column 4) do not appear to be 
significantly different between the two sectors17. Thus, the private employees 
seem to differ from the self-employed only for urban females and rural males, two 
rather small groups. Overall, household characteristics (H) seem to better explain 
participation than personal (Z) or location characteristics (X) as shown by the Chi 
squared calculated for the group of variables at the bottom of the table.
Table 7 -  Private employees Vs. Self-employed (Probit)
Dep. var: 
Private=l 
Self-empl=0
Urban
Males
(1)
Urban
Females
(2)
Rural
Males
(3)
Rural
Females
(4)
age (years) 0.08 -0.012 0.012 0.016
(1.31) (0.13) (0.08) (0.08)
age squared/100 -0.085 -0.018 -0.010 0.015
(1-18) (0.18) (0.06) (0.06)
age 14-25 0.388 -0.302 -0.043 0.785
(0.98) (0.52) (0.05) (0.75)
education (years) 0.069 0.122 -0.113 0.126
(1.77) (2.34)* (1.11) (1.08)
reg. empl. rate -0.002 -0.007 0.014 0.030
(0.12) (0.36) (0.46) (0.76)
reg. av. cons/cap 0.002 0.000 0.034 0.020
(0.20) (0.00) (1.70) (0.95)
head of HH -0.285 0.049 0.820 0.025
(1.24) (0.20) (1.81) (0.05)
HH no. of children -0.098 -0.424 -0.078 0.147
(0.78) (2.61)** (0.38) (0.51)
ln annual HH cons. -0.044 0.240 0.668 0.051
(0.23) (1.13) (2.08)* (0.11)
HH owns car -0.369 -0.183 -1.642 0.082
(1.65) (0.63) (3.62)** (0.16)
Constant -1.620 -2.773 -9.017 -6.504
(0.65) (0.95) (2.02)* (0.95)
Observations 185 151 78 56
‘Z’ x2 4.99 9.10* 1.32 1.68
‘X ’ X2 0.04 0.21 4.44 2.83
‘H’ x2 6.91 10.82** 15.94** 0.31
Abs. value of z-stat in parenthesis; * sign, at 5% level; ** sign, at 1% level
17 For rural areas the number of observations is rather small and results should be taken with 
caution.
Next, I compare the private and self-employment sectors with the group of 
unemployed (tables 8 and 9). The unemployed are those who have been ‘rationed’ 
as they are seeking work and cannot find it. Therefore comparing the employed 
with the unemployed should highlight what factors determine rationing18. In this 
case, the household characteristics are included only as control variables while we 
are interested in how employers discriminate the unemployed through the 
individual characteristics (Z) and how the local economic and labour market 
conditions (X) determine rationing.
Table 8 shows the probit estimates comparing private employees and the 
unemployed. For urban males (column 1), age and education seem to be important 
factors in excluding the unemployed from private employment. Workers in 
wealthier regions seem less likely to be in the private sector though the coefficient 
is very small. Private employees tend to be from wealthier families than the 
unemployed. For urban females (column 2), education and household wealth 
increase the probability of being in the private sector while the number of children 
decreases it. For rural males (column 3), only household wealth seems to make a 
difference while for rural females (column 4) a higher regional employment rate 
slightly increase the chances to be in private employment. Overall ‘Z’ factors 
seem to be more relevant than ‘X’ factors to explain rationing of the unemployed 
in the private sector and this phenomenon is more visible in urban areas and for 
males.
18 This is similar to Pradhan (1995)
Table 8 -  Private employees Vs. Unemployed (Probit)
Dep. var: 
Private=l 
Unempl=0
Urban
Males
(1)
Urban
Females
(2)
Rural
Males
(3)
Rural
Females
(4)
age (years) 0.252 0.019 0.078 0.163
(3.35)** (0.15) (0.56) (0.94)
age squared/100 -0.267 -0.069 -0.133 -0.186
(3.15)** (0.47) (0.80) (0.85)
age14-25 0.822 -1.094 -1.174 0.245
(1.66) (1.71) (1.62) (0.24)
education (years) 0.110 0.190 0.043 0.043
(2.36)* (2.96)** (0.53) (0.40)
reg. empl. rate 0.034 -0.007 0.023 0.070
(1.82) (0.39) (0.95) (2.03)*
reg. av. cons/cap -0.021 -0.007 0.020 -0.028
(2.28)* (0.70) (1.13) (1.51)
head of HH -0.078 0.396 0.762 0.718
(0.28) (1.38) (1.72) (1.32)
HH no. of children 0.105 -0.411 -0.166 0.128
(0.73) (2.51)* (0.90) (0.58)
ln annual HH cons. 0.566 0.481 0.586 0.474
(2.69)** (2.19)* (2.15)* (1.29)
HH owns car -0.444 -0.375 -0.642 0.289
(1.76) (1.22) (1.33) (0.57)
Constant -13.327 -6.135 -10.569 -12.698
(4.86)** (1.94) (2.43)* (2.59)**
Observations 192 160 117 110
‘Z’ X2 22.56** 16.59** 11.15** 4.31
‘X ’ %2 5.82* 1.31 3.74 4.20
‘H’ *2 8.20* 18.09** 7.89* 3.90
Abs. value of z-stat in parenthesis; * sign, at 5% level; ** sign, at 1% level
Table 9 -  Self-employment Vs. Unemployment (Probit)
Dep. var: Urban Urban Rural Rural
Self-empl=l Males Females Males Females
Unempl=0 (1) (2) (3) (4)
age (years) 0.077 0.019 0.020 0.165
(1.65) (0.41) (0.19) (1.38)
age squared/100 -0.087 -0.012 -0.029 -0.213
(1.60) (0.27) (0.24) (1.36)
age14-25 -0.255 -0.377 -1.183 -0.277
(0.69) (0.85) (1.89) (0.44)
education (years) 0.009 -0.017 0.017 -0.114
(0.20) (0.38) (0.33) (2.01)*
reg. empl. rate 0.033 0.012 0.024 0.056
(1.82) (0.63) (1.02) (2.22)*
reg. av. cons/cap -0.014 -0.015 -0.028 -0.037
(1.56) (1.60) (2.46)* (2.92)**
head ofHH 0.332 0.478 -0.561 0.996
(1.27) (2.12)* (1.36) (2.43)*
HH no. of children 0.248 0.172 0.069 0.113
(1.71) (1.29) (0.50) (0.69)
ln annual HH cons. 0.527 0.369 -0.046 0.534
(2.51)* (1.81) (0.19) (1.97)*
HH owns car -0.044 -0.027 1.079 0.270
(0.19) (0.10) (3.60)** (0.71)
Constant -8.654 -4.433 0.094 -9.383
(3.40)** (1.81) (0.03) (2.58)**
Observations 169 183 133 134
‘Z’ X2 8.51* 6.58 10.59** 12.91**
‘X’ y2 3.88 2.72 6.32** 8.79**
‘H’ %2 11.86 10.01** 15.55** 9.88**
Abs. value of z-stat in parenthesis; * sign, at 5% level; ** sign, at 1% level
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In table 9 self-employment and unemployment are compared. None of the 
rationing factors is significant for either urban males or urban females (columns 1 
and 2). For rural males (column 3), wealthier regions seem to be associated with a 
reduced participation to self-employment. For rural females (column 4) education 
and living in wealthier regions seems to reduce participation in self-employment. 
Overall, self-employment does not seem to exclude the unemployed on the basis 
of rationing in urban areas, while this seems to be the case in rural areas due to 
both individual and location characteristics. As compared to the previous 
comparison between private employees and the self-employed, self-employment 
seems to be a sector 'closer' to unemployment and less discriminating, at least in 
urban areas.
Aside from the unemployed, the generally poor labour market conditions 
generated a group of discouraged unemployed, people wishing to work but 
thinking that seeking actively work would not lead to employment. In our sample 
this is a rather large group (table 2). Comparing the unemployed with the 
discouraged unemployed may give some indications of the reasons why some 
unemployed stop searching.
Table 10 reports the results. None of the ‘Z’ and ‘X’ variables seem to matter for 
any of the four groups except for regional wealth for urban males (column 1). For 
urban males (column 1), living in wealthier families decreases the probability of 
being unemployed. Household car ownership instead significantly increases the 
probability of seeking work for urban males. Probably having a means of 
transport reduces the cost and effort of seeking. Household related variables for 
urban males are really the only important factors in explaining the difference 
between the unemployed and the discouraged unemployed. Females seem to be 
very similar between the unemployed and the discouraged unemployed groups 
(columns 2 and 4). Given that the discouraged unemployed have been identified 
as those not employed who declared a wish to work, many of these females are 
probably looking after children though they expressed a wish to work and 
therefore would be better classified as housekeepers.
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Table 10 -  Unemployed Vs. Discouraged unemployed (Probit)
Dep. var: Urban Urban Rural Rural
Unemp 1=1 Males Females Males Females
Disc.unempl=0 (1) (2) (3) (4)
age (years) -0.175 -0.077 -0.011 -0.184
(1.46) (0.48) (0.12) (1.32)
age squared/100 0.206 0.146 0.054 0.295
(1.44) (0.71) (0.45) (1.41)
age14-25 -1.121 0.200 0.722 -0.216
(1.35) (0.26) (1.19) (0.36)
education (years) -0.095 0.038 0.056 0.096
(1.27) (0.53) (0.98) (1.68)
reg. empl. rate -0.040 -0.016 0.031 0.002
(1.56) (0.64) (1.57) (0.09)
reg. av. cons/cap 0.030 0.013 0.006 0.015
(2.12)* (1.03) (0.56) (1.36)
head ofHH -0.192 0.211 0.320 0.806
(0.42) (0.49) (0.71) (1.16)
HH no. of children -0.008 0.432 -0.029 0.272
(0.03) (2.07)* (0.26) (2.06)*
ln annual HH cons. -0.608 0.406 -0.158 0.120
(2.19)* (1.34) (0.79) (0.58)
HH owns car 1.327 -0.650 0.018 -0.436
(2.82)** (1.83) (0.05) (1.24)
Constant 12.457 -3.186 -1.386 -0.381
(2.89)** (0.88) (0.50) (0.11)
Observations 114 124 143 146
‘Z’ X 2 4.01 3.23 3.76 3.96
‘X ’ %2 4.61* 1.06 4.95* 2.88
‘H’ %2 10.34** 7.69 1.10 7.33
Abs. value of z-stat in parenthesis; * sign, at 5% level; ** sign, at 1% level
Last in this series of comparisons, the housekeepers are compared with women in 
employment in the private and self-employment sectors (table 11). This should 
give some indications of whether housekeeping is a form of hidden 
unemployment and what factors limit women’s access to employment. Education 
in urban areas is a significant factor increasing women’s participation in both 
private and self-employment. Heading a family significantly increases 
participation in both sectors while the number of children significantly decreases 
it (columns 1 and 3). Overall, household factors predominate in explaining 
women’s participation, as one would expect. It is noticeable that there is little 
difference between participation in the private and self-employment sectors in 
urban areas (columns 1 and 3). In rural areas, household factors do not seem to
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affect significantly female participation in private employment19 (column 2) 
while, for self-employment, household related variables are very important in 
determining female participation. These numbers suggest that a certain degree of 
rationing is present in urban areas in the form of screening (education) but that for 
the most part housekeeping is a choice determined by household characteristics.
Table 11 -  Female employment Vs. Housekeeping (Probit)
Dep. var:
Priv or self-emp=l 
Housekeepers=0
Private
Urban
(1)
Private
Rural
(2)
Self-empl
Urban
(3)
Self-empl
Rural
(4)
age (years) - 0.111 0.090 -0.051 0.089
(0.81) (0.49) (0.55) (0.71)
age squared/100 0.147 -0.117 0.099 -0.135
(0.85) (0.49) (0.87) (0.83)
age14-25 -0.178 -0.167 0.126 -0.594
(0.30) (0.21) (0.27) (1.15)
education (years) 0.250 0.154 0.116 -0.026
(4.07)** (1.68) (2.38)* (0.49)
reg. empl. rate -0.007 0.060 0.029 0.046
(0.35) (1.78) (1.58) (1.82)
reg. av. cons/cap 0.004 -0.005 -0.012 -0.024
(0.42) (0.29) (1.45) (1.95)
head of HH 0.805 0.831 0.878 0.999
(2.91)** (1.47) (3.81)** (2.49)*
HH no. of children -0.698 -0.231 -0.277 -0.274
(4.27)** (1.21) (2.11)* (2.07)*
In annual HH cons. 0.106 0.063 0.011 0.118
(0.47) (0.23) (0.06) (0.59)
HH owns car -0.523 -0.250 -0.253 -0.326
(1.80) (0.61) (1.10) (1.05)
Constant -1.776 -7.993 -2.135 -3.826
(0.48) (1-74) (0.74) (1.21)
Observations 174 131 197 155
‘Z’x2 17.01** 4.84 7.68 5.67
‘X’x2 0.21 4.52 2.95 4.31
‘H’ y2 34.66** 5.23 23.86** 14.97**
Abs. value of z-stat in parenthesis; * sign, at 5% level; ** sign, at 1% level
19 This may be due to the rather small sample.
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5. Conclusion
The chapter compared income and workers in different sectors to see what factors 
characterise workers found in each sector.
Results on income illustrate some important features of the Kazakh labour market. 
The formal wage is significantly lower in the state sector as compared to the 
private sector. This difference persists when looking at average income (table 1). 
This reflects two phenomena with opposite effects. One is that the state sector 
pays more collateral benefits on top of the wage than the private sector, and the 
other is that the state sector has a larger share of wage arrears. Average income in 
self-employment situates itself in between the state and the private sector. The 
difference between the average of the logarithm of income across sectors is much 
reduced due to the larger variances of average income in the private and self- 
employment sectors and to the larger number of outliers. The state sector seems to 
be the only sector that values some of the individual characteristics of workers 
such as age and education. The variance of income in the private and self- 
employment sectors does not appear to be explained by personal characteristics 
(table 3). Neither the private nor the self-employment sectors seem to value the 
individual characteristics of workers, including the level of education. This would 
suggest that workers who exited the state sector and entered the private or self- 
employment sectors were not selected or self-selected on the basis of their 
personal characteristics.
Considering expected income under different assumptions, neither the private nor 
the self-employment sectors offer better income prospects overall. The two sectors 
show similar distributions in the logarithm of income, the private sector has an 
average higher income while, when we assume that workers are well informed 
about wage arrears, self-employment incomes show a better distribution. 
Therefore, if a selection mechanism exists in the choice between the private and 
self-employment sectors, it is more likely to be found among non-income factors, 
as the Heckman selection model suggested.
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The state sector remains the most traditional sector in that theoretically rewards 
workers on the basis of their personal characteristics, is present in both urban and 
rural areas and does not discriminate between men and women. The private sector 
is instead a clear urban and male phenomenon (tables 2 and 6). Probably as a 
consequence of this factor, workers in this sector come from smaller and slightly 
wealthier families. Differences between workers found in the private and self- 
employment sectors seem to be in relation to education and the number of 
children for urban females and household wealth and car ownership for rural 
males. Urban males (the largest group in both sectors) do not differ significantly 
between the private and self-employment sectors. Therefore, difference in pay 
observed in the two sectors are hardly attributable to differences in personal 
characteristics of the workers.
Personal characteristics of workers seem to be a more important factor in 
explaining access for the unemployed to the different working sectors. The private 
sector seems more restrictive than the self-employment sector in this regard 
requiring younger and better educated workers than what the unemployment pool 
has to offer (tables 8 and 9). Therefore, the self-employment sector seems to 
locate itself in between the private sector and unemployment in terms of access 
for the unemployed. The discouraged unemployed, technically economically 
inactive, do not differ significantly from the unemployed suggesting that the flow 
of people in and out unemployment has also psychological determinants difficult 
to capture with available data.
Overall, the choice of the sector seems to be determined by ‘rationing’ due to 
location characteristics (X) and by ‘preference’ due to household characteristics 
(H). As predicted by the model in chapter 2, in times of transition and recession, 
non-income factors seem to gain importance relatively to wage and income factors 
in the choice of the sector. This implies that the reallocation of labour can be 
better understood moving from a wage to a more comprehensive income analysis 
and from income to non-income factors.
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CHAPTER 6
LABOUR MARKET POLICIES AND THE FUTURE OF LABOUR
It is useful at this stage to take a step back and reconnect with the initial theme of 
this work about the differences observed in CEE and CIS countries. In particular, 
CEE countries have a relatively longer experience in labour market policies and a 
good look at this experience may help to better focus on labour market policies in 
Kazakhstan, their scope, meaning and effectiveness. Labour market policies are 
evaluated in the light of current macroeconomic conditions and a discussion on 
future prospects of labour and the economy is offered to conclude this work.
1. Introduction
Unemployment was a new condition in the early days of reforms and the obvious 
step was to look at how Western economies were dealing with the problem. As 
was the case with macroeconomic policies, the labour market policies popular in 
OECD countries in the early nineties influenced strongly the qualitative advice 
provided to transitional economies. Following the OECD model, transitional 
economies reformed the Employment Services (ES) and designed a range of 
Labour Market Policies (LMP).
The cause of unemployment in Western economies in the early nineties was (and 
still is) understood mainly in terms of labour market rigidities including regional 
and skills’ mismatches, excessively high minimum wages, powerful trade unions, 
generous unemployment benefits and dear social contributions attached to the 
wage. Labour market policies had therefore a double role. On the one hand, they 
had to protect from destitution the unemployed on a human right ground, and, on 
the other hand, they had to contribute to reducing labour market rigidities by 
increasing skills on the supply side of the market, helping in matching supply and 
demand and preventing long-term unemployment.
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Although unemployment in the CEE showed symptoms of rigidities from the 
early days of reforms, the very nature of unemployment was a large fall in output 
and production. A demand side phenomenon rather than a supply side. Skills had 
to be reoriented but the general level of education was exceptionally high in ex- 
Socialist countries by international standards. This inconsistency between the 
nature of unemployment and the response in terms of labour market policies did 
not seem to preoccupy policy makers in the early years of transition. Moreover, 
such inconsistency seems to increase moving East. Despite the deeper and more 
protracted recession in the CIS countries, the range of LMP has been generally 
smaller than in the CEE and declining, less experimental with innovative solutions 
and increasingly focused on few measures meant to reduce rigidities on the supply 
side. In effect, such trend has been partly determined by the fact that a larger fall 
in production meant a smaller employment fund and less choice when it comes to 
LMP.
2. Labour market policies in the CEE countries
Labour market policies are usually categorised as active or passive depending 
whether they actively endeavour to put people back into work or not. In the 
following sections, we look first at the institution of ES and then distinguish 
between labour supply policies, meaning LMP which target specifically the 
registered unemployed as a group, and labour demand policies, meaning those 
measures aimed at encouraging employment retention and/or generation from the 
production side. This alternative classification is better suited to highlight the 
contradiction between the nature of unemployment and its response outlined in 
the introduction.
2.1. The Employment Services
The most immediate response to the new emerging conditions in the labour 
market was the establishment (or, rather, the reform) of employment services
199
throughout countries and regions and the supply of unemployment benefits to a 
selected group of the unemployed. Labour market institutions had to be 
established to count and monitor the unemployed, and to design and implement 
policies.
The resources necessary to finance the ES and their activities have been secured 
through a form of taxation imposed on both workers and enterprises. A share of 
workers' wage bill and a corresponding contribution from the enterprise are levied 
and put into a special fund (the employment fund) which can be managed within 
the budget, though more often than not is extra-budgetary. The combined tax rate 
(workers + enterprise contribution) applied is variable, usually around 2-3% of the 
wage bill, with a peak of 7% in Bulgaria (Godfrey and Richards 1997).
Generally speaking, the total level of expenditure on active and passive 
employment measures in CEE countries as well as the distribution of this 
expenditure among different labour market programmes are similar to those of 
their neighbours in the West (Rutkowski, M. 1996). Approximately, between 0.3 
and 3% of GDP is spent on such measures which is what OECD countries with 
comparable unemployment rates tend to devote to LMP. The greatest share of 
LMP expenditure still goes to passive measures (PLMP), unemployment benefits 
above all (Table 6.1).
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Table 6.1 - Expenditure on LMP (% of GDP) and share of PLMP
1992 1993 1994
Bulgaria 0.6 1.03 1
(% PLMP) 83 82,6 80
Czech Republic 0.39 0.3 0.3
(% PLMP) 45,3 65,4 72
Hungary 1.13 2.91 2.96
(% PLMP) 79 77,4 71,3
Poland 1.83 1.97 2.08
(% PLMP) 93 87,3 86
Source: Turunen (1997)
PLMP= Passive Labour Market Policies
ES seem to be understaffed as compared to their OECD counterparts. The ratios 
of registered unemployed or benefit claimants to employment services' staff are 
higher in the CEE than in Western Europe. Registered unemployed to ES staff 
range from 37 (Czech republic) to 600 (Romania) in the CEE (1993-1994) as 
compared to a range of 41 (Germany) to 370 (Italy) for Western Europe in the 
1990s. The average was 159 for Western Europe and 265 for the CEE. A similar 
pattern is visible if benefits claimants are taken into account (Godfrey and 
Richards 1997). Therefore, the financial resources relative to the size of the 
economy seem generous and they are not over-utilised on excessive numbers of 
staff.
2.2. Labour supply policies
The range of policies adopted is generally comparable to those in OECD 
countries. Other than the four main activities (job brokering, unemployment 
compensation, re-training and public works), LMP targeting the registered 
unemployed include start-up business schemes, self-employment schemes and 
activities addressed to groups affected by higher unemployment such as women, 
the youth and the disabled. The general consensus and lesson from OECD 
countries is that active policies should be preferred to passive. Public works or 
start-up business schemes should be preferred to unemployment benefits.
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The job-brokering function has become more difficult over the years. On the 
supply side of the market the increasing number of long-term unemployed and the 
prevalence of low skilled workers meant that ES found increasingly difficult to 
match these workers with vacancies. On the demand side, the process of 
privatisation and the general large supply of labour allowed many enterprises to 
fby-pass' ES. Workers are often found at the enterprise's gate rather than in ES. 
Therefore, ES have progressively lost their capacity to match those workers and 
enterprises that are willing to use their services.
Unemployment benefits absorb most of the resources dedicated to LMP. That is 
because of the large number of unemployed rather than the cost per individual. In 
1993 and 1994, the value of the average unemployment benefit in CEE countries 
was between 27% and 40% of the average gross wage (Godfrey 1996). Benefits 
should be a measure of last resort with the capacity of supporting financially a 
person in real need. Therefore, the value of the benefits should be low enough to 
discourage rent-seekers and high enough to guarantee subsistence. The search for 
this difficult balance is often cause of debate but it is usually recognised that 
unemployment benefits are low by any standards in transitional economies with a 
few exceptions such as the Czech republic.
Training became a necessary measure undertaken by ES. It is recognised that 
skills' mismatches exist and that they are partly a product of the very nature of 
transition. Indeed, training has become popular and, together with public works, 
this measure has been expanding in size over the years. However, it is costly, it is 
offered to a relatively small number of unemployed and helps mainly the 
unemployed with higher skills, those who are less at risk of not finding 
employment in the current labour markets. Also training is often seen as an 
alternative to benefits though it is said that this measure should be offered after a 
period of full-time job search (OECD 1996). This allows those who would find a 
job anyway to be matched, and it would allow for a larger share of the long-term 
unemployed to benefit.
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Public works are popular and have been growing in importance in many countries. 
It is argued that these schemes pursue several objectives at the same time. They 
provide income maintenance and social inclusion, prevent loss of skills and 
motivation and contribute to socially useful projects. In the past, this measure has 
been a major policy tool of centralist governments undergoing severe recessions 
(Chile under Pinochet is a renowned successful example). On the other hand, it is 
a difficult policy to sustain financially and in the long-run alternatives have to be 
found, also to avoid creating a dependency culture on this type of income source.
Start-up subsidies for would be entrepreneurs are in use in several CEE countries 
and incentives for small businesses are indeed recognised as necessary. However, 
they have lost ground over the years and they are often hampered by hostile macro 
and micro conditions. A World Bank survey (1997) on business constraints 
around the world found that The highest obstacle according to businessmen in the 
Visegrad region is tax regulations and high taxes. This obstacle was considered 
as a very strong one by 76 percent o f the respondents, compared to 46 percent for 
inflation, the obstacle ranked second. Corruption was ranked third followed by 
financing'1. In Hungary, where start-up subsidies schemes have been adopted, in 
1997 legislation raised the tax rate for the self-employed to 45% of the monthly 
income (Financial Times 19-2-97) thus undermining the possible gains of such 
schemes.
Policies aimed at increasing mobility such as housing policies, reduction of 
registration requirements such as residency permits and mobility subsidies have 
also been in use in CEE economies, though they are not always classified as LMP. 
Bulgaria, for instance, has adopted a mobility support programme for the 
unemployed which covers travel and removal costs for the families of the 
unemployed (Bobeva 1997). Labour mobility is indeed a serious constraint. 
Housing markets are still weak particularly in the low rent sphere as most people 
live in properties of their own. Transport costs are also on the increase and those
1 Internet source; http//www.worldbank.org (publications)
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workers who take up working opportunities in other regions or countries tend to 
move alone, leaving families behind.
Other schemes are in use such as early retirement and post-benefit assistance to 
the unemployed. The first scheme pays compensation to those firms which put 
workers on early retirement and provide for the early retirement pension. Hungary 
and Slovenia, for instance, have adopted such a scheme. The second scheme 
provides some form of income support to those long-term unemployed who are no 
longer entitled to benefits.
2.3. Labour demand policies
These measures focus on labour within enterprises and encourage enterprises and 
single entrepreneurs either to retain the existing labour or to create new jobs. The 
popularity of such measures has been in decline because of the negative stigma 
attached to subsidies and the fear of rendering enterprises once more dependent on 
the state. Also, the growth of unemployment and the consequent growth of the 
unemployment benefits bill has contributed to squeeze out demand measures. 
Thus, the range of these policies has been reduced to a few measures.
Subsidies to enterprises willing to take up unemployed persons have been adopted 
by several countries. Bulgaria subsidises employers who hire young professionals 
and skilled blue-collar workers though the programme does not seem very popular 
(Bobeva 1997). In Hungary employers who hire a long-term unemployed person 
may receive a wage subsidy for up to one year. The scheme, not very popular in 
its early stage covered 18% of participants in active labour market programmes in 
its third year of existence (Frey 1997). Poland also provides subsidies to 
employers who take up unemployed people selected from the employment offices 
under a scheme called 'intervention works'. Long-term unemployed, school- 
leavers and women are usually the target of these schemes (Gora 1997a).
204
Jackman and Rutkowski (1994) have argued that subsidies to enterprises can be 
an effective measure to prevent short-run unemployment growth. They argue that 
such policies should be 'selective', i.e. targeted to enterprises with some economic 
potential and in cases where the cost of supporting the unemployed would be 
higher than the cost of subsidies necessary to maintain the same people into work. 
Moreover, the local authorities should be able to support this type of social 
services and enterprises' difficulties should be recognised as transitory. Godfrey 
(1996) also seems in favour of this kind of intervention.
Hungary has experimented with employment companies in areas particularly 
depressed and traditionally reliant on one major company. The scheme allows the 
setting up of new companies for the absorption of laid-off workers. Although the 
scheme has been limited to few areas, it has been judged positively (Frey 1997). 
In CEE countries this is not a very popular measure but countries such as China 
have used it extensively. In China, public works are often substituted by the 
creation of special enterprises that employ laid-off workers (Godfrey 1995). Other 
experiments of this kind in Europe have been attempted in Germany with 
employment companies which '(...) act as service delivery agents for labour 
market programmes and offer temporary employment to laid-off workers and 
unemployed in depressed regions' (Godfrey and Richards 1997b).
Some countries such as Bulgaria have subsidised bank credits which are taken by 
enterprises with the purpose of creating new jobs. These subsidies have been 
financed with the employment fund thus falling under LMP but it is uncertain 
whether they really encourage enterprises to hire new labour or if they simply pay 
for labour needed anyway. More popular in most countries are small and medium­
sized enterprises (SMEs) promotion. These measures include the support of SMEs 
through business and legal advice, micro-credit and training. The schemes exist in 
all countries and are often supported by foreign donors such as USAID or 
European Union's Tacis and Phare programmes. Such initiatives can hardly be 
labelled as LMP, but in some countries such as the Czech republic these measures 
were initially part of the active LMP financed by the employment fund.
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Perhaps the most important LMP in Poland have been apprenticeship 
programmes. Enterprises are supported with small contributions for the 
employment of youth labour in need of experience. Where these activities are 
financed by employment funds they are considered active LMP. Such schemes are 
widely used in Western Europe and are one of the major forms of youth 
employment schemes in countries such as Italy or Germany. Occasionally, other 
forms of measures taken by enterprises in major difficulties such as work-sharing 
and reduced working time are supported and encouraged by employment services 
with some contributions, becoming in this way an additional form of LMP.
Demand side LMP lost ground vis-a-vis supply side policies. Overall, labour 
market policies in CEE countries maintained emphasis on the supply side. This 
seems in line with the prevalent view of scholars engaged on this front. In a 1997 
report on labour markets in CEE countries, Boeri, Burda and Kollo conclude 
calling for a number of measures to enhance labour supply in these 
countries'. The issue of policies for the demand side usually falls under the 
domain of macro and industrial policies. LMP which envisage some form of 
subsidies to enterprises to encourage labour retention or absorption are looked at 
with suspicion and countries allowed for these measures to disappear gradually.
2.4. Are labour market policies effective?
The objectives of LMP are multiple. Unemployment reduction, income 
maintenance, the reduction of market rigidities to improve labour matching and 
reallocation and the prevention of long-term unemployment are some of the main 
objectives. The evaluation of LMP against these objectives remains complex, time 
consuming and costly. These obstacles have left the question of whether these 
policies are effective with no obvious answer. Schwanse (1996) commenting 
about LMP outcomes in OECD countries remarks: '(...) Unfortunately the answers 
provided are far from clear-cut: evaluation studies tend to vary in terms o f rigour,
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coverage, time horizon and evaluation results show that some programme seem to 
work well for some groups but not for others.' (p. 17).
Evidence for CEE countries is scattered and controversial. A few experiments 
have been carried out to test the effectiveness of LMP. According to Rutkowski, 
M. (1996), in Hungary where these tests have been carried out for retraining and 
public sector employment there is scarce evidence that the schemes have been 
successful . In Poland, retraining was also not found effective in increasing the 
outflow from unemployment (Gora and Sztanderski 1994). Rutkowski, J (1998) 
evaluated LMP in Poland and concluded that ’Although subsidised employment 
programs seem well targeted, they are not very effective in enhancing the chances 
o f the unemployed to get regular jobs’.
Of a different opinion is Nesporova (1998) who argued that the Czech Republic 
and Poland have been fairly successful in placing people into jobs after re­
training, with placement rates exceeding on average 70% and 50% (1995) 
respectively. A programme designed to capitalise unemployment benefits to start 
small businesses in Slovenia was also found fairly successful by the same author 
when evaluated using a control group over a period of three years.
The only transitional economy which has been successful in maintaining a low 
level of unemployment for a long time is the Czech Republic. Nesporova and 
Uldrichova (1997) attribute the low level of unemployment in this country to 
relatively low real wages, labour hoarding in large enterprises, the absorption 
capacity of the private sector, high flexibility and mobility of the labour force and 
well designed employment policies. How much of the positive outcome is to be 
attributable to LMP remains to be estimated. According to Boeri (1996), in 
countries that have been more successful in stopping the rise in unemployment 
such as Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia, the achievement is to be attributed 
to substantial growth rates that would be difficult to be explained in terms of 
employment policies.
2 Evidence is taken from O'Leary (1994) and Gill and Dar (1995)
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3. Labour market policies in Kazakhstan
3,1, Labour market policies
The government of Kazakhstan has been initially fairly active with regard to 
labour market policies. The new ES system established in 1991 reformed the 
earlier system of placement offices. By mid-1993 the ES had 2,500 staff 
distributed in 300 regional and local offices. At the time, that was a ratio of 15 
registered unemployed per PES official, which was a very low ratio as compared 
to Italy (397 in 1993), Norway (26 in 1994) or Poland (270 in 1993-1994). 
However, the initial positive start deteriorated quickly and financial resources 
devoted to LMP have been scarce as compared to other transitional economies. 
The employment fund's contributions represented between 1992 and 1996 no 
more than 0.2% of GDP which is less than what has been devoted to sickness or 
maternity benefits alone (IBRD 1998).
In spite of the scarce resources, Kazakhstan adopted initially a wide range of LMP 
including subsidies to enterprises, job creation schemes and housing programmes 
meant to facilitate labour mobility and the return of Kazakhs living abroad. In the 
early stage of reforms, policies focused on retraining schemes within enterprises 
to facilitate the upgrade of existing labour to new needs. Also, job-creation 
schemes addressed particularly to areas at risk such as small towns, rural areas 
and ecological disaster zones were introduced.
Table 6.2 reports the range of LMP adopted by Kazakhstan and the share of 
expenditures on different policies. It is shown that the share of expenditure on 
unemployment benefits increased from 5.5% to 56% of the total budget thereby 
compressing other forms of policies. That is due to the growth of the registered 
unemployed and it is comparable to what has been observed in CEE countries as 
reported in Boeri (1996). Employment services' administrative costs are the
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second largest item of expenditure. These declined as a share of the total from 
35.6% in 1992 to 15.7% in 1996.
Job creation and job security measures and enterprises' subsidies introduced in the 
early years virtually disappeared from the spectrum later on, job creation schemes 
and subsidies to converted defence companies as early as 1994. Housing 
programmes absorbed a substantial share of total expenditure, particularly the 
housing programme for Kazakhs returning from abroad in 1993 (43.5%). Housing 
programmes were still a significant share of expenditures in 1996. Expenditure on 
training increased from 11% to 14.8% during the period and public works from 
0.6% to 1.1%. These last two are the only 'active' measures increasing between 
1992 and 1996.
Table 6.2 - Employment fund expenditures
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Expenditure as % of GDP 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
Structure of expenditure 100 100 100 100 100
Unemployment benefits 5.5 5.5 10.2 22.8 56.5
Training and retraining 11.0 11.0 15.4 12.5 14.8
Public works 0.6 0.5 0.9 0.7 1.1
Subsidies to enterprises for disabled labour 0 0 0 0.1 0.2
Subsidies to converted defence companies for training 11.4 1.6 0 2 0
Job creation 20.2 2.3 0 0.3 0
Job security/lay-off prevention 5.2 1.4 1.5 7.7 0.1
Employment service 35.6 28.2 35.1 19.5 15.7
Information services for enterprises and individuals 1.2 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.8
Retraining centre in Turgen 0 0 30.8 16.3 2.2
Housing for Kazakhs returning from abroad 0 43.5 5.3 6.1 3
Other housing programmes 0 0 0 10.5 4.1
Interest on EBRD loans 0 0 0 0 0.1
Other expenditure 9.2 5.3 0.3 0.8 1.5
Source: EU (1997), IBRD (1998)
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3.2. Have labour market policies been effective?
All registered unemployed are assisted, mainly with benefits, training or public 
works. This means that in 1996, and according to the KLSMS, 29% of the total 
unemployed (U3 in chapter 4) were assisted with LMP (table 4.10, chapter 4). The 
share of job-seekers who find occupation declined throughout the period 1992- 
1996 (table 4.9, chapter 4). Considering that the number of registered unemployed 
actually started to decline from 1996 and that employment remained stagnant 
during the year, we should conclude that some unemployed lost hopes of finding a 
job through ES and abandoned this job-search mechanism. Therefore, less than 
one third of the ILO defined unemployed are assisted with LMP, and this share is 
decreasing.
Concerning unemployment benefits, we saw that the share of the unemployed on 
benefits increased (table 4.9, chapter 4). However, we also saw that benefits reach 
only 36.8% of the registered unemployed, that is 10.7% of the total unemployed 
(table 4.10, chapter 4). Of these, 56% received less than 1,000 Tenge and 93% 
less than 2,000 Tenge at a time when the average salary was just below 7000 
Tenge (about USD 100) and the estimated Minimum Consumption Basket 
(MCB) pro-capita was calculated at 2750 Tenge. Thus, the 1996 KLSMS shows 
that the number of those who actually receive unemployment benefits is less than 
what is claimed by ES statistics and that the amount actually received is 
insufficient for basic subsistence needs. Unemployment benefits reach a small 
minority of the unemployed and do not perform the income maintenance function 
they are designed for.
ES data system provides information on the people on retraining and public work 
schemes which allow for a crude evaluation. Data are presented in tables 6.3 and 
6.4 by region for 1996 and 1997.
Public works (table 6.3): In 1996, 24,446 people benefited from public work 
opportunities, equal to 4.4% of the job-seekers. 85% of the beneficiaries were
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registered unemployed while public work was also offered to students and other 
groups of job-seekers in need. In 1997, the share of public work beneficiaries 
increased slightly to 4.6% of the job-seekers and within the beneficiaries the share 
of the unemployed increased to 89%. The share of long-term unemployed also 
increased between 1996 and 1997 from 25.3% to 34.4% of the total beneficiaries 
while the number of students and young people decreased. Most striking, 
however, are the differences across regions of any indicator. For instance the 
share of women beneficiaries varies from 26.9% in Kustanay to 75% in North 
Kazakhstan. People with dependants are given priority over other groups and ex­
prisoners and refugees are also included in the schemes.
Training (table 6.4): The number of people on training schemes dropped from 
4.4% of the job-seekers in 1996 to 2.5% in 1997. This implied a higher selectivity 
which resulted in a much better placement ratios of the trainees into jobs from 
58.4% to 81.9%. A much smaller proportion of trainees create their own business 
and this proportion declined between 1996 and 1997 (2.2% in 1996 and 1.9% in 
1997). About three fourths of the beneficiaries are young people below the age of 
29 while there does not appear to be a significant gender bias. Among the young 
beneficiaries only one third have secondary education or more. Again, the 
regional diversity is striking. There are regions that manage to place virtually all 
the trainees into jobs and others which place less than one third of them.
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Table 6.3 - Public works by Oblast, 1996,1997
Kazakst Akmola Aktyub. Almaty Atyrau 
an
East.Ka Jambul 
z
West
Kaz.
Karaga
nda
Kzil-
orda
Kustan
ay
Mangis Pavloda North 
tau r Kaz.
South
Kaz.
Almaty
city
Total 1996 
Shares
24446 754 431 749 926 1472 128 1543 387 623 2182 429 1787 164 1639 745
unemployed 85.3 65.3 100.0 97.2 100.0 96.0 39.1 79.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 94.2 42.2 86.6 97.3 100.0
younger than 20 25.5 15.3 26.9 19.5 25.6 27.4 10.2 37.5 19.9 20.5 21.8 21.4 69.6 45.1 18.1 11.3
women 45.4 41.6 41.8 61.7 67.0 49.8 35.2 45.8 68.7 37.4 26.9 47.6 55.8 75.0 45.1 40.7
close to pension age 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.1 0.7 0.0 0.9 0.0 3.7 0.0 2.6 0.5 1.2 1.9 0.8
invalids 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.7 0.8
people with dependants 31.8 42.8 35.7 47.1 27.4 27.6 45.3 32.4 41.1 29.9 37.6 35.2 14.5 12.8 37.8 47.9
long-term unemployed 25.3 26.8 16.2 25.6 28.2 7.7 18.8 18.8 39.0 24.7 30.5 30.5 13.1 23.2 26.4 18.8
ex-prisoners 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.2 2.9 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.5 1.1
refugees 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 10.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.5 0.0 0.0
students on vacation 3.4 39.4 2.6 0.0 2.9 2.2 0.0 3.1 3.9 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 31.1 0.0 32.1
Total 1997 
Shares
24379 812 1225 2868 1295 2264 63 532 2287 2386 1703 386 1664 1969 3055 1870
unemployed 89.1 96.8 94.7 93.4 100.0 96.9 100.0 100.0 61.2 92.8 99.4 95.6 98.9 96.0 63.6 98.7
younger than 20 18.8 10.7 14.3 16.2 27.3 26.2 15.9 10.9 17.9 30.8 18.3 25.4 12.3 7.6 27.9 3.6
women 48.1 49.4 29.0 64.6 67.5 47.4 58.7 46.4 48.7 31.2 53.1 72.8 42.1 56.3 31.4 57.4
close to pension age 1.1 0.6 0.2 0.6 0.3 4.3 7.9 0.8 0.5 0.0 1.5 0.3 1.5 0.6 0.6 2.4
invalids 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 2.1 0.2 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.5
people with dependants 32.7 39.8 35.0 36.1 20.0 35.6 23.8 33.6 37.4 24.1 24.1 13.5 47.0 22.5 34.5 39.7
long-term unemployed 34.4 20.0 34.0 43.7 32.3 39.6 19.0 39.8 28.4 32.3 35.1 14.2 30.5 29.2 37.9 37.8
ex-prisoners 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1
refugees 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
students on vacation 0.6 8.9 0.8 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Source: CSAK 1997 and 1998
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Table 6.4 - Training by Oblast, 1996,1997
Kazakst Akmola Aktyub. Almaty Atyrau East.Ka Jambul West Karaga Kzil- Kustan Mangis Pavloda North South Almaty
an___________________________________ z______________Kaz. nda orda ay_____ tau r Kaz. Kaz. city
Total 1996 
Shares
24739 1026 1234 1788 930 1901 523 1100 1350 1676 1164 640 956 572 1843 520
now employed 58.4 90.7 48.9 50.4 39.1 70.0 98.9 67.6 44.7 77.8 77.3 80.8 74.0 71.2 53.7 52.1
now with private business 2.2 0.8 2.3 4.9 0.0 1.4 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.3 5.9 0.0 4.4 0.4
currently on training 20.1 8.0 3.5 30.5 7.1 11.0 16.6 5.6 35.3 41.3 5.8 0.5 8.4 50.2 19.3 41.0
from rural areas 36.0 18.5 33.5 64.5 32.0 19.9 52.0 15.6 62.8 15.9 30.3 48.3 41.4 11.2 46.8 34.4
women 50.6 36.5 61.1 60.7 40.4 48.0 61.0 36.1 47.0 40.9 41.2 35.6 57.0 43.2 43.8 48.7
invalids 0.3 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.5 1.3 0.3 0.4 1.2
ex-prisoners 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.2 1.0 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.0
young 16-29 78.7 83.1 83.8 69.2 77.5 81.9 80.7 80.7 85.8 81.7 77.3 80.5 76.4 80.9 79.2 72.9
young 16-29 from rural areas 31.0 17.3 30.8 45.5 25.1 18.8 47.0 11.6 55.6 14.3 23.2 47.7 37.2 11.0 37.7 31.7
young 16-29 with secondary 
education
25.9 23.8 1.7 17.2 45.1 10.1 67.3 34.3 43.6 22.9 51.1 1.6 35.6 2.6 1.7 52.5
young 16-29 with higher 2.6 3.4 0.0 3.8 4.3 0.4 13.4 1.3 3.3 2.4 1.8 0.3 2.9 0.0 0.6 14.8
education
Total 1997 
Shares
13345 642 647 2721 610 583 248 971 2011 490 429 419 890 447 341 1896
now employed 81.9 86.8 56.4 74.2 56.7 88.7 97.2 97.8 89.7 79.2 85.5 96.9 55.5 99.6 94.7 89.9
now with private business 1.9 0.2 0.3 5.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.5 3.9 0.2 3.3 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
currently on training 33.6 38.9 5.6 38.4 31.6 43.1 100.4 54.8 35.7 14.1 15.9 33.4 10.6 45.4 34.3 27.7
from rural areas 29.8 21.7 21.0 49.3 20.3 35.0 44.4 53.8 16.3 47.8 43.1 21.5 41.3 13.6 39.9 0.0
women 54.9 46.3 74.7 63.0 57.5 43.1 67.3 53.7 40.3 44.5 62.5 47.5 34.9 52.1 38.4 72.7
invalids 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.9 0.2 0.0 0.3
ex-prisoners 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.9 0.0 0.2
young 16-29 73.0 74.5 81.5 74.6 87.5 78.9 77.8 85.6 80.1 63.5 74.4 85.4 79.0 68.0 83.6 41.8
young 16-29 from rural areas 24.2 17.4 19.5 35.0 19.3 28.0 38.7 49.9 14.2 34.3 34.7 21.5 34.7 13.2 36.1 0.0
young 16-29 with secondary 
education
16.6 7.9 2.0 21.7 5.6 4.8 57.3 33.2 8.0 55.5 11.4 0.0 7.9 49.2 76.2 0.1
young 16-29 with higher 2.9 7.9 0.0 2.8 2.3 0.7 20.6 5.7 0.3 2.7 4.9 0.0 0.3 14.8 7.0 0.0
education
Source: CSAK 1997 and 1998
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The coverage of public works and training is small. Only around 8.8% of ES job­
seekers benefited of training or public work in 1996 and this proportion declined 
to 7.1% in 1997. On the other hand, the placement ratio of training programmes is 
fairly good given the harsh market conditions and the targeting of both public 
works and training seems appropriate. A preference for young people, long-term 
unemployed and people with dependants exists reflecting the structural 
composition of the unemployed and a focus on the most in need. While small 
categories at risk such as the ex-prisoners, refugees and invalids are not forgotten. 
There is a small gender unbalance considering that women are still the majority of 
the registered unemployed and there is a strong bias in favour of young people. 
Nonetheless, on the whole, it could be said that these policies are effective given 
the limited and declining resources available to ES.
I do not have at my disposal proper instruments for evaluating special subsidies to 
enterprises. However, these measures almost disappeared from the labour market 
policies portfolio and cannot possibly have had any significant impact on the 
labour market in Kazakhstan in recent years. Moreover, subsidies, when they 
existed, were targeted to disabled labour and converted defence companies 
covering a very small share of the labour force. Again, it would be difficult to 
sustain the existence of any relevant positive or negative impact of these measures 
on the labour market as a whole and we do not have firm specific data to discuss 
local implications of these measures.
Job creation and job security measures also disappeared in recent periods. The 
disappearance coincided with the massive lay-off of the post-1993 period. Up 
until that time employment did not decline in Kazakhstan. However, whether and 
how job creation and job security measures contributed to employment retention 
and creation cannot be estimated with the available data.
Housing benefits and programmes have been popular in Kazakhstan. This was 
partly due to the national policy of encouraging Kazakhs living abroad to come 
back and settle in the country. In 1993, 43.5% of all employment fund resources
214
went for this purpose alone. This effort declined over the years but in 1996 still 
3% of resources were allocated for this purpose with an additional 4.1% used for 
other housing programmes. Given the diversity of local market conditions and 
given the existing poor housing market, labour mobility can benefit a great deal 
from housing programmes. However, these programmes too are losing ground 
vis-a-vis passive policies.
In conclusion, LMP in Kazakhstan show similar features to what we observed for 
CEE economies. The range of LMP initially adopted was large but unemployment 
benefits have squeezed out other policies over the years. The only active LMP 
which maintained and increased somewhat their share on total expenditure are 
training and public works, the effectiveness of which remains an area of study. 
Perhaps, Kazakhstan has been more active than CEE countries on the housing 
policy front being quite successful in repatriating Kazakhs living abroad. On the 
other hand, employment fund's resources are limited and the provision of 
unemployment benefits seems poorer than in CEE countries.
4. Who needs help? Labour and Poverty
All registered unemployed in 1997 were still receiving some form of assistance, 
whether in terms of benefits, training or public works. However, it was shown that 
the support is limited and that the number of registered unemployed is small as 
compared to the number of those seeking employment. It is also the case that once 
we take into account the total number of unemployed, the structure by gender, age 
and education changes significantly. Among those who do not apply to 
employment services, the majority of the unemployed is not represented by 
women but by men and the share of youth unemployment is much higher than 
what registered figures show (table 4.11, chapter 4). Therefore men and young 
people tend not to register and registered unemployment is not a representative 
sample of the total unemployed.
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There are also a considerable number of the formally employed who have de facto 
no jobs as shown in the underemployment section of chapter 4. At least 10% of 
the employees did not provide any work and were not paid (table 4.7, chapter 4). 
In addition, there are a number of people who are formally categorised as 
economically inactive but who under normal circumstances would be looking for 
work. The discouraged unemployed is one example. During deep and protracted 
recessions the number of these people is likely to be high, as chances of 
employment are realistically very scarce. There is also a class of people who may 
wish to work and have the potential to do so but who are incapacitated because of 
social duties emerged during the recession. Many women who were formally 
employed had to give up their jobs to look after the children or the elderly in the 
household (housekeepers).
Labour market distress has spanned well over the population target of labour 
market policies and has affected groups of individuals that would be normally 
protected from poverty and destitution from other members of the household. This 
meant that over the years the concern of the Kazakh authorities and international 
observers have progressively moved from labour market issues and the protection 
of the unemployed to poverty issues and the protection of the destitute irrespective 
of labour status.
Poverty is not a completely new phenomenon in Kazakhstan. Central Asia was 
known to be one of the poorest areas of the Soviet Union. Atkinson and 
Micklewright (1992) using as a measure of poverty a Minimum Consumption 
Basket (MCB) calculated from the Soviet Union’s family budget survey found 
that in 1989 approximately 15.5% of the Kazakh population had a per capita 
monthly income below the poverty line. Milanovic (1998) using a threshold of 
four international dollars per day at 1990 prices found that the percentage of the 
population living below the poverty line in 1987-1988 was 5%.
During transition poverty increased. Milanovic (1998) found a rise in poverty to 
50% of the population by 1994. The 1996 Kazakhstan Human Development
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Report using as a poverty line a MCB estimated a poverty figure of 64% of the 
population in August 1995. A World Bank study on living standards in 
Kazakhstan (1998), based on the 1996 KLSMS, puts the poverty figure at 34.6% 
of the population. As noted by this last study, such a diversity in estimates is due 
partly to the methods employed but also to the sensitivity of the choice of any 
particular threshold.
Other findings of the World Bank report (1998) show a poverty gap ratio of 
11.4%, higher poverty in rural areas (39% against 30% in urban areas), strong 
differences across regions with the Southern regions being by far the poorest and 
the Northern regions being the least, while there is not a substantial difference 
across gender. Inequality, according to the report and as calculated with a Gini 
coefficient, was 0.35; an increase from 0.29 as estimated for the region in the 
1980s. In relation to labour, the report finds that the bottom quintiles in the 
income distribution tend to have lower participation, higher unemployment rates 
and a higher dependency on employment .
From the 1996 KLSMS, I calculated poverty incidence rates (percentage of 
individuals living in households with annual consumption per capita below the 
poverty line) for all the labour categories I have been using in this study and by 
gender, age, location and regions. The results are reported in table 6.5. The table 
is self-explanatory but some important aspects should be highlighted.
3 Headcount poverty (H) and the poverty gap (PG, a measure of the depth of poverty) are 
calculated as follows:
H = Z
n ,=i z
q = Number of people below the poverty line 
n = Total number of people 
z = Poverty line = 2861.4 tenge (IBRD 1998, p. 12)
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Poverty incidence is high across all categories, including the employed. This 
confirms the precarious state of employment altogether as described in chapter 4. 
Overall 28% of the employed are below the poverty line.
Across employment categories defined in terms of ownership, the private 
employees are better off with ‘only’ a share of 21% below the poverty line. On the 
other hand, the self-employed seem to be the worse off with a 32% share4. It is 
also noticeable that the self-employed seem to situate themselves between the 
employed and the unemployed in terms of poverty incidence.
There is a substantial difference between paid and non-paid employees suggesting 
that those who have not been paid at the time of the questionnaire are not a 
random sample of the population but a segment which probably is usually not 
paid5. The difference between paid and non-paid is most remarkable among the 
very young (14-24). There is almost no difference in poverty between the 
employees working full-time and those working part-time. This may simply mean 
that those working part-time do so because living in relatively wealthy 
households.
Poverty incidence among the employed seems to be rather equally distributed 
across gender except for the private employees and the self-employed. In these 
cases, poverty incidence is definitely higher for males. Age distribution does not 
present any particular pattern, while poverty incidence among the employed is 
higher in rural areas, except for the private employees. Regional differences are 
remarkable, while the same pattern across employment categories is reproduced 
very seemingly in each region6.
4 The self-employed here include all self-employed and not only the ‘business owners’ as in 
chapter 5
5 This need not to be in contrast with chapter 5 where it was found that private paid and non-paid 
private employees are not significantly different. Here the figure is mostly affected by state 
employees who represent 88.5% of employees.
6 Regional differences may be partly explained by the fact that regional price indexes were used to 
adjust consumption estimates.
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Poverty incidence for the unemployed is calculated using the different definitions 
of unemployment adopted in chapter 4. The first important aspect is that poverty 
incidence seems to increase moving from the loosest definition (wish to work) to 
the stricter (registered unemployed on benefits) and that this pattern is maintained 
across gender, location and regions. This is quite obvious looking at the increase 
in value from the unemployed applicants to state employment centres (41%) to the 
registered unemployed on benefits (46%) which suggests that, although 
unemployment benefits are not designed to target the poor, the selection 
mechanism in place to identify the unemployed in need was rather successful in 
favouring the poorest. It may also mean that those in real need tended to converge, 
as a last resort, to employment centres, though the increase in incidence between 
those who wish to work and the applicants to employment services is much less 
obvious7.
The second relevant finding is that the poverty incidence among the unemployed 
is significantly higher for males. The age pattern is not so obvious. It seems to be 
higher among the very young in U1-U2, while is the opposite for U4-U7. Poverty 
incidence for the unemployed is also higher in rural areas and in the Southern and 
Western regions as it was the case for the entire population.
The economically inactive were divided in categories as homogenous as possible 
keeping in mind that a minimum number of observations in each cell was 
necessary for the table to have any meaning. The categories are self-explanatory 
and were calculated from those who at the time of the survey were not working. A 
working pensioner or student is classified as employed. For students, answers 
were double-checked with the section of the survey which dealt with education, 
therefore students should include all those who at the time of the survey were in 
education. The category ‘other’ was calculated as a residual and includes those 
who had not responded to any of the relevant questions or who could not identify 
themselves with any of the categories described.
7 Note that the number of observations in U5 is rather small and should not be taken as significant
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As a general remark, the economically inactive show similar figures to the 
unemployed in terms of poverty with rates generally higher than the employed. 
Students show a rather average pattern with a 34% overall incidence, higher rates 
for males and in rural areas and the usual distribution across regions. This may not 
be surprising. When children are taken as individuals, they tend to show higher 
poverty rates. That is because large families tend to be poorer. On the other hand, 
those still in education between the age of 14 and 24 tend to be from wealthier
o
families as poorer families have a harder time to support children in education . 
Therefore the two phenomena probably cancel each other out leaving the student 
category with an average pattern.
Poverty incidence among disabled and ill is generally high and higher for males, 
young people and rural areas, while the regional pattern follows the pattern 
observed for other categories. Pensioners seem to reflect the average pattern of 
poverty with an overall rate of 34% and a standard distribution across regions. 
The only peculiar feature is an equal distribution between gender and urban and 
rural areas which reflects perhaps a rather egalitarian pension system irrespective 
of the profession, a heritage of the Soviet pension system.
Poverty among housewives and women on maternity leave is generally higher 
than the national average with a 43% incidence, more severe in rural areas and 
very severe in the Southern regions with a peak of 82%, the highest value in the 
table. This is a phenomenon that deserves more attention and research as the 
difference with other regions or categories is remarkable.
There is also a group of young individuals between the age of 14 and 24 who are 
not in school and not employed. These are found in the two categories 
‘discouraged unemployed’ and ‘Other’ which also show high poverty rates (47% 
and 38% respectively). 56.5% of the discouraged unemployed and 88.4% of the 
category ‘other’ are young people in age 14-24. This is almost 6% of the
for the regional distributions.
8 This used not to be the case in the Soviet Union and it is a clear product o f the process of 
transition.
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population. Poverty among the very young is probably a new phenomenon in 
Kazakhstan determined by the process of transition and the difficulties that many 
families are facing in substituting declining public provision of education with 
private provision. Up until now, it was fairly clear that unemployment affected the 
young in a particularly harsh way. What was not clear, was that the youth in need 
are found well beyond those usually identified as unemployed. Poor young people 
seem to go undetected because still sheltered by a supporting family and because 
they do not ‘fit’ any generally recognised labour category.
Labour market changes which have occurred during the transition have changed 
not only the labour profile but also the poverty profile of Kazakhstan. Categories 
that once fell in well identified target groups for social assistance such as mothers 
with many children or the disabled are now accompanied by additional categories 
bom in the process of change. Some of these categories such as the unemployed 
were an expected development of transition and transitional economies equipped 
themselves early on to protect this group. However, the complexity of changes 
went far beyond what the employment services could cope with or even ‘see’. 
Several other new categories of people in need such as some of the employed and 
some of the economically inactive have emerged though not recognised or not 
recognisable by the government. While these groups are a consequence of labour 
market distress they are nowhere close to qualifying for labour market targeting.
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Table 6.5 - Poverty incidence by labour groups
Males Fem. Age Age Urban Rural Cent. South West North East Total Obs. 
14-24 25-55
Employment 
Total employment 0.28 0.27 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.31 0.22 0.64 0.29 0.07 0.25 0.28 2925
Total employees 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.28 0.21 0.65 0.30 0.08 0.23 0.26 2303
State employees 0.26 0.28 0.32 0.27 0.26 0.29 0.20 0.65 0.29 0.08 0.26 0.27 1669
Private employees 0.24 0.15 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.13 0.22 0.57 0.23 0.11 0.18 0.21 215
Paid employees 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.24 0.20 0.61 0.22 0.04 0.21 0.22 1265
Non paid employees 0.32 0.32 0.34 0.32 0.34 0.31 0.23 0.68 0.39 0.12 0.26 0.32 1054
Full-time employees 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.27 0.21 0.67 0.33 0.07 0.22 0.26 1457
Part-time employees 0.28 0.26 0.29 0.27 0.25 0.29 0.20 0.61 0.26 0.09 0.26 0.27 866
Total self-employed 0.35 0.29 0.34 0.31 0.23 0.41 0.30 0.61 0.22 0.03 0.32 0.32 622
Owners of ent. self-employed 0.40 0.30 0.40 0.35 0.17 0.46 0.48 0.62 0.11 0.00 0.43 0.36 241
Other self-employed 0.32 0.28 0.32 0.28 0.26 0.35 0.16 0.61 0.31 0.05 0.24 0.30 381
Unemployment
U1 - Wish to work (not employed) 0.42 0.39 0.43 0.40 0.37 0.44 0.26 0.73 0.43 0.11 0.42 0.41 608
U2 - Job seeker (self-evaluation) 0.45 0.44 0.46 0.43 0.43 0.46 0.26 0.73 0.43 0.17 0.47 0.45 420
U3 - Job seeker past 30 days or registered 0.45 0.38 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.41 0.25 0.68 0.48 0.15 0.46 0.41 365
U4 - Job seeker past 30 days at employment centres 0.45 0.37 0.36 0.44 0.36 0.44 0.29 0.69 0.48 0.14 0.45 0.41 198
U5 - Job seeker past 7 days 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.42 0.37 0.30 0.76 0.41 0.26 0.36 0.40 139
U6 - Registered unemployed 0.45 0.44 0.38 0.47 0.37 0.50 0.15 0.69 0.58 0.24 0.45 0.45 101
U7 - Registered unemployed on benefits 0.50 0.44 0.42 0.48 0.38 0.50 0.00 0.60 0.77 0.13 0.44 0.46 39
Economically inactive
Students 0.39 0.28 0.34 0.25 0.32 0.36 0.19 0.68 0.35 0.03 0.28 0.34 306
Disabled or ill 0.55 0.34 0.64 0.42 0.38 0.50 0.20 0.75 0.71 0.09 0.40 0.44 72
Pensioners 0.35 0.34 0.36 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.28 0.66 0.41 0.10 0.27 0.34 784
Housekeepers or maternity leave 0.43 0.47 0.42 0.35 0.52 0.37 0.82 0.23 0.05 0.42 0.43 224
Discouraged unemployed 0.42 0.53 0.54 0.39 0.38 0.52 0.40 0.80 0.36 0.06 0.36 0.47 165
Other 0.36 0.39 0.36 0.44 0.33 0.41 0.35 0.62 0.54 0.12 0.28 0.38 431
Chidren (<14) 
Total
0.42
0.35
0.41
0.34 0.39 0.30
0.33
0.30
0.47
0.39
0.30
0.27
0.75
0.69
0.44
0.38
0.13
0.09
0.38
0.46
0.41
0.35
1904
Total observations 3445 3758 3322 2897 3554 3668 1372 1475 997 1442 1936 7222
Source: 1996 KLSMS
5. The future of labour
5.1. From transition to development
In Soviet times, the enterprise had the double function of production unit and 
dispenser of community services. Though the source of subsidy was the same, the 
enterprise accounting recognised this dichotomy and maintained the two sectors 
separate in the spirit of the material and non-material macroeconomic distinction. 
As the nature of the economic decline has been centred around the malfunctioning 
of the enterprise, the direct consequence of the production decline has been 
reflected on both the production and material side, including the provision to 
workers in terms of wages and benefits, and on the social services and non­
material side in terms of the provision of social services to the community. This 
two-sided consequence of the recession occurred in concomitance hitting 
households from the two ends of income and social provision.
By definition, the process of transition implied the privatisation of enterprises and 
with it the transfer of social services to local administrations. However, local 
administrations financing had to rely forcibly on levies from enterprises so that 
whether this transfer of responsibilities occurred or not the fate of social provision 
remained irremediably linked with the fate and health of enterprises. In other 
words, the state of enterprises has been and still is to a large extent closely 
associated with household welfare.
The continuing decline in enterprises’ production has been substituted in time 
with alternative forms of production most visible in the self-employment sphere 
and the trade and catering sector. This phenomenon emerged as a necessity for 
households to escape the negative cycle affecting enterprises, to cope with 
transitional changes and to preserve a subsistence minimum standard of living. 
While this phenomenon may have contributed to limiting somehow poverty 
growth, it also represents an ‘informalisation’ of the economy that keeps scarce 
resources away from the reach of the state and undermines long-term growth
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potential by constraining valuable human capital in low productivity and value 
added activities. Hence, a severe decline of government revenues and a growing 
incapacity of the state to face its new responsibilities in terms of social assistance 
and social protection.
In such an environment, the real losers and the new poor may be found not only in 
traditional ‘pools’ such as the less educated, the unemployed, the old or those 
employed in the informal sector, but also in new ‘pools’ such as among the 
formally employed, new labour market entrants or people in prime working age. 
This aspect complicates the task of the state in identifying those at risk of severe 
poverty and destitution, potentially reducing further the impact that the state may 
have in its social protection policies.
5.2. From labour market policies to social protection strategies
Despite the diversity between CEE and CIS countries in labour market experience 
depicted throughout this work, Kazakhstan took a very similar approach to labour 
market policies to what the OECD and CEE experiences had to offer. With little 
resources, ES did their best managing to assist somehow all the registered 
unemployed. Unemployment benefits, re-training and public works reach all but 
only the registered unemployed. They reach only a small proportion of the total 
unemployed and do not reach the economically inactive in need of a job. They do 
not reach those people formally employed but with no or little income and work.
If we put LMP in relation to the different current conditions which Kazakhstan 
faces vis-a-vis CEE countries, it is clear that LMP can do little either to put people 
back into work or to alleviate poverty. LMP in Kazakhstan failed on the fronts of 
unemployment reduction and income maintenance for different reasons. 
Unemployment reduction is arduous if structural conditions and enterprise 
conditions do not improve while income maintenance is caught in between the 
growth of unemployment and the reduction of enterprises' contributions to the 
employment fund.
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This raises the question of whether Kazakhstan made the right choice by 
abandoning demand side LMP such as subsidies to enterprises for specific 
purposes, job creation and job losses prevention measures. For some of the CEE 
countries where macro and micro economic conditions allowed for enterprise 
restructuring and the growth of a new private sector, the management of the 
unemployed may be better achieved outside enterprises in order to facilitate 
restructuring and labour reallocation as early transition models foresaw. But in a 
CIS environment, where financial resources have been depleted by long lasting 
hyperinflation, where the disruption and disorganisation of production have been 
larger and the recession deeper and where the social cost has been higher, LMP 
focused on the supply side may not be the best tactic.
Maintaining a worker in an enterprise rather than in redundancy can satisfy 
different objectives. Even if the worker is paid only occasionally the latter could 
benefit from some services still provided by enterprises. Taking these into 
account, income can hardly be below the current level of unemployment benefits. 
The training provided to the unemployed can simply be provided on the job, 
increasing the chances of matching the worker with enterprises' needs and giving 
to the same enterprise the necessary confidence in the worker's abilities. Also 
public works' funds, if shifted to the enterprise, could better serve the community 
by focusing on supporting units of production rather than the general public. At 
the same time, social inclusion is guaranteed given that all workers would face the 
same destiny and that the social fabric would be maintained. Moreover, 
discrimination would not occur between those who are currently formally 
employed but with no income or work and the registered unemployed while the 
number of non-registered unemployed would be reduced.
In April 1999, the Government of Kazakhstan introduced major reforms in the 
area of social protection. The new system now includes a Social Assistance 
Programme (SAP) managed by local authorities and meant to alleviate poverty 
and a Special State Allowance (SSA) programme administered by the central
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authorities meant to support persons with special needs. Until 1998, there were 47 
special categories of people such as war veterans and disabled entitled to a range 
of 202 different types of special discounts such as discounts on telephone use or 
transportation. The new system reduced the categories to 14 and replaced most 
discounts with a single cash allowance.
Labour market policies fall under the SAP. In the new scheme, employment 
centres are privatised and supposed to become self-supported entities by selling 
their services to the enterprises and by managing government funded 
programmes. The employment fund and unemployment benefits have been 
abolished while a new single social tax (21% of wage bill) should finance active 
labour market policies, including public works and training. A wage subsidy 
program for employers contributing to the public works schemes is also part of 
the new programme.
This new direction in social protection seems to recognise that labour market 
policies meant little on their own. The unemployed and labour market policies are 
no longer special categories managed independently but they are now part of an 
integrated social protection strategy. While the new system already showed poor 
applicability especially in relation to the establishment of independent exchange 
offices, the underlying strategy seems appropriate. The poor become the priority 
for social protection and labour market policies become one of the instruments to 
alleviate poverty. This is also the direction supported by international donors such 
as the World Bank and perhaps the only feasible approach given the poor and still 
declining government revenues.
5.3 From adjustment to recovery
The government of Kazakhstan is beginning to adjust to a new scenario of poverty 
and development unimaginable only a few years ago. The first painful but 
important step to take in order to think anew about how to move from the current 
long-lasting adjustment phase into a recovery phase is in fact to recognise that the
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country finds now itself in an early stage of economic and industrial development. 
The current industrial system is a shadow of what used to be and the memory of 
what used to be is of little help in devising a modem industrial system.
In many ways, the current situation in Kazakhstan resembles European countries 
in the post-war years. European economies were emerging from a large output fall 
determined by the war and faced the need to reconvert the industrial apparatus 
from a war type to a market type. This is rather similar to converting the industrial 
structure from a planned to a market economy. European countries also 
experienced a breakdown of industrial and trade relations with other economies 
due to the war that badly affected production. This seems also similar to what 
Kazakhstan experienced soon after independence with the breakdown of relations 
between Soviet enterprises.
What is less clear is why a similar situation has been confronted with radical 
different means. Privatising large state owned companies immediately after the 
war or cutting subsidies to private enterprises would have seemed a rather strange 
approach to converting these same companies from producing tanks to producing 
tractors. Prices of basic food commodities (at least in the formal economy) were 
indeed regulated and subsidised to prevent major forms of destitution from 
emerging during a period when problems related to production and distribution 
were not yet solved. After the war, European countries established first a 
provisional government and then quickly set-up large state organisations in charge 
of determining the industrial priorities and channelling the Marshall plan and 
other funds into industry and infrastructures accordingly.
The fact that privatisation is an essential instrument to boost productivity in 
contemporary Europe says little about contemporary Kazakhstan. The government 
of Kazakhstan, that for a long time limited its vision of industrial development on 
the oil industry now seems to recognise that the solution to poverty and 
unemployment will not be found, at least in the medium term, in the oil industry. 
The experiences of Nigeria and Venezuela above all have shown that there is a lot
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more to fighting poverty and industrial development than oil revenues. The real 
issue still to be seriously tackled remains the identification of a clear industrial 
development strategy in branches that can potentially absorb large quantities of 
labour and that are likely to transfer growth onto other branches such as light 
industry and manufacturing.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
In the course of this work three concomitant processes of change have been 
explored. The first is the process of transition defined as a standard set of 
economic reforms thought necessary to move from a planned or command 
economy to a market economy. This standard set of reforms was identified with 
price liberalisation, trade and exchange rate liberalisation, establishment of 
property rights, privatisation, establishment of market financial institutions and 
macroeconomic stabilisation policies. The second process of change analysed in 
this work has been the deep recession that characterised the early years of the 
transition period. Though linked to the process of transition, the relationship with 
the latter is complex and articulated and, as it was the case for the recession in the 
1930s in countries such as the United States and Germany, the 1990s recession in 
the Post-Soviet economies is both historically unique and of outstanding 
proportions. The third process of change explored is the process of change of the 
labour market. This is seen as a consequence of the combination of the two named 
processes of transition and recession and, at the same time, as one field where to 
seek causes that may contribute to explain the prolonged stagnation in which most 
post-Soviet economies found themselves in starting from 1995.
The main aim of the thesis was to contribute to explaining how the supply of 
labour in the post-Soviet economies has changed and how these changes can 
explain the peculiar pattern of labour reallocation between sectors defined in 
terms of ownership (state, private or self-employment). As labour market changes 
have been perceived mainly as a consequence of the macroeconomic changes 
occurred, it was felt necessary to start the story from these macroeconomic 
changes and see how transitional reforms and the crisis of the enterprise have 
filtered down affecting households and eventually labour supply. Changes in 
labour supply have been, in turn, studied as possible factors that can contribute to 
explain the difficult transition to recovery.
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Chapter 1 introduced the work by drawing a parallel between CEE and CIS 
countries. It has been shown that, roughly speaking, the two blocks of countries 
have followed different paths in terms of growth idealised in the U-shaped and L- 
shaped output developments. The recession in the CEE countries has been shorter 
and less deep that the one observed in the CIS countries. The relationship between 
the decline in output and the decline in employment has also been very different 
with the CEE countries experiencing a decline in output proportional to the 
decline in employment. On the contrary, the steeper decline in output in the CIS 
has not been reflected in a proportional decline in employment determining a deep 
fall in productivity. In fact, adjustments in the labour market appear to be different 
looking at a range of different issues such as the number of those who register at 
employment offices or the reallocation of labour between economic sectors.
After the first few years of transition, it was argued that CIS countries had been 
slow reformers and that if countries were compared adjusting the state of 
advancement of reforms the two blocks of countries would show a very similar 
path in output development. As shown in chapter 1, this same argument no longer 
stands looking at the second half of the 1990s when reforms in the CIS have been 
pushed through and output did not show any significant sign of recovery. In fact, 
in some areas such as macroeconomic stabilisation, the CIS economies 
outperformed their CEE neighbours. The pace of advancement of reforms seems 
no longer a leading candidate to explain the difference between the CEE and CIS 
performances.
One of the evident and most remarkable aspects of labour market changes in 
many CIS countries has been a steep rise in self-employment. This phenomenon 
has been little studied in the economic literature of transition despite its magnitude 
mainly because the focus of attention, especially in early transitional models, has 
been the enterprise and the bargaining process for wage determination occurring 
within enterprises between owners, management and workers. Answers to 
questions arising from issues such as the reallocation of labour, enterprise
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restructuring and the growth of unemployment were sought in the dynamics 
explaining such bargaining process. In chapter 1, it was suggested that exploring 
self-employment, thus shifting the attention outside enterprises, could add useful 
elements to the understanding of the labour market in transition.
In chapter 2, a framework of analysis making use of self-employment was offered. 
In such framework a number of critical aspects have been emphasised. First, it 
was shown how the depth of the recession can be instrumental in determining the 
recovery capacity of a country. The deeper the recession the more difficult is to 
re-establish growth and reach the pre-transition level of output. Second, the initial 
shock experienced by CIS countries in 1991 and 1992 has been explained mainly 
in terms of a supply shock, meaning a sudden and sharp increase in industrial 
input prices due to price liberalisation. This occurred in parallel with disruptions 
in industrial supply of intermediate goods caused by the break-up of the Soviet 
Union’s system of exchanges. The recession eventually affected the demand side 
of the economy hitting households on different grounds including loss of savings, 
steep fall in real wages and decline in public services’ provision.
During the adjustment phase, while the government remains mainly concerned 
with stabilisation measures, enterprises and households continue to face major 
difficulties. Enterprises are being privatised but not restructured partly because 
management and control is diluted among a multitude of co-owners and partly 
because of insiders’ resistance to change, but mostly because restructuring 
requires a substantial injection of capital which is simply not available (the credit 
crunch argument). There are no private savings in the financial system (or where 
these exist are invested abroad), FDIs focus on few strategic sectors such as oil 
and gas, the government is applying hard budget constraint policies preventing 
enterprises from accessing soft loans, and commercial banks rely on the central 
bank for borrowing capital. Therefore, there is very little liquidity in the system 
and this does not reach enterprises for the purpose of restructuring.
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Throughout the adjustment phase, wages in the state sector continue to decline 
relatively to other sectors. At one point, the average income package that state 
enterprises are able to offer to workers becomes equal or smaller than what the 
private or self-employment sectors have to offer. At this stage, many workers will 
be encouraged to leave state employment and try their fortune elsewhere. 
Unemployment may be taken up as a temporary condition but the level of benefits 
is insufficient for basic needs. Employment in the private sector is constrained to 
few areas and economic sectors and access is rationed. As a consequence, for 
many workers, inventing their own job and becoming self-employed becomes an 
attractive alternative.
With enterprises declining irreversibly, whether state or privatised, and with the 
decline in private savings and public provision, households had to reorganise 
themselves to cope with the crisis. By doing so, the supply of labour had to 
change and this, in turn, contributed in determining the peculiar reallocation of 
labour observed. The labour supply model presented in chapter 2 depicts the main 
dynamics thought to explain the reallocation of labour in a context where self- 
employment has been growing steadily.
The labour supply model sees three working sectors -  state, private and self- 
employment -  and two non-working sectors -  unemployment and economic 
inactivity. Each sector is perceived as a possible choice for workers with its own 
rewards and constraints. A clear hierarchy between sectors is not established a 
priori and workers value each sector according to the potential total income that 
may accrue to them at the end of the month and according to non-income factors 
such as location and household attributes. Sector participation is the result of a 
combination of rationing (employers’ screening and local opportunities) and 
preference (expected income and household needs) factors. By formalising the 
labour supply model in this way, two elements are emphasised. The first is that 
potential income, meaning the total pay package that workers expect from each 
sector, is what is thought to matter for workers as opposed to the formal or 
contractual wage that each sector may be offering on the market. The second
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element is that non-income factors are brought into the model on the same plan as 
income factors. That is because it is expected that, in times of transition and 
recession, changes occurring in households and local labour markets affect the 
supply of labour significantly.
The persistence of such scenario where self-employment grows both as a workers’ 
choice and ‘by default’ can potentially lead to a situation of a developing type 
with large portion of the population employed in informal, illegal and subsistence 
activities. If this occurs, then the transition from the adjustment phase to the 
recovery phase is no longer a matter of pushing transitional reforms through but it 
becomes an issue of economic development with problems similar to what -  say - 
poor Latin American economies have been struggling with during the past fifty 
years. Hence, a clear change in policies and approach to the study of CIS 
countries would be needed.
Part II of the thesis turned to verify some of the pillars of the framework presented 
in chapter 2. The case study Kazakhstan is taken as one good example of a CIS 
economy that experienced a major recession during transitional reforms and that, 
as a result, is experiencing a sharp growth in self-employment. The time window 
1990-1996 has been selected because this is the time period when the recession 
and adjustment periods can be documented with both administrative and survey 
data.
Chapter 3 illustrated transitional reforms in Kazakhstan as they occurred between 
1990 and 1996. Three distinctive periods of reforms have been identified. The 
first period before independence in December 1991 has been characterised by 
asymmetric reforms and changes in the republics of the Soviet Union that brought 
about price disparities and the first difficulties in exchanges of goods, particularly 
after the first rounds of price liberalisation in January and April 1991. This 
rendered the supply of goods to the economy difficult and widened the already 
existing demand-supply gap typical of the Soviet economy. The second period 
between 1992 and 1993 starts with independence and a major price liberalisation
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operation in January 1992. These two concomitant events disrupted the flow of 
commodities between the now ex-republics of the union and determined a sudden 
slow down in enterprises’ production, particularly in those sectors that most relied 
on imported intermediate supplies. This period has been characterised by 
hyperinflation, output decline and monetary instability determined by the 
incapacity of the Russian central bank to keep the monetary base under control 
and coordinate monetary policies across the ex-republics. During the third period, 
between 1994 and 1996, the output decline comes to a halt and monetary 
discipline is established but no signs of a recovery towards sustained growth are 
visible (the adjustment phase).
The explanations behind the output decline in transitional economies have been 
numerous and some of these have been identified as possible causes of the output 
decline in Kazakhstan. The excessive initial reliance on Russia for transfers and 
on the Soviet Union for trade and the chronic overmanning and overcapitalisation 
in enterprises prior to the beginning of the process of transition have been 
important factors in explaining such a rapid decline in the early years. Shortage of 
liquidity and credits contributed in constraining the restructuring potential later 
on. One important aspect that perhaps has been obscured by the ‘speed of 
reforms’ debate was the actual time and sequencing of reforms. Many reforms 
seem to have gone wrong not much for the speed or even content but for the 
timing. Price liberalisation and privatisation occurred in the absence of the basic 
institutions of a state such as the judiciary and legislative branches and during a 
period of provisional and fast changing governments. The traditional control once 
guaranteed by the central party has not been replaced by democratic institutions 
and enforceable rules and regulations for a market economy. As a result, many 
economic agents, including enterprises and local administrations, have operated at 
their own will and driven by short-term self-interest during the crucial period of 
transitional reforms.
The peculiar nature and dynamics of the output decline translated into structural 
changes in the industrial apparatus. The industrial sectors at the core of the
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industrial system such as manufacturing or light industry have suffered the most. 
The Kazakhistani economy has in fact polarised towards the two tails ends of raw 
materials (oil and gas) on the one hand and consumers services (health, education 
and retail trade) on the other hand. Hence, the multiplicatory role that sectors such 
as manufacturing can play in an industrial reprisal has been seriously undermined. 
The reprisal of sectors such as oil and gas remains linked to external factors such 
as FDIs and international oil prices while it will hardly contribute to address 
employment issues. Therefore, the potential for employment generation in the 
industrial sector remains limited in the foreseeable future and workers understand 
and adapt to such scenario by finding alternatives to employment in enterprises.
Chapter 4 illustrated first the changes occurred in the labour market during the 
transition. An unprecedented population crisis including a sharp rise in mortality, 
a strong decline in birth rates and large migration flows proves that the economic 
crisis has affected deeply and with long-term consequences the population of 
Kazakhstan. Between the two censuses carried out in 1989 and 1999 respectively 
the population of Kazakhstan declined by approximately lm people while an 
estimated 8.3m people (more than half of the population) changed residency 
through emigration, immigration or internal migration between urban and rural 
areas. Historically, crises of such proportions have been observed only in times of 
wars, famines or natural disasters.
Employment declined in all sectors of the economy with one notable exception, 
trade and catering. This sector grew significantly in terms of workers witnessing a 
true reallocation of labour from other sectors of the economy. The process of 
privatisation has determined a growth of the private sector in almost all sectors of 
the economy but there is little evidence that there has been a significant growth of 
a new private sector imagined as a group of newly bom entrepreneurs who set up 
an enterprise with employees producing goods or services.
Instead, the most visible phenomenon in employment has been a sharp growth of 
self-employment. This emerged partly as a consequence of the privatisation
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process of large state distribution networks and collective organisations (shops 
sold to individual households or farm land allocated to households) and partly as a 
migration of workers from enterprise employment in various sectors of the 
economy to self-employment in the trade and catering sector. It was shown from 
survey data that this sector is largely represented by traders and service providers 
and that the value of assets of such businesses is rather small. These are small 
activities with little capital investment that generate small cash flows and little 
savings.
Underemployment is also a major phenomenon with more than 40% of the 
employees not paid and more than 15% not working at all. The general survey on 
satisfaction and expectations offered by the 1996 KLSMS showed that there is a 
high level on insecurity on the part of the employed. On the other hand, 
unemployment had reached between 11% and 13% of the labour force by 1996. 
Only one third of the unemployed were registered at the state employment offices 
while the majority of workers were seeking work by themselves. In fact, the 
resources available and the service provided by the employment services are poor. 
Unemployment benefits reach a very small part of the unemployed and their value 
shows that they cannot perform the income maintenance role they were designed 
for.
In sum, the economic crisis has been fully reflected onto the labour market. This 
is visible not only in terms of growth of unemployment but also in terms of 
migration of labour, underemployment, job insecurity and the growth of a self- 
employment sector of subsistence.
Once we turned to analyse the reallocation of labour occurred in Kazakhstan 
between 1990 and 1996, little evidence was found to support the initially expected 
trend of a reallocation from declining state enterprises in traditional sectors to 
growing private enterprises in modem sectors. The high labour turnover observed 
seems to be the outcome of high labour instability. Workers changing jobs within 
enterprises, the same workers quitting and re-entering the same enterprise,
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immigrants replacing emigrants, the creation of new entities out of old ones seem 
to be some of the possible explanations for a high labour turnover in an 
environment where almost all economic sectors declined. Also, the relationship 
between output, employment, productivity and relative wages, at least from the 
macro picture presented, seems to be very confused and certainly not in line with 
orthodox economic theory. An analysis of the major possible forms of rigidities 
in the labour market such as minimum wage, reservation wage, trade unions, and 
social contributions payable by enterprises could not explain a reduced mobility 
across sectors. In fact when people wish to move by migrating or changing status 
(becoming self-employed for instance) there seem to be no obstacles to these 
trends.
Chapter 4 concluded by raising some important questions about the true causes of 
the reallocation of labour towards self-employment and chapter 5 attempted to 
address some of these questions by comparing income and the characteristics of 
workers found in the different sectors. It was found that income in the state sector 
is lower than in other sectors while the difference in income between the private 
and self-employment sectors is much less visible. Most of the workers found in 
the private and self-employment sectors are likely to come from the state sector 
but such movement does not appear to have resulted in a selective allocation of 
workers based on personal characteristics such as age and education. Where 
workers live (urban or rural areas, rich or poor areas) and household attributes 
seem to be more important factors in differentiating workers found in the private 
and self-employment sector. The private sector also seems to ‘ration’ the 
unemployed more than the self-employment sectors.
The economically inactive pool, represented in the study by the discouraged 
unemployed and the housekeepers, also showed to possibly contribute to explain 
labour changes. The discouraged unemployed seem a very similar group to the 
unemployed. The difference between the two groups is determined by whether 
respondents were actively seeking work during the month before the survey or 
not. Obviously, many individuals seek work actively only occasionally given the
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generally poor labour market conditions and, as a consequence, the 
unemployment rate is very much affected by the ‘mood’ of these workers. Also, 
while some women in urban areas may be rationed from entering employment 
because of education, women with children are now clearly confined to 
housekeeping which it was not the case during Soviet times. Women voluntarily 
leaving employment to take up home duties has been a rather well documented 
process in most transitional economies. Flows in and out of economic inactivity 
were observed in the macro data as a constant phenomenon throughout the period 
considered and the micro survey data show that location and household attributes 
are important elements in explaining such flows.
These results conform to a scenario where the private sector is mostly a 
‘privatised sector’ with limited access and constrained growth and where self- 
employment acts as a possible alternative for many groups of people including 
those exiting the state sector, the unemployed and the economically inactive. Self- 
employment has been identified as an important safety net for workers in search 
of better opportunities, with the wish of taking control of their own welfare or just 
pushed into this sector by the lack of viable alternatives. For most of these 
workers this path seems a defensive strategy and an escape from poverty and 
destitution rather than a ‘gold rush’.
The long-term implications of such developments are uncertain. Many of the 
workers found in self-employment have professional skills that they are not using, 
thus impoverishing the human capital stock that was available at the outset of 
transition. There is little accumulation in the sector and, if savings are made, they 
are not deposited into banks given that households do not use banks. Thus, there is 
little chance for this sector to generate a process of accumulation and growth. This 
may contribute to explain why the economy can stay in the adjustment phase for 
such a long period. While unemployment may not grow indefinitely as foresaw by 
Blanchard (1997), self-employment may well grow indefinitely. That is because, 
if the current trends continue, the government’s revenues will continue to decline 
and so will the government’s capacity to provide for the unemployed pushing this
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group to seek alternatives. Given that the state sector does not restructure and 
continue to lose workers and given that the private sector is characterised by entry 
barriers and constrained growth, self-employment becomes for many the only 
option in the long run. As this sector expands, the economy moves towards 
informality, illegality, small and unorganised forms of production in selected 
sectors such as petty trade, personal services and food production.
Chapter 6 addressed some of the policy questions arising from such a prolonged 
labour market crisis and adjustment phase. Labour market policies have been 
originally designed to combat labour markets affected by significant rigidities and 
then ‘exported’ first to CEE and later to CIS countries. Although some rigidities 
may exist especially in the form of poor housing markets, the core of the 
employment problem rests with the enterprise and the current incapacity of 
industry to re-activate production. Therefore, policies aimed at targeting the 
supply side of the labour market (the unemployed) deal with the consequence and 
not the primary cause of the problem. Moreover, these policies have proved to be 
not sustainable in the long run given the growing number of unemployed and the 
declining government revenues.
If we are willing to take a broader perspective on the ‘victims’ of the transition we 
find many new pockets of poor that are not reached by labour market or social 
policies in the broad sense. Thus, in a time of severe budget constraints, the best 
strategy seems to concentrate resources on a few targets that can offer a certain 
degree of equity. Targeting the poor seems to respond to such need. Poverty is 
becoming the main social issue emerging from the process of transition and 
poverty alleviation is the new agenda of reforms. This is what the government of 
Kazakhstan is recently coming to terms with as witnessed by the fact that social 
policies are currently being re-directed towards the poor.
The first ten years of transition in Kazakhstan have resulted in a convergence 
towards a third world scenario rather than the first. Poverty alleviation and 
development strategies are progressively becoming the new jargon of policy
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making and the transition debate is leaving the ground to a development debate. It 
is no longer a question of pushing transitional reforms through but a question of 
tackling issues such as good governance, corruption, grass-root development and 
industrial strategies. These are the kind of issues amply explored in the 
development literature constructed on the experience of developing countries. 
Perhaps one of the important lessons emerged from this literature is that a process 
of development is a long-term process centred on human capital development. As 
human capital was the main comparative advantage that former Socialist 
economies had at the outset of the transition process, the loss of such capital 
entailed by the growth of self-employment is one of the obvious pressing 
problems emerging from the current stagnation.
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Appendix
The 1996 Kazakhstan Living Standards Measurement Survey (KLSMS)
The 1996 Kazakhstan Living Standards Measurement Survey (KLSMS) was 
carried out in July 1996 by the Sigma Institute of Berlin in collaboration with the 
Committee for Statistical Analysis of the Republic of Kazakhstan (CSAK) and 
under a World Bank social protection technical assistance project.
The survey followed general guidelines for World Bank LSMS surveys. It was 
administered to 1996 households and 7224 individuals. It is a sample survey, 
nationally representative and reflects the social and territorial distribution of the 
population. The key criteria to identify the sample were as follows:
Table A1 -  Survey design
Large cities Villages and 
small cities
Rural areas Total
No. o f inhabitants 6,177,000 3,072,792 7,182607 16,432,399
Portion of inhabitants 37.59 18.69 43.72 100
Number of HHs 2,130,000 883,015 1,695,262 4,708,277
Portion of HHs 45.23 18.75 36.02 100
Average quantity of HH 2.9 3.47 4.23 3.49
Number of PSU 90 38 72 200
Sampling fraction 23,666 23,545 23,545
Source: CSAK (1996c); Sampling fraction = No. of HHs/No. of interviewed areas (PSU -  
Probability Sample Unit)
The survey has three components: A community, a family and an individual 
questionnaire. All interviews were carried out using personal interviewing 
methods. The community questionnaire included five sections: Demographic 
information, economy and infrastructure, agriculture, education and health care. 
The family questionnaire included five sections: information on family, housing 
conditions, agriculture and cattle breeding, expenditures and consumption and 
income. The individual questionnaire included six sections: General data and 
migration, education, care of children, occupational status and labour, medical 
services/health assessment/women and time budget. The community questionnaire 
was discussed with members of the regional administration responsible for the
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various topics covered. The family questionnaire was discussed with the head of 
the household or with the person available more knowledgeable about the 
household. Questions for the individual questionnaire were discussed with all 
grown-ups (over 16 years old). Normally one interviewer was assigned to one 
PSU, usually comprising ten households.
Labour categories
In line with ILO recommendations, I started by counting the employed including 
the largest possible number of respondents in order to capture anyone who, during 
the 30 days before the survey, had performed any economic activity, paid or 
unpaid. The questionnaire offered several questions to identifying the employed. 
Therefore we considered employed any respondents who replied positively to any 
of the following questions:
a. Did you do any work for money or were you involved in any professional 
business during the past seven days?
b. Have you got a job or business and were you temporarily not at work during the 
past seven days?
c. Did you do any unpaid work for relatives during the past seven days?
d. Did you participate in farm activities or were you involved in selling products 
during the past seven days?
e. Are you currently employed by an enterprise, organisation, collective farm or 
cooperative (past 30 days) ?
f  Who owns the enterprise?1
1. The state
2. Public department or administration
3. Public organisation
4. Municipality
5. Workers o f the enterprise
6. Collective farm and other cooperatives
7. Private owner, private company
1 All respondents to this question were included. The reason is that more respondents replied to 
this question than those who declared to be employees. We assumed that if a respondent replied to 
the question the person is in fact employed.
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8. A foreigner
9. A foreign company
10. Other
g. Do you run your own business?
h. Did you do anything else during the past 30 days that you have not told yet and 
you were paid for? Maybe you sewed a dress, gave a lift with your car, assisted in 
house or car repairing, bought and transported food, looked after a sick person, or 
did anything else you were paid for.
From the total number of employed we then separated the employees including all 
respondents who declared to work for any entities (questions ‘g’ and ‘f )  but 
excluding those who, in a subsequent question, declared to own the enterprise 
where they work. We called this latter group ‘owners of enterprises’ and we 
included it into self-employment. State employees are those who answered 
question ‘f  with answers 1 to 4. Private employees are those who replied with 
answers 7, 8 or 9. A category called ‘members of collective organisations’ was 
created to include respondents from question T  who replied with answers 5 and 6.
‘Owners of enterprise’ includes those who replied positively to the question Are 
you the owner o f the enterprise where you mainly work?’ Single owners of 
enterprises as well as respondents who felt they owned the enterprise where they 
work maybe because they own shares are included in this category. In any case, it 
was felt important to distinguish this category from the employees because of ILO 
recommendations and because when it comes to measuring income those who 
declared to own the enterprise where they work are likely to either set their own 
income or participate in the income setting process.
Question ‘g’ allowed identifying the ‘business owners’. A set of further questions 
allowed subdividing the business owners into four categories; traders, goods 
producers, services providers and others. Question ‘h’ identified a group that we 
called ‘other services providers’. Both categories were included into the self- 
employed. From the total number of employed initially counted we subtracted the
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employees, the owners of enterprises, the business owners and the other services 
providers. We obtained a residual of 125 observations. These were cross-tabulated 
with questions ‘a’ to ‘d’ so that four more categories were created as ‘other 
professionals’ (a), ‘other employed not at work’ (b), ‘other unpaid work’ (c) and 
‘others farming or trading’ (d). Other professionals were so labelled because 
having replied positively to question ‘a’ they did not reply to any of the questions 
on the employees. Therefore this group may capture professionals or self- 
employed which the questionnaire does not identify with other questions. These 
last four categories were all included into self-employment. Technically ‘other 
employed not at work’ could be either employees or self-employed and we could 
not distinguish between the two. However, the group contains only 11 
observations and we decided to include it into the self-employed together with a 
final residual of seven observations not classifiable. In conclusion, we created 15 
employment categories 2 for the employees 1 for the members of collective 
organisations and 12 for the self-employed.
The above categorisation was used in chapters 4 and 6 while in chapter 5 the self- 
employment category was reduced to the goods producers, traders and services 
providers for comparative purposes while the members of collective organisations 
were not included into the analysis as this sector is not a product of the transition 
process but heritage of the Soviet system, therefore beyond the issues tackled in 
the chapter. This means that farmers are not included because most farmers are 
still part of some form of collective organisation necessary to manage collective 
assets that could not be given to individual households in the course of 
privatisation such as large pieces of land or heavy machinery.
244
Variables
The discussion on income measurement was provided in the text as well as some 
of the descriptive statistics for the variables used. Below a description for each 
variable is given.
Formal wage: This is derived from question d_019 of the occupation section of 
the questionnaire. The question is ‘What is your official salary at the main 
workplace?’ and it was addressed to all employees. Answers were provided in 
tenge and are relative to the month before the interview.
Income: This is derived from question d_124 of the occupation section of the 
questionnaire. The question is: ‘How much money did you get during the last 30 
days including salary, bonus, profit, pension, allowance, occasional earnings and 
other money income (including in hard currency, but converted the latter into 
tenge)?'" The question is the only question on income that was addressed to all the 
employed as well as to the pensioners.
Income per hour: This is income as described above divided by the number of 
hours spent at work as reported by all respondents in the time budget section of 
the questionnaire. The question in the time budget section was: ‘How much time 
did you work excluding time to go to your job place, the way back and lunch 
breaks during the last 7 days?" The question was addressed to all adult 
respondents who declared to work in the specific question addressed in the time 
budget section. Answers were given in hours and have been multiplied by a factor 
of 4.3 to obtain the average number of hours worked per month.
Age (years): This was calculated as a difference between the date of birth of the 
respondent and the date of the questionnaire. Date of birth was provided in the 
general data/migration section of the questionnaire.
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Education (years): This comes from the education section of the questionnaire. It 
is the sum of the answers to the following two questions: 1. How many forms did 
you finish at school?; 2. How many years were you training after school? By 
school it is meant the compulsory primary cycle and by training it is meant 
vocational, secondary and higher education.
Regional employment rate: This is calculated as the number of employed divided 
by the labour force (employed plus unemployed) per region (oblast). How the 
employed were calculated is described in the section above on labour categories. 
How the unemployed were calculated is described in the text, chapter 4, section 
2.5 ‘Unemployment’.
Regional average annual consumption per capita: Household annual consumption 
per capita is a variable constructed from the expenditure section of the 
questionnaire by Kinnon Scott at the World Bank in Washington and kindly 
provided to me. Regional average annual consumption per capita is simply the 
average of this variable by region. This is meant to represent regional welfare.
Logarithm o f household annual consumption: This is the natural logarithm of the 
household annual consumption variable also provided by Kinnon Scott at the 
World Bank and constructed from the expenditure section of the questionnaire.
Household number o f children: This is the number of children in each household 
aged 13 or less.
Dummies: ‘Women’, ‘urban’, ‘age 14-25’, ‘head of household’ and ‘household 
owns a car’ are all dummies.
Table A2 shows average, standard deviations, minimum and maximum values and 
information on how the variables were constructed for all variables used in chapter
5.
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Table A2 - Chapter 5 variables
variable Obs. Mean Stand.
deviat.
Min Max Construction
formal wage (all 2495 5006 4572 0 65000
employees respondents)
income (all employed 2766 4571 8215 0 200500
respondents)
women 7203 .5217271 .4995624 0 1
age (years) 7224 30.03638 20.02608 0 96.39425
age squared/100 7224 13.03172 15.04409 0 92.91851
age 14-25 7224 .231866 .4220531 0 1
education (years) 7224 7.628738 5.680913 0 20
urban 7224 .4919712 .4999701 0 1
regional employment 7224 59.84189 7.280243 46.808 74.71265 E/WAP* 100
rate 51 by region
regional average annual 7224 54.28233 14.83749 29.823 82.23235 Regional
consumption/capita 36 mean of In of 
yradjpc
head of household 7224 .2763012 .4471985 0 1
household number of 7224 1.204457 1.157356 0 7
children
In household annual 7222 10.68772 .6615027 7.7006 13.185 Ln of
consumption 55 household
annual
consumption
household owns a car 7224 .2257752 .4181207 0 1
E = Employed
WAP= Population in age 14-60 or employed
yradjpc = yearly consumption per capita adjusted with regional price indexes (variable provided by 
the World Bank)
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